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1. Introduction 
 
From Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Fillon calling for a renegotiation of the Schengen agrement  
or arguing that ‘Brexit’ criticism of the EU is justified1, to CSU leadership praising AFD voters2, 
and from David Cameron being pressed into offering a ‘Brexit’ referendum, to Federica 
Mogherini stating that recent election results show ‘there is a need to rethink the EU project’3, 
there is growing evidence that Europe’s moderate and hitherto pro-Integration political 
establishment is feeling ever more pressure from the Eurosceptic wave that is sweeping the 
continent. The process of European Integration is facing an unprecedented degree of challenge 
and contestation as successful Eurosceptic and fringe party mobilization are calling the project of 
„ever closer union‟ into question. This dissertation investigates in what ways Eurosceptic policy 
entrepreneurs are able to influence traditional and mainstream politics in Western Europe. 
While it is already taken for granted that the EU’s traditional permissive consensus4 has 
been replaced by a „constraining dissensus‟, it is still an open question how Europe’s party 
systems will react to growing distrust towards the EU and the growing appeal of Eurosceptic 
parties. The central research question of this dissertation is thus “Does the electoral success of 
Eurosceptic Parties force other political parties in their countries to change their position on the 
issue of European Integration?”5  
Do Europe’s mainstream parties maintain their standard discourse and policy positions 
unaltered, or are they forced to qualify their typical pro-integration stances when Eurosceptic 
challengers are successful at the ballot box? If such adjustments in policy positions occur, what 
lies behind them? Are some parties or party systems more susceptible to Eurosceptic 
„Contagion‟ than others? These are just some of the timely questions that are tackled in this 
study. While tentative steps have been made in the past at theorizing the effects of populist 
parties from the Europeanization perspective, the topic has until very recently remained severely 
underdeveloped and understudied.  
                                                 
1 Sarkozy, 2014; Sarkozy, 2016, Fillon, 2016 
2 Seehofer, 2014; Gauweiler, 2013 
3 Mogherini, 2015 
4 Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970 
5 In the context of this project, ‘position’ refers to the general positions of the leaderships of political parties on the 
question of European Integration at the moments in time in which the data employed in this study were collected.  
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„Hard, but hardly relevant‟. That is how Kris Deschouwer and Martine van Assche 
described Eurosceptic parties as recently as 2008 (Deschouwer and Van Assche 2008). 
Statements of this kind in the academic state of the art suggest that Eurosceptic Parties are not in 
a position to influence European politics. While debates about the EU and Europeanization have 
created, in the words of Mudde (2012, 196), a cottage industry of Integration and Euroscepticism 
studies, the jury is still out on whether Eurosceptic parties influence their more mainstream 
competitors (and party systems generally). Despite some contention over the influence that the 
EU issue can exert in national party systems, this dissertation argues and shows that 
Eurosceptic parties actually manage to influence mainstream competitors, forcing them to 
qualify their traditional pro-European stance, even in a eurosceptic direction. The idea that 
populist and challenger parties can influence an existing political ecology and determine it to co-
opt elements of their discourse or position is well established in the field of party politics, and a 
wealth of previous work has explored how such phenomena occurs on related policy questions, 
usually associated with traditional populist themes. Oddly enough, this type of research question 
has traditionally not been applied to the question of European Integration, and only very recently 
has research begun to give the issue its due attention. Some views that dismissed the potential of 
the Eurosceptic ‘Threat’(Mair, 2000, 2007; Green-Pedersen, 2012) were founded on the 
assumptions that mainstream parties can control the politicization of the EU issue, or that 
Eurosceptic parties cannot be initiators of change but merely react to developments in the arena 
of party competition. Using inferences from proximity theory (Downs, 1957) and salience theory 
(Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996) and employing a variation of the past election model 
(see Budge, 1994), I argue and show that Eurosceptic parties can influence their national party 
systems and ‘pull’ them in the direction of their policy preferences, provided they are successful 
enough at the ballot box. This occurs as a consequence of dynamics inherent to party competition 
wherein political parties attempt to gain votes or alleviate vote loss by responding to changing 
public preferences. While previous work in the state of the art have already contributed to 
expanding our understanding of the changing landscape of European and Western Politics, or the 
evolution of social cleavages that facilitate said landscape changes (Hooghe and Marks’ 
Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration, Kriesi et al’s New Cleavage Hypothesis, Cas 
Mudde’s Populist Zeitgeist) it has tended to take a wider, ‘bigger picture’ perspective of change 
in European Politics. The present work, however, more narrowly focuses on the behavior of 
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political parties in their attempts to imitate, or oppose, the policy positions and agendas of their 
rivals in the electoral race, offering a more ‘micro-level’ investigation of political change in 
Europe, as well as a corresponding theoretical contribution. By presenting empirical proof that 
Eurocritical fringe parties can influence mainstream parties and their national party systems more 
generally, it brings additional support to what De Vries (2007) termed the ‘Radical Party 
Hypothesis’, and contributes both to the literature describing mainstream adaptation to populist 
success (Harmel and Svåsand 1997, Meguid 2005, Van Spanje 2010, Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen 2014) as well as that describing party positional shifts as a reply to electoral 
performance (Budge 1994, Somer-Topcu 2009). 
Despite a wealthy literature on the Europeanization of national politics, and a plethora of 
studies that have investigated how political parties adapt to populist success in other policy 
fields, there are views that Euroscepticism dosen’t actually matter, as referenced above. Even 
when the potential danger of Eurosceptic centrifugal forces for the process of European 
Integration was hypothesized (Bartolini, 2006, 2008), attempts to close the empirical gap have 
been inconsistent, few and in-between and focusing on single countries or moments in time 
(Baker et al 2008, Quaglia 2008, Van de Wardt 2014). This project thus contributes to the 
closure of the said empirical gap, and therein lays its main empirical contribution.  
The dissertation brings together the specific literature on Europeanization and European 
Integration with more general theories of political party competition, Downsian proximity theory 
being the central one employed here. An information-via-elections model (similar to Budge’s 
Past Election model) underlies the causal mechanism at the heart of this project. According to it, 
voters give their votes to those parties whose policy positions lie closest to their own, and 
political parties try to establish policy positions that lie closer to the preferred position of voters 
than their competitors do in order to gain the all-valuable vote. Election results and changing 
support for various parties communicates to political actors important information about the 
distribution of voter preferences on various issues (attitudes and position on EU integration is 
one of them). When parties lose votes and register worse election results, they gather that their 
policy position is less attractive to the public than those of their competitors, and will adjust their 
policy proposals accordingly. The inference is that when Eurosceptic Parties register growing 
support among the electorate and attract voters from parties at the political center, the latter 
might deduce on the basis of electoral results and declining public support that they need to shift 
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their own policy positions in a direction that brings them closer to populist parties in order to 
stem voter defection. That inference and hypothesis is tested in this project in a cross-temporal, 
cross-national manner, and in exploring how political competition unfolds along the ‘vertical’ 
EU issue dimension, contributes to Hooghe and Marks’ Postfunctionalist research agenda. The 
aforementioned perspective argues that Europe has entered a new, post-functionalist, phase of 
Integration Politics in which hard, economic considerations are being replaced with soft, 
ideational, cultural factors as the determinants of the speed of European Integration, and in which 
populist Eurosceptic parties manage to politicize and mobilize the issue of European Integration 
to such an extent that it can no longer be ignored by traditional parties (Hooghe and Marks, 
2009). The airwaves now abound with discussions about the present limits of and challenges to 
European Integration. The Euro crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, and growing support for 
populist parties have all worked to amplify debates and dissent within Europe among its 
members, within and across national borders. Opposition to the European community is at an all-
time high. Questions about regional integration – and opposition to it –have acquired an 
importance that transcends the academic realm. 
 
Why Eurosceptic Contagion Merits Exploration 
 
Despite occasional hiccups (such as the empty chairs’ crisis, national EU referenda rejections, 
treaty opt-outs), European Integration has always seemed to run a somewhat steady course. 
Various reforms or events (the evolution from European Coal and Steel Community, via the 
European Economic Community, into EU, the adoption of a common currency, the enlargements 
into Central and Eastern Europe) have strengthened the impression over time that the Process of 
European Integration was set thoroughly on its tracks. This has now changed. The EU’s way of 
working, its logic, and purpose are being called into question. The Eurosceptic wave has become 
almost a normal and mundane element of daily political life, any article in the media that tackles 
elections in European Polities or the financial crisis make reference to Eurosceptic populism, and 
the challenge it constitutes. Political actors with the expressed desire to not only roll back the 
EU, but even withdraw their countries from it are leading in the polls in various member states. 
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This June witnessed the first secession from the block when British citizens voted to leave the 
EU. 
In the realm of comparative politics, the EU (as well as the general process of European 
Integration) was often referred to as having a Sui Generis character. No other regional or 
transnational integration project has ever gone as far or has been as ambitious as the EC/EU in 
depth and breadth. It is popular to compare European Integration to a bicycle. The presumption 
behind such allegory was that if it does not advance or move forward, it will stall and then fall to 
the ground. Should EU policies or Integration be reversed, the suboptimal character of the 
current institutional set-up and centrifugal forces would tear it apart. The EU had never really 
experienced serious or sustained roll-back of Integration. While the speed of Integration has 
indeed varied across decades, there always seemed to have been a tacit understanding among 
policy and decision makers (in the European Community) that even if there are minor bumps 
here and there, these would be short lived, and that the journey towards „ever closer union‟ 
would resume its course. Not only was the EU compared to a bicycle, its sui generis character 
meant that it was the only ‘bicycle’ in town, it being unclear whether this sole ‘bicycle’ could be 
brought back up if it ever should stall and fall. Such a stalling of the process was hard to imagine 
because it was for a long time unclear what could force the hand of politicians away from the 
integrative stance. It has been something of a taken for granted idea that the politicians who 
occupy the political center tend to be rather pro-European, more so than politicians from the 
fringes of the political spectrum, and even more than the electorate (De Wilde and Zurn, 2012; 
Mair and Thomassen, 2010). By extension, it has been equally taken for granted that mainstream 
centrist parties lacked a good incentive to move away from such policy preferences towards the 
EC/EU and be more responsive to the more euro-cautious public. Such incentives might now 
present themselves in the form of the success of Eurosceptic Parties. Due to their ever-growing 
success and visibility, they are offering those voters that are discontent with Integration (and 
have more Eurosceptic views than traditional parties) an outlet and electoral alternative that was 
previously not present, or as readily available. The result is a net loss of votes for mainstream 
political actors which are forced to respond somehow. These developments are possible because 
there is base for such political discourse among the public and electorate. There is growing 
discontent towards Europe and growing Integration fatigue among the electorate, and arguments 
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have been made that such mainstream policy shifts would not take place in the absence of 
Eurosceptic party pressure, even if the electorate at large reflects such views (De Vries, 2007).  
For a variety of reasons, ranging from historical to social ones, support for populist 
Eurosceptic parties was weaker in the pre-Maastricht era than today, and opposition to 
integration was itself less of a politically salient issue. Previously parties opposed to European 
Integration (calling either for a fundamental reform of the entire process, of the treaties, or even 
outright roll-back of integration) never managed to make a consistent assault on the pro-
European center of the political spectrum. The past two decades have shown us how this can 
change. According to Hobolt (2014, 1434), citizens in Europe have been becoming increasingly 
aware of the euro crisis and have become more likely to hold the European Union rather than 
their national governments accountable for various problems in their polities. Treib (2014, 1552) 
concludes that the potential for Eurosceptic support, for the proportion of voters declaring 
support for Eurosceptic parties may not have reached its peak and grow further over the coming 
electoral cycles, while others (De Wilde and Zurn 2012) suggest that the current trend of 
politicization of the integration issue is well past the point at which it can be reversed. 
One might think that the last bastion of pro-European sentiment lies with the politicians 
of Europe’s traditionally pro-European centrist parties. Declarations by various European 
politicians, a few of which were presented in the opening of this monograph, hint that they too 
are feeling the pressure of public apprehension with European Integration. As this project shows, 
there is mounting evidence that even they are starting to qualify their original pro-European 
positions in the face of growing public weariness with European Integration and Eurosceptic 
success.  
 
The Growth of Euroscepticism: Popular Discontent, Mainstream Immobilism and 
Populist Pragmatism 
 
Since the late 80’s enthusiasm surrounding the Maastricht treaty and honeymoon phase of ‘Ever 
Closer Union’, populism in Europe has come a long way. Populist political parties and actors are 
doing better than ever, and have been steadily improving their performance over the past two 
decades. In between the last elections to the European Parliament and the most recent national 
elections, we have come to a situation wherein we are no longer talking about Eurosceptic 
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Parties merely improving their electoral showing. It has instead come to the point where we are 
discussing the possibility about those parties winning elections in some countries.  
Populist and Eurosceptic Parties have with time gone from being a ‘nuisance’ to more 
recently becoming a legitimate threat to centrist parties’ monopoly of political power. At the 
same time, there is a growing feeling that questions related to European Integration are becoming 
more contentious. If it was easier to keep away from discussing European Integration in the past, 
there is less escaping the debate now.  
While it might be easy to attribute at first hand the current climate of advancing Euro-
caution/pessimism to developments of the past half-decade, many indicators in fact show that 
public attitudes towards integration have been increasingly cold since the Maastricht days, and 
this problem has been exacerbated by the dissonance of preferences between the electorate and 
the elected. This divergence in preference was less consequential in the early days of European 
Integration leading up to, and through, the Maastricht period. Since populist parties have begun 
to reassert and re-legitimize themselves (and make increasing use of popular discontent about 
Integration), it has turned into an issue that political parties in Europe can no longer discount, 
and must instead respond to. From euro crisis, and refugee crisis to Brexit, Europe is now mired 
in a seemingly never-ending cycle of challenges, which make the ‘boring’ years of consensual 
muddling through look easy in comparison. Mainstream Parties and elites are now facing a 
national and supranational environment that has been mutating over the course of the last few 
decades. Whereas the original ECSC was largely market-centered, the transformation - through 
the EC and into the EU - has brought about integration with more implications for national 
policy and sovereignty, which were bound to make the EU more contentious as time passed. 
Compared to nowadays, the EU’s previous incarnations seemed relatively unimportant and 
benign. National budgetary contributions were small, as was a range of policy areas in which the 
EC was involved. With decisions being made by unanimous accord, „the Community‟ was seen 
as less threatening to the primacy of national states. With the end of the cold war, the Single 
European Act and then the Maastricht Treaty, the situation changed markedly. The range of 
policy areas under community control ballooned with time, as did the issues to be decided by 
majority vote. To top if off, Economic and Monetary Union became a very visible bone of 
contention, both between and within parties.  
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As European Institutions gained a bigger say in decision making, the question of Europe 
became increasingly salient, to the point where there is no hiding from it. EU issues no longer 
fall short of what Scharpf (1999, 23) refers to as „the threshold of political visibility‟. Given the 
social consequences they generate, EU policies have become much more widely perceived and 
experienced by the general public, especially since the advent of the crisis. An increase in debate, 
discussion and contestation also bring with it increased awareness of the preference gap between 
electors and the elected, between the supply and demand of policy options. Hooghe and Marks 
(2005) suggest that the once permissive consensus has turned into a constraining dissensus. 
Since the signing of Maastricht Treaty and the growing number of issue areas under EU control, 
discussions about Europe are becoming harder to evade. At the same time, more democratic 
control over EU decision making has brought political parties and the public into EU decision 
making. According to the authors, political parties are now “in”, which means that the issue of 
integration has been politicized, electorally, to a degree which marks a clear breaking point with 
the past – mainstream parties now have to accept dialogue and confrontation with rivals and 
contestants on the EU topic. The EU issue has become a matter of party politics Elites and party 
leaders in positions of authority now have to „look over their shoulders negotiating European 
Treaties‟ and „what they see does not reassure them”. (Hooghe and Marks, 2009, 5). 
As was already mentioned previously, warnings about populism and its political potential 
are not new, with Mudde’s warning of a ‘Populist Zeitgeist’ (2004) being perhaps one of the 
most sobering warnings about the ‘shallow’ ideology and its prospects for success in Europe. 
Two related phenomena have been gaining speed and worrying the continent’s political 
establishment. The first is the inescapable reality of public discussion and contestation of 
Integration, the second one is the electoral success of Eurosceptic Parties. The graph below 
shows how Eurosceptic parties have been performing over time in Western Europe, on average. 
Such parties have become the biggest single parties in some countries, and in others, they have 
won enough votes to qualify them among their countries’ biggest parties. The definition and 
operationalization of Eurosceptic Parties in this dissertation is data driven, and relies on the 
judgement of numerous national county experts who have weighed in on the policy position of 
political parties (the leaderships of political parties to be more precise) in their countries. Each 
countries’ political parties are thus placed on a scale with one end representing parties whose 
leaderships are entirely opposed to European Integration and the other represented by those 
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parties whose leaderships are very much in favor. All political parties deemed by the experts to 
be below an established ‘neutral’ mark6 are thus treated as Eurosceptic for the present purposes. 
 
Figure 1: Eurosceptic Success over the years 
 
 
EU15 Eurosceptic electoral performance: Above - Biggest Eurosceptic Parties (Mean Eurosceptic Success); Below - All 
Eurosceptic Parties (Mean Total Eurosceptic success), averaged across countries, (with confidence interval of 1,96 SD) 
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Not only have Eurosceptic Parties made impressive gains on the national arena, they gained a 
significant amount of votes at the supranational level as well. European Parliament elections 
have traditionally been regarded as second order national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Hix 
and Marsh, 2007), but public apprehension of the EU, debate, divisiveness, and even disdain for 
some, surrounding Integration has turned the question of Europe into enough of an issue to make 
it electorally decisive, even at elections for the Strasbourg plenum. In an interview for The 
Independent published before the 2014 EP elections, Anthony Giddens predicted – with 
reference to the growing support for UKIP and populist parties in other countries – that by 
colluding and aiming to present a common eurosceptic front to the Electorate, these parties are in 
an odd way helping bring about true public, integration-oriented discussion about EU-matters. 
Such parties are turning the upcoming EP elections into the first genuinely “European” elections 
ever held, because “for the first time, they are likely to be focused mainly upon transnational 
rather than local issues” (Giddens, 2014). Whereas previously, European Elections were more 
about classical themes and issues, because of their second order status, the strength and visibility 
of Eurosceptic Parties meant that the electoral campaign actually presents the citizens with 
visible questions on the constitutive nature of Europe: do you want more or less Europe?  
The results of the elections for the 8th European Parliament was painful for the centrist, 
traditionally pro-European political parties. Voters did not punish mainstream parties by 
transferring their votes to the ‘legitimate’ opposition, the government in waiting. Instead, votes 
were transferred to fringe and Eurosceptic Parties. While the winners of the most recent EP 
elections were, in absolute terms/numbers still the mainstream party groups (the Social 
Democrats, the EPP, the Liberals, the Greens), the ‘real’ winners have been the populist 
Eurosceptic parties who gained almost a third of votes. In fact, the most recent European 
elections produced a parliament of which almost a third of members reject the institution or wish 
to see its influence rolled back, as can be best seen from the bar chart in figures 2 and 3, where 
the centrist, pro-European space (EPP, S&D, Alde, Green) shrank to around 70 percent. 
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Figure 2: Changes between the 7th European Parliament (left) and 8th European Parliament  (right)7 
 
Figure 3: Changes between the 7th and 8th European Parliaments8. 
 
 
How was this possible? How were Eurosceptic Parties able to capitalize so strongly on this? In 
the literature on the EU’s so called Democratic Deficit, much has been made of the discrepancy 
between voters’ and representatives’ opinions of EU integration. There are two elements to this 
divergence. First, over time there has been a lessening of public support for European 
Integration, a trend that can be identified as having started in the early 90’s. The following 
                                                 
7 Data obtained from the website of the European Parliament : 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/20150201PVL00021/Previous-elections 
8 Eurosceptics: UKIP, 5 Star Movement, Sweden Democrats, etc 
Non-Affiliated:  Austrian FPÖ, Belgian VB, French FN, German DNP, Greek Golden Dawn, KKE,  
Lega Nord, Jobbik, Dutch PVV, etc 
European ’Conservatives’: British Conservatives, Danish People’s Party, Finns’ Party, German AfD, etc 
Radical Left: People’s Mvmt against EU, Syriza, Radical Left Parties 
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Graphs use Eurobarometer data to show public attitudes towards the EU and its institutions. As 
can be seen below, the percentage of people/respondents saying that their country’s membership 
of the EU is a good thing dropped strongly in the 1990’s, and then remained somewhat stable, 
zig-zagging between the 50 and 60 per cent areas. While that indicator remained somewhat 
stable in the 2000s, the percentage of people who said that they consider their country’s 
membership of the EU a bad thing registered a slow but steady rise, going from less than 10% in 
1992 to 20% the last time the question was asked in the Eurobarometer.  
 
Figure 4: Public Opinion of EU membership, EU-wide9 
 
 
It is not possible to measure public approval of EU membership with the same indicator after 
2011, but one interesting set of data comes from another question of the Eurobarometer, which 
started being asked in 2003, and continues to this day: it asks respondents whether they trust the 
EU or not.   
 
                                                 
9 Data sourced from the Eurobarometer Website: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm. 
The question was last posed in 2011, when the euro crisis was at its peak. The data from the last few surveys shows 
that the indicator of EU approval entered a drop in 2009, and the indicator for EU disapproval was on an upward 
trend, with the two lines approaching each other. In 2011, question seized being asked. 
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Figure 5: Trust in the European Union 
 
A similar trend can be found in the graph depicting people’s trust in the European Comission. 
Glancing at the period between 2004 and 2009/10, we can almost identify a replication of the 
trends from Figure 5. The indicators for respondents who tend to trust and not trust the EU hover 
in a zig-zaggy equilibrium until 2009, when the indicator for respondents who trust the EU 
begins to drop, while the indicator for respondents who do not trust begins to rise. In 2010/11, 
the two indicators swap places, around the same time as the Eurobarometer stops asking the 
original question. For the first time, there were more people in Western-Europe who do not trust 
the EU, than there are people who trust it, and things have remained so since. 
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Figure 6: Trust in the European Commission 
 
 
Figure 7: Trust in the European Parliament 
 
In comparing citizens’ and candidates’ preferences on integration, Thomassen and Schmitt 
suggested that the electorate and the elites are living in „different European worlds‟ (Thomassen 
and Schmitt 1997, 181). When comparing the views of members of national parliaments, 
European MEPs and citizens in a later study, the authors found that citizens appeared to be less 
pro-European than elites, regardless if the representatives came from national parliaments or the 
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European Parliament (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000). Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004, 32-50) 
have showed on the basis of the 1999 European Election Study (which asked voters to place 
themselves and parties on the pro/anti-EU integration dimension) that the diversity of opinion 
found in the electorate was simply not reflected at the level of political parties. De Vries and van 
Kersbergen (2007) reported that between 1991, when the Maastricht Treaty was being finalized, 
the period just prior to the outbreak of the economic crisis, popular support for the EU had fallen 
by over 15 % per cent across the EU-15. The decline was strongest in the Netherlands and 
France, but was also significant in the U.K., Germany, Italy and Belgium. Moreover, in a series 
of articles about divergence in preferences on the European question, Mattila and Raunio (2006) 
show that parties are closer to their voters on the left/right dimension, than on the European 
Dimension, with politicians being much more approving of integration than the public at large. 
The authors found that factors such as party size and membership of government or opposition 
tended to co-vary with a party’s Euro-responsiveness towards its voters EU preferences. The 
authors concluded that central parties and those that spend long periods of time in power were 
found to be less responsive to voter opinions of the EU, suggesting that parties tended to be more 
pro Integration the more ‘established’ they are. In other words, a growing gap had taken shape in 
Europe’s political landscape, which lay ripe for those political actors willing pursue anti-
integration policies. A follow-up study conducted by the same authors (Mattila and Raunio, 
2012) several years later showed that in 2009, political parties seemed to be even further away 
from their voters than in 2004. The larger distances on the EU dimension than on the Left-Right 
dimension again showed that political parties seemed much more ‘in touch’ with their electorates 
on the latter issue. Moreover, the discrepancy was found to be larger in the older member states 
than in the new ones. That should probably come as no surprise as EU and Euro-Atlantic 
Integration more generally were seen as real ‘national projects’ in central Europe in the 2000’s, 
as a desire to ‘rejoin the west’. It was much more of a gamble for parties in Central-Eastern 
Europe to be Eurosceptic than for those in the West, especially in the 90’s and the 2000’s, and 
the electorate in those countries was more pro-integration than in the EU15. 
What does it mean to say that the gap was growing larger between elites and voters? On 
the one hand, it could be taken to mean that elites and people’s preferred policy point had shifted 
away from each other in a Downsian sense, while the distribution of preferences maintained its 
shape. It could, however, also be taken to mean that the shape of the distribution had changed, 
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that it has flattened and that more people have been driven away from central/less strong views 
on EU integration. Down and Wilson found evidence that both phenomena are occurring (2008), 
with a shift in central tendency being accompanied by a flattening of the distribution of public 
opinion. Not only had there been a shift in the ideal policy preference of the median voter away 
from that of „elites‟, (meaning all voters are on average less warm to integration) but the 
distribution has changed and flattened, which means that while a very small number of voters 
were more pro-European, many were even more susceptible to Eurosceptic discourse. The 
increase in polarization suggests an increase in issue salience across the electorate as well. This 
divergence of preference created the opportunity space which populist parties exploited to ever 
greater effect.  
It is important to specify that the existence of a gap in policy preferences does not imply 
that there is no reaction by Mainstream Parties, i.e. no influence on them by Eurosceptics. The 
gap can grow even when Eurosceptic contagion happens, if voters move away from moderate 
parties faster than moderate parties can amend their own positions on the issue. This study has a 
cross-temporal design, because it seeks to find out if there is eurosceptic contagion occurring not 
only now, but also in the past. If we find that Eurosceptic Contagion occurred even in the past, 
when populist parties were not as threatening as they are today, then Europhiles might have 
precisely more so reason to worry about the near future, considering the ever stronger showing of 
fringe parties and growing salience of issues such as Integration or immigration. 
 
Outline of the Study  
 
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework of this project, which lies at the intersection 
of two strands of literature: European Integration and Political Party Competition. The study 
brings together debates about the history of European Integration, Eurosceptic movements, 
opposition to Integration10, voter discontent with the EU as well as ‘mainstream’ political actors 
with theories of electoral contests, inter-party competition, and party behavior. Chapter 2 is 
largely divided into two parts. The first one introduces the causal processes underpinning the 
study, describing the theory behind party positional shifts and the interplay between election 
                                                 
10 And implicit discussions about Europe’s democratic deficit 
17 
 
results and party behavior11. Building on that, the chapter then presents the concept of electoral 
and political contagion and explores the mechanism by which fringe and challenger parties 
(radical, fringe, niche and single issue parties) influence their party systems – those two sections 
in effect spell out the causal mechanism of the study, according to which the electoral success of 
radical parties incentivizes other parties to adjust their own policy positions. The second part of 
the theoretical chapter returns to the (more) specific theory of Euroscepticism, combines it with 
the causal mechanism and premises of the previous section and generates the hypotheses that 
inform and lead this project. By plotting and hypothesizing the expected changes of mainstream 
parties’ policy position on the European issue, the last section moves towards the ‘left’ side of 
the equation. 
Chapter Three is dedicated to questions related to Research Design. At the origin of this 
project lies the desire to explore the influence of Eurosceptic Parties across various countries as 
well as across different time periods. The aim is to produce nomothetic, generalizable findings 
about the West European Community and to deliver robust results that can be used to describe 
the above mentioned influence in a ceteris paribus manner. Far too often the state of the field has 
relied – in endeavors aimed at answering related questions – on work analyzing one particular 
country or taking a single snapshot in time. This project is thus a large-N study employing a 
correlational logic, and the principal method of analysis is a variation of Time-Series Cross-
Sectional Analysis. That chapter will begin by presenting the overarching logic behind the 
research design, which seeks to analyze whether and to what degree the evolution of electoral 
competition correlates with changes in the policy positions of political parties. A principal 
concern was that of finding data that actually permits cross-country and cross-temporal 
comparison and analysis, which also includes measures of parties’ stances vis-à-vis regional 
integration. To that end I chose the Chapel Hill Expert Survey12 administered by the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, which was purpose-designed to measure and follow political 
parties’ inclinations towards the EU (Bakker, De Vries, Edwards, Hooghe, et al 2012, 2015). The 
Chapter discusses issues of estimation technique, sources of data, conceptualization and 
operationalization of the factors central to this dissertation and used to depict the process of 
Eurosceptic Contagion. 
                                                 
11 The general theory: party competition 
12 Often referred to as ‘CHES’ in this text, for brevity’s sake 
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The term contagion, already employed in the literature on populist politics (Van Spanje 
2010, Rooduijn et al 2014), is used to describe the spread and adoption of Eurosceptic policy 
positions. It relies on the idea that a feeling, issue, idea, or discourse can spread through an 
ecology (in this case one consisting of party systems and political parties) and ‘contaminate’ its 
constituent parts, which then display it or some of its characteristics. The chapter also elaborates 
on the different ways in which EU issue dimensionality can be conceived of, the decision to stick 
with the CHES one-dimensional scalar measurement tool, as well as the tricky question of how 
to conceptualize and measure Eurosceptic Success. Should one look at Eurosceptic Parties’ 
election results in the static/absolute sense, or rather analyze such parties’ evolution and dynamic 
by measuring changes in electoral performance over time? Are we to look at number of votes, 
percentage of votes, or proximity to the electoral threshold? Is it better to look at the totality of 
Eurosceptic Parties and their cumulated electoral performance, or look more closely at how the 
biggest/strongest Eurosceptic Party in every country is performing? To that end, I coin the term 
‘Flagship Eurosceptic’, to denote those populist Eurosceptic Parties which at one given time 
dominate the Eurosceptic area of a country’s political landscape and occupies the center of 
attention from the media, the public, and other parties as a token of Euroscepticism. 
The empirical starting point of the dissertation is Chapter Four, which sets the theme of 
the analytical part by presenting and comparing Eurosceptic Party success across Western 
Europe’s individual states. It then proceeds to testing the Radical Party Hypothesis via the base 
regression model, which will be the core of all subsequent analyses. It shows that Eurosceptic 
Contagion is a real, existing phenomenon. When populist parties opposing European Integration 
register growing electoral success, mainstream parties react by shifting their own policy position 
in a slightly Eurosceptic direction. 
After showing in chapter four that Eurosceptic Contagion actually happens, Chapter Five 
delves deeper into the issue and investigates why it happens. It takes the empirical effort in a 
slightly more explorative direction and asks who experiences Eurosceptic contagion, when, 
where, and why. Building upon the base model(s) of the project, the chapter investigates what 
factors influence the effect that Eurosceptic Party Success has on the other party’s policy 
positions, providing important information about the motivations of mainstream parties, and 
what it is about Eurosceptic success that actually makes them react in the manner that they do. 
The chapter suggests that the premises are there for Eurosceptic Contagion to strengthen with 
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time, with Eurosceptic success and the increasing salience of the EU issue growing with time in 
a manner akin to a self-reinforcing process. At the same time, I argue that the results can also be 
interpreted in a way that lend themselves to the belief that at least some of the euro-cautious 
shifts in position by mainstream parties the political mainstream are meant to keep Eurosceptic 
Parties out of power and at least to some degree to uphold and conserve integration.  
The third and final empirical chapter stays in ‘when and where’ territory, with a twist. It 
challenges one of the core premises of the study (and literature on Europeanization in general), 
the second order election thesis. It looks into whether Eurosceptic Contagion can indeed only 
happen in the circumstances and as a function of national elections (which have been the main 
political arenas of European Politics), and not due to European ones (given the second-order 
assumption that they are not important enough). The chapter can be said to represent the 
institutional take on the analysis in that it looks into how much institutional design influences the 
effects of Eurosceptic success. While the second order election thesis may have long been held to 
the highest standards, evidence is emerging that they can take a first-order character in certain 
conditions. The inescapable growing salience and contention surrounding politics within the 
European Block are causing more EU issue voting, even at EP elections. Eurosceptic and 
populist parties have galvanized public opinion about Europe in preparation for elections to the 
9th European Parliament in 2014. Eurosceptic mobilization – ironically – provided those 
elections with a distinctly transnational, European flavor, that previous ones had been lacking. 
Secondly European Elections can have a determining role in party systems characterized by low 
proportionality. Majoritarian party systems suppress the information carrying potential of 
national elections that this project is developed around, due to the incentive it offers voters to 
engage in strategic voting. I develop the argument in this last empirical chapter that the 
introduction of proportional supranational elections within the UK’s political system served to 
cancel the above mentioned information suppression effect, by offering fringe parties a 
platform/arena where they can display electoral results proportional to the support enjoyed 
among the electorate. While the United Kingdom Independence Party kept performing ever 
better at European Elections – which supplied the party with financial and institutional resources 
that allowed them to run in ever more conscriptions at national elections – their national election 
results remained interestingly poor. I then explain this by showing that for majoritarian systems, 
Eurosceptic Contagion is more likely to occur due to populist success at EP elections, and less 
20 
 
likely due to such developments in national contests, while in proportional party systems it is the 
other way around, with the 2nd , European, level elections being less important. This provides 
further weight to the information-via-elections model used in this text because it points to the 
requirement that election results depict public preferences as closely and proportionately as 
possible. 
The final chapter recaps the empirical results and discusses the results of this dissertation 
in light of the wider debates in academia surrounding more profound, fundamental changes in 
the political landscape of Western Europe. It is argued there that the (initially) depoliticized 
evolution of the EU went hand in hand and co-evolved with the transition from mass parties to 
catch-all and ‘cartel’ parties in the West. These two parallel processes helped create the growing 
political space and capital available to Eurosceptic Parties, which can also be associated with the 
perception of limited possibilities for normal or ‘traditional’ opposition to the policies related to 
regional integration. It is posited that the development of the EU and its initial permissive 
consensus led to a decoupling of voter and elite preferences on the issue of regional integration. 
The depoliticization of the EU, however, carried with it the seed of its own undoing. On the 
national level, voter de-alignment, weakening class ties, globalization and major parties’ shifts to 
the political center allowed populist policy entrepreneurs to deplore centrist parties apparent 
decoupling from voters, lack of accountability and responsiveness and deride them as being ‘out 
of touch’. On the trans-national level, the tacit and seemingly-unopposed development of 
regional integration allowed those same actors to claim that the EU was an elite project of those 
same ‘out of touch and unresponsive’ national elites. The ever growing political opportunity 
space of Eurosceptic parties did not go unexploited, it allowed them to draw voters from the 
centrist parties in increasing numbers, to draw more and more attention to these parties and their 
message, which helped reinforce their visibility and wish to politicize globalization and 
European Integration. Their electoral success not only repoliticizes the EU and increases public 
apprehension about Integration, but also exerts increasing pressure on moderate parties. Centrist, 
mainstream parties are forced to respond to these changes in order to stem the loss of votes. They 
do so by changing their policy position on the EU issue dimension, taking the electoral gains of 
Eurosceptics as cues on the direction they have to move in, in order to get closer to the mean 
voter. In doing so, in adjusting their policy positions, they become more responsive to the 
electorate again, because such changes in position are meant to shrink the gap that separates 
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voters from elites. One consequence of these processes is thus a shrinking of the gap between 
voters and elites. The downside is that by qualifying their own discourse on the EU and 
borrowing elements of Eurosceptic and Eurocautious discourse, mainstream parties can push 
themselves on a slippery slope of criticizing European Integration from which it might be hard to 
recover pro-EU positions anytime soon, or which might set the polity on a path towards EU 
secession, as was seen this summer in the UK. 
Issue Disclaimer 
Why should we look at European Integration? If we are concerned with the influence of fringe, 
extremist or populist parties on their party systems, could such a study not center on more 
general populist discourse, political shifts to „the right‟ or opposition to immigration? What is 
different about opposition to European Integration that sets it apart from „other forms” of 
populisms?  
A typical critique that is leveled at this type of research question is that populist parties 
are not only Eurosceptic, and that their success and influence on national politics might be due to 
things other than opposition to the EU. That does not really matter here. This study is about how 
the other (moderate, non Eurosceptic) parties „think‟ and act. If Eurosceptic parties „do well‟ 
but the others do not react by moving on that particular policy dimension, it means that a) they 
don’t think the Populists’ success is due to the EU issue, and b) they will thus be „unmoved‟ and 
unaffected by the Eurosceptic parties. If mainstream parties on the other hand do exhibit position 
changes, it means they thought that the issue of European Integration is relevant enough for 
national political competition, and they deemed it necessary to change their position on the issue 
in order to shore up voter support and prevent further voter defection. 
There is no denying that such issues are closely intertwined, and that their use is often 
related in the forums of political competition, but they are distinct questions. There are numerous 
examples of political parties who had many of the traditional trait marks of populist, right-wing 
parties, but who were not much concerned with the EU initially (some of them actually had 
favorable views of the European Community given its potential liberal bias), but gradually 
developed and established strong anti-Integration positions to the point that they are now 
considered ‘hard’ or ‘radical’ Eurosceptic Parties. Alternatively, some parties that started out as 
being solely Eurosceptic, or began their lives as being almost single issue parties dedicated to the 
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fight against regional integration (the United Kingdom Independence Party started as the Anti-
Federalist League when a historian opposed to the Maastricht Treaty, Alan Sked, sought to create 
a party aimed at taking the UK out of the EU; the German Alternative Für Deutschland was also 
borne mainly to counter European Integration, monetary union specifically) and then established 
positions and moved to the ‘right’ on other issues, taking up policy positions on questions of 
immigration policy, minorities, etc. While a country’s immigration policy does have strong 
consequences for those living within its borders (and prospective migrants), halting or rolling 
back EU integration carries consequences that spill over and far beyond the boundary of the 
nation state, and whose effects might be harder to predict. It can be said in a way that moderate 
party adjustment on the EU issue has more and stronger consequences than adjustment such as a 
mere tightening of immigration policy.  
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
 
The introductory part of this text has provided a foray in the discussion about rising 
Euroscepticism and corroborated that development with the gap in policy preferences between 
the electorate at large and political elites on the question of European Integration. Catching up 
with their traditionally pro-EU counterparts, parties opposing European Integration are forecast 
to provide a growing challenge to the political establishment, especially aided by the uncertain 
political climate that reigns today. Politics in Europe are heading in a direction not witnessed in 
the last half a century and it is not entirely clear where the path will lead or end. Mark Franklin 
and Cees van der Eijk (2004) have used the metaphor of a sleeping giant to describe the potential 
force of Euroscepticism in the European landscape since the 1990’s. The issue was said to be a 
giant due to its potential power to disrupt the traditional political land, and it was said to be 
dormant because its potential was still yet to be unleashed. Concerns on a similar note were 
raised by Bartolini (2006, 2008), who noted the prospect of Eurosceptic and Nationalist 
Centrifugal forces reshaping the direction of European Integration. Such depictions of European 
politics have been countered by arguments that Europe could not become a point of contention in 
European Politics. Peter Mair (2000) went as far as saying that Europe’s political elites had 
effectively managed to “sedate” the so-called giant and keep it dormant, while Green-Pedersen 
suggested in an article from 2012 titled “A giant fast asleep” that mainstream parties can 
maintain a measure of control over Euroscepticism. Such lines of reasoning predict either that 
Eurosceptic Parties would not become significant political actors, that the issue of European 
Integration would not become one that can impact national politics, or perhaps most importantly 
that moderate and mainstream parties would maintain their pro-European policy positions.  
The present political reality, however, suggests that the giant has indeed awakened. And 
instead of being ‘in control’ of the situation, political parties are trying to find ways to respond to 
it. This text argues that despite their traditional, historical, inclination towards European 
Integration, political parties are finding themselves forced to adapt to a more Eurosceptic 
Environment which often requires that they themselves adopt more Eurosceptic policy positions 
in an effort to alleviate vote loss. The underlying assumption of this project is that political 
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parties are (at least to some degree) vote seeking rational actors trying to maximize their vote 
tally and, if possible, ‘win’ elections to become ‘formateur’ parties.  
The project relies first on Anthony Downs’ (1957) spatial theory of party politics, 
according to which political parties seek to present their policy positions as being as close as 
possible to the preferences of voters. The rationality of political actors and parties is bounded by 
various factors. Parties operate in environments of imperfect information, and parties are not 
always on the same ‘page’ as voters with regard to political preferences, or the two side’s policy 
positions might differ13. Given sufficient opportunity and incentive structures (unhappiness with 
politicians’ position on important policy matters coupled with the possibility to cast a vote for an 
actor offering policy alternatives), voters can transfer their votes from their previous choice to a 
new preferred party. In the current landscape of European Politics, this means a growing 
recognition of ‘Europe’ as a contentious issue and of Eurosceptic parties as genuine alternative 
vote recipients.  The new, beneficiary parties are more often than not turning out to be parties 
from the political fringes that take aim at the political establishment, and in the present case, at 
the mainstream’s pro-European policies.  
The second base of this project is Budge’s past election model (1994), according to which 
political parties use election results to gain information on their proximity to voters’ own 
preference, as well as that of rival parties. Hence, this study is at its heart one whose model uses 
a causal mechanism based on information. One can boil the essential down to the question of 
whether political parties use the results from recent elections to deduce that they need to rectify 
their current positions on the EU issue, in order to stem voter defection. 
As stated above, the latent potential of Euroscepticism as a political force has been 
theorized, and the mobilization of populist and chauvinistic discourse in electoral contests has 
not gone unnoticed (Bale, 2003; Mudde, 2004; Rooduijn, 2013; Taggart, 2004; Van der Brug and 
Van Spanje, 2009; Van der Brug et al, 2000, 2005, Loxbo 2010). Moreover, the causal logic 
used in this project (fringe parties altering the political agenda and influencing other parties) has 
likewise been used in other sub-fields in the domain of party politics. Yet, an empirical gap 
remained at the crossroads of European Union studies and the literature on populist political 
parties. That it has taken until now for the thesis of Populist Contagion to be put to the test in 
                                                 
13Moreover, that rationality is mitigated by the fact that while mainstream political actors wish to not only win 
elections, but have other political goals as well, such as preventing the dissolution of the EU/the continuation of the 
European Union  
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combination with the question of EU Integration is somewhat astonishing and all the more 
surprising considering that this type of research questions have been posed for other related 
topics and policy issues. Research into populist politics is not lacking, and neither is the literature 
on that which is sometimes referred to as political ‘contagion’ and ‘adaptation’. The blank spaces 
are only now beginning to be filled, and this project is part of a larger (very recent) movement to 
fill the empirical gaps about Eurosceptic influence. This chapter is divided in two parts. The first 
section resembles a literature review and presents the causal mechanism that underlies this thesis, 
addressing questions from the field of party politics more generally. The second half of this 
chapter hashes out the theoretical and empirical contribution of this dissertation by pointing to 
the empirical gap in the literature on Euroscepticism that this project fills. 
 
The Causal Mechanism 
 
Spatial (Proximity) Theory 
 
The causal model employed in this project stands on two theoretical pillars: Downsian proximity 
theory and Budge’s past election model, and can be summarized as follows: Political Parties use 
election results (changes in election results between the most recent and the previous election, to 
be more precise) to update their map of the opinion landscape and determine how they should 
adjust their position on the issue of European Integration in the run up to the next election. In 
other words, parties rely on changes in election results to determine what they should ‘offer’ 
voters in preparation for the next election. Depending on how Eurosceptic parties have done at 
the ballot box (have they improved their electoral faring between the elections, or have they 
worsened it?), political parties will adjust their policy positions in the hope that they would 
reverse the gains that Eurosceptic parties have made at their expense. 
Political Parties are central to most political processes in democratic systems, if not the 
most important elements in democratic politics. The study of political parties and their behavior 
is thus of great importance to comparative politics, and Downsian spatial theory, named so after 
its author Anthony Downs, is perhaps the most renowned strategic approach to party competition 
(Downs 1957). Downsian spatial theory (also known as proximity theory) depicts political 
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parties and voters as acting in an electoral marketplace, characterized by its own tendencies of 
supply and demand. Parties determine and adjust what they supply (in terms of policy positions) 
in response to the stimuli from voters and other parties. According to the model, on any given 
political issue, both voters and parties can be thought of as located at certain points across an 
ideological spectrum depicted as one dimension (Downs 1957, 115-117). While there might be 
multiple issues affecting politics, each of these issues can be treated singularly as one dimension; 
when there are multiple issues affecting each other or strongly correlated with each other, they 
are often collapsed into one, such as the GAL-TAN14 structure, or the (general) left-right 
dimension15. 
The model assumes that each voter can locate herself at a point on that dimension 
reflecting the voter’s ideal preference. The position of each party can also be represented by a 
point in that same space. The theory assumes that under conditions of perfect information, 
rational voters will choose the party which is closest to their ideological position on that same 
axis, and will in turn dismiss parties that are further away, hence it being referred to as 
‘Proximity Theory’. Voters look for political parties that lie closest to them on the issue 
dimensions that matter and are relevant to them. That is policy demand. Parties will seek to 
adjust their policy proposals, trying to attract voters with their product (policy proposals), vying 
for ‘market share’, in the process generating policy supply. A central prediction of this model is 
that parties will adjust their policy positions in response to shifts in public opinion, a hypothesis 
which springs from the logic that vote-seeking politicians tailor their policy promises to the 
policy preferences of voters (Somer-Topcu, 2009, 826). Another prediction of the model is that 
parties adjust their policies in response to policy shifts by competitors.  
This is where it becomes important to mention that political preferences are not static. If 
the public’s ideal policy spots – and zones of acquiescence – change, the system loses its static 
character. Public preferences may shift in various directions. Various things can account for such 
changes in the position of the electorate. Such movements can occur naturally, due to socio-
demographic factors, or can be caused by external shocks (economic downturns, enlargement of 
the EU to the east, increased immigration, terrorist attacks, etc). While parties try in principle to 
approach and approximate the positions of voters, it is possible for the overall positions of the 
                                                 
14 Green, Alternative, Liberal – Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist 
15 which is distinct from the economic left-right dimension, the latter being just a function of economic policy 
preferences 
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electorate and of parties to find themselves drifting apart with time. History can cause voter 
preferences to change. This can be the result of cumulative and gradual influence of long term 
trends, strong sudden exogenous shocks, or persuasive arguments by politicians. Rational 
politicians wishing to maintain public support (and office) must move ‘along’ with that zone of 
acquiescence. If voters’ position on the policy dimension changes, that can result in a change of 
how votes are cast16, and parties will have to change their policy positions/proposals as well, in 
order to follow suit, and keep up with voters. 
Based on the assumption that voters are rational and will support the party with policy 
preferences most similar to their own, political parties can chose from two possible strategies 
when they are faced with changing electoral fortunes: movement toward a certain competitor 
(also known as policy convergence) and movement away from the competitor (in other words 
policy divergence). Policy divergence occurs when a party feels it is too close to competitors, 
and needs to differentiate itself from it, or when it seeks to increase the apparent political conflict 
on certain policy dimensions.  Such a strategy is closely tied to the salience logic of party 
politics, since policy divergence has, all things considered, a high likelihood of spurring conflict, 
debate and discussion about an issue, increasing public awareness and apprehension about the 
said issue. Policy convergence takes place when parties hope to ‘steal’ voters away from 
threatening competitors by copying its policy position or co-opting its discourse. 
 
Influence Parties and Challengers  
 
Whereas new parties are also intended to win elections, they are often more important as means 
of influencing the policies of previously existing parties. Since old, established parties can be 
ideologically immobile, they might not adjust rapidly to changes of voters distributions, and new 
parties can enter wherever it is most advantageous. Such parties can be ‘influence parties’, who 
may crop up when convergence has pulled a major party too much in a certain direction and 
certain political actors consider that they can ‘pull it back’ by threatening to highjack a part of its 
voters. The main purpose of influence parties or candidates is not to win elections but to 
                                                 
16 If party A lies closer to the mean voter than party B, more voters will vote for party A than B. If voters were 
previously closer to party A, but underwent a change in policy preferences (the preferences of electorates change 
with time) so that they moved closer to B, they will now take their votes to B because they feel it better represents 
their own position on that policy dimension. 
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influence an existing ecology of parties (Downs, 1957, 127)17. Such political actors attract just 
enough voters to hurt one party or another (or a group of parties). One of the parties on the losing 
end takes notice, infers that it has to amend its own position on that policy dimension and 
qualifies its position in a way it hopes will bring some voters back. Other previously center-
convergent parties take notice themselves, decide to follow suite and induce momentum in the 
political system. By threatening to upset the electoral balance, such a fringe party can cause a 
shift in the entire political system even if it promises to steal only a minority of voters from other 
parties. Such parties thus attain their goal on a certain policy issue without needing to actually 
win power or form government. 
Because the issue is only then starting to gain significant importance, it is not entirely 
certain how many more voters would ‘switch sides’ if the issue gained even more salience (if 
more voters would vote according to that issue, it is assumed that there is potential for more 
voters to defect granted sufficient salience). Things can get tricky if political parties suspect that 
the distribution of voter preferences (on that issue) does not overlap or conform to those of the 
other issues, those which determined elections thus far. Such can be the situation in the European 
question, where it is now known that a) voters have different preferences from the political 
leadership, and b) the distribution of these preferences are orthogonal to those on the left-right 
spectrum (van der Eijk and Franklin, 2004). That is also the premise of the ‘Sleeping Giant’ 
thesis, which suggests that the distribution of voters on the alternative potential conflict 
dimension is wherein the danger lies. In such circumstances, a shift in the political agenda 
whereby the new (previously unimportant) issue becomes decisive has the potential to massively 
uplift and disrupt the political status quo. Faced with such a situation and threat, political parties 
will try to downplay the issue if they can (that is only possible before the issue passes a certain 
threshold of salience, after which it becomes impossible to ignore). The relative salience of 
political issues can change with time, however, just as policy preferences do. These can be traced 
                                                 
17 This can happen when convergence has pulled parties too close to the political center, or too close to other 
competitors and disaffected members of the party threaten to harm the party by withholding/taking a part of the 
party’s constituency that is required for the party to perform against other centrist or mainstream parties. 
Alternatively a new political party can be founded to take advantage of dissatisfaction with the policy shifts of a 
traditional party when the founders of the new party believe there are enough voters of the traditional party that are 
discontent with the policy shift. In such a case, the new party threatens to position itself where the traditional party 
formerly stood, providing the large party’s dissatisfied voters with a viable alternative at their original preferred 
location. This puts the traditional party in the tricky spot of having to ‘navigate’ back to prevent the dissatisfied 
voters from defecting, or at least altering its policy position in such a way as to minimize losses given the new 
circumstances created by the new party. 
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back not only to impersonal, historical forces, but also be managed by political actors who stand 
to gain from the change in political discussion agenda. Such forces (natural and strategic) can 
work hand in hand, for example if a party feels it can use recent socio-economic developments to 
mobilize its preferred issues and raise awareness of it. If issue agenda control is no longer an 
option, parties will then try to qualify their position on the issue in a way that brings them closer 
to the policy preference of the mean voter18. This, they hope, reduces the potential for further 
voter defection, as well as (it is hoped) reducing the potential for a rearrangement of the political 
system by diminishing the distance between parties and the distribution of voters on that policy 
dimension. 
A classical problem in such discussions is how parties can figure out what issue they 
actually won or lost votes on. This is not really a problem in this case. If parties consider that the 
EU issue, and positions on it, actually affects the distribution of votes (if they assume or believe 
that Eurosceptic parties are taking their voters on the back of their integration policy position), 
then they will do something about it, and find it worthwhile to change their position on it. The 
project is not concerned with ‘what issue actually wins or loses parties their votes’. It is not 
concerned with the factors that affect parties’ destinies. If parties don’t think that the EU issue 
affects whether they gain or lose votes (that it does not affect election results), then they will 
leave the issue be, and not spend time, energy and resources reformulating a strategy that nobody 
pays attention to anyhow. 
 
The Past election model 
 
It is not always easy for parties to gauge public opinion and identify the best policy 
position to take on various issues19. Parties work in conditions of imperfect information. In the 
case of ‘normal’ issue dimensions, parties try to obtain as much information as possible out of 
surveys and opinion polls, as well as direct communication via lower party members and offices 
at the local level. These instruments are nevertheless imperfect, and for any given issue, there is 
                                                 
18 This holds especially so for ‘catch-all’ parties, who rely on larger number of non partisan, non-aligned 
contested, swing voters 
19 Things are a bit easier in the case of Valence issues, in which case parties simply try to present 
themselves as ‘owners’ of those given issues, or the most capable as possible to ‘deliver’ on those issues. 
Alternatively, they try to downplay the issue to reduce other parties’ advantages on the said valence 
issues. 
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a chance that a party will ‘misread’ where the mean voter stands (and thus misread what position 
it should itself present). They might overestimate their own proximity to the electorate’s ideal 
points, or they might overestimate the degree to which public preferences have changed, 
resulting in them shifting their own policy preferences too far. As is discovered over and over 
again (the most glaring recent examples being the last UK general election, the Brexit 
Referendum, or the recent American Elections), opinion polls can be very blunt and imprecise 
instruments, especially if the poll is conducted well in advance of the election. The closer to 
Election Day the poll is held, the higher the odds of it being more accurate. Organize the poll too 
close to an election, and one turns it essentially into an exit poll. Parties have to assess how far or 
close they are to the median voter and elections are a good instrument in this regard, helping 
parties learn where they and their voters are standing ‘relative’ to each other. Public opinion is 
not static. With time, individual persons can change their policy preferences, and so can the 
constituencies and electorates that those people compose. The challenge for parties is thus to 
establish correctly in which direction that change (in demand) has occurred, and how strongly. 
Then, they try to react to that change accordingly, by changes in their own policy proposals – 
these make up a large part of the variance in election manifestos and party programs, from one 
election to another. 
Two useful retrospective sources of information that parties can use to gauge their 
position’s appeal, and that of rivals are: How parties changed their own policy position between 
the two most recent elections, and how the distribution of voter preferences changes (for the 
latter, information can come from vote-intention results in the build up to elections, or changes in 
election results in the course of one electoral cycle). Using this information, they try to deduce 
where the median voter actually lies, based on how votes were cast for various policy positions. 
They then attempt to amend/formulate a policy position that will bring them closer to the 
pursued voters, at least closer than their rivals are to the mean voter, on the assumption that the 
issues they amend positions on are salient. If they performed poorly from the previous election to 
the most recent one, and their rivals did well, parties will infer that they need to change what 
they offer to the voters. In such cases, we will see bigger changes in their policy position than 
otherwise. In what Budge (1994, 240) terms the ‘past election model’, past election results work 
as a mechanism for the acquirement of information (by parties) about their congruence with 
public opinion, and the public’s favor of its policy preferences. Under this model, a party 
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remains at the same position or provides more of the same (it continues further in the same 
policy direction as last time) if it gained votes in the last election; and changes its policy 
direction from last time if it lost votes. Empirical evidence seems to support the assertion that 
parties are likely to change position in order to win elections or recuperate electoral losses. 
Somer-Topcu (2009) demonstrates that parties change their positions more frequently after 
experiencing a bad showing in previous elections (see also Budge et al. 2010). A change in 
election results tells the party how it is situated vis-à-vis public opinion relative to other parties, 
how it has moved closer or further away from the median voter relative to other political 
competitors. Somer-Topcu (2009, 246) also notes that this effect dissipates strongly over time – 
the ‘lag’ is usually no larger than that of one election. Because of this moderating effect that time 
has, as time passes, leaders are less confident that they can extrapolate from past election results 
to a contemporary political situation that may be different; it is the most recent election (and 
changes in election results between the previous election and the most recent one) that parties 
stand the most to learn from. 
 
Salience 
 
Even though it long dominated discussion on party behavior, the spatial/positional perspective on 
party competition is not without its limitations. According to the main proponents of saliency 
theory (Budge, Klingemann, Robertson), the alternative is to distinguish between party positions 
at the level of specific issues and their general priorities across issues. Parties might endorse the 
same positions to a certain extent, but still prioritize them differently. Some parties might 
emphasize national defense and immigration in their electoral programmes and discourse, others 
might emphasize redistribution and equality while yet others might emphasize the environment20. 
According to this perspective, parties do not directly oppose each other on an issue by issue basis 
(Somer-Topcu, 2009, 239). Very often, there is only one tenable position on a variety of issues, 
or one particular position that will gain the thick of the vote on the said issue dimension. What 
differentiates parties, then, is their credibility as handlers of different problems and issues, and 
their choice of issues to emphasize or downplay. That means some parties will (for example) try 
to make an election ‘be’ about the economy, others about foreign policy, etc. Parties devote 
                                                 
20 Budge, Robertson and Hearl, 1987, 395 
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energy to emphasize those policy areas on which their credibility (to deliver) on those positions 
are strong enough to win them votes. The salience model assumes that voters’ decisions rely not 
only on the proximity of political parties on a given issue dimension. There are several 
dimensions along which parties structure their fight (external policy, social security, economic 
growth, fiscal policy, environmental issues, etc), and these issues are not always equally 
important in the electorate’s eyes. Their salience (or at least perceived salience) defining political 
space thus matters equally much as party positions. Voters will not be very impressed with the 
attractivity (proximity) of a party’s position if they find the overall issue not to be very relevant 
or important. Proximity to voters’s policy preferences can thus be rendered irrelevant if the 
underlying policy dimension is not salient enough (Meguid, 2008, 25).  
Another lesson from the theory is that all parties can all be in favor or all against a certain 
policy direction or position on any one specific issue. The political system displaying such 
characteristics can nevertheless gain dynamism because voters see some parties more able to 
carry through a particular policy than others. When voters face parties who are equally close to 
them on an important policy issue, the deciding factor is party issue credibility, or issue 
ownership (Petrocik, 1996). In other words, voters might deem liberal and right wing parties to 
be more capable of carrying out structural reforms or rolling back the state, they might see 
hawkish politicians as better able to deal with foreign threats (the ‘Nixon goes the China’ thesis), 
and socialist parties more capable to reduce poverty or inequality. Salience theory argues that 
most parties inhabit (largely) the same positions on various dimensions, they only emphasize 
them differently. The theory states that party competition often takes the form of a battle over 
agenda control. Parties try to influence which issues are on the agenda, selectively stressing those 
issues that are favorable to them and de-emphasizing and playing down those where they are at a 
disadvantage. Thus party competition involves the definition of the political space – i.e., what is 
important and what is not. Thus, liberal parties do not argue against the welfare state (which 
might prove unpopular), they are just said to emphasize low taxes, while social democrats are 
said to emphasize social security and equality while avoiding to themes. 
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Salience and Niche Parties 
 
While most of the literature has focused on the electoral fight over issue ownership between 
‘volksparteien’, the degree to which issue manipulation explains party politics is also very 
important to the interaction between established parties and smaller challengers. Niche parties, 
extremist parties, and single issue parties (the name is self-explanatory) are often reliant on the 
importance of a more reduced number issue dimensions. If there is a marked reduction in the 
salience of their core issues, these parties can find themselves losing many voters quickly. As 
Meguid (2008, 26) notes, those issues introduced by niche parties can be more susceptible to 
salience manipulation generally, given that they are not the central economic dimensions along 
which political systems are often built, and around which the traditional parties were founded in 
the past. 
Because of the character of such issues, it is argued here that it should easier, at least on 
paper, for mainstream parties to jostle and adapt to issue position and salience along these issues, 
than for example economic issues that underscore the ideological foundation of political parties. 
This implies that there is more fluidity on these issues in party systems, i.e. parties find it easier 
to copy each other and there is more adaptation taking place when such issues21 are concerned, 
which are promoted by fringe parties. If a new party (or a previously small party) manages to 
introduce a new issue, then for the time being, it will be regarded as the owner of that issue. The 
other parties can then try to downplay the issue, or promote it as well, in order to challenge the 
first party’s ownership of that issue. In a logic somewhat similar to that of positional 
competition, parties try to appear close to the voter. They want to show voters that they too are 
aware of the relevance of a policy issue, and that they can be relied upon to deliver change on it, 
that they too are responsive. In the absence of an issue entrepreneur that seeks to alter the 
agenda, the need to seem as ‘adapting to the voter’ is not as imperative. 
This perspective on the salience of issues introduces the concept of valence issues, which 
are issues on which all political actors and large segments of the electorate share common 
preferences (often finding themselves at the same poles of the issue dimension). These are issues 
such as criminality, unemployment, poverty, defense. There is little maneuvering space on these 
issues from a positional point of view, but parties will try to emphasize or de-emphasize such 
                                                 
21 Immigration, globalization, integration, environmental concerns 
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issues depending on whether they believe that that public regards them as more or less capable of 
dealing with these problems. Likewise, parties will try to de-emphasize those issues where they 
feel their policy position is less popular with voters than those of rival parties(Steenbergen and 
Scott 2004, 167). While many issues can be seen as valence issues, the question of European 
Integration is not one of them. There is no ‘obviously/universal right choice’ on the issue. This 
implies that the potential competition space on the European issue is quite large, and parties can 
maneuver both along spatial positions as well as issue salience.  
Policy Divergence can be used as a tool to strengthen the perception of conflict 
surrounding a certain policy issue22. This applies when a party thinks that it stands to gain by 
underlining and stressing the differences in policy positions between them and their rivals. 
Meguid (2005, 2008) shows us that when a party (party “A” for ease of description) does not 
take the threat of a populist challenger too seriously, or does not consider it to pose a systemic 
threat, but views it nonetheless as a tool via which it could weaken its main center rivals (party 
“B”) relative to itself, it can employ policy divergence as an instrument of electoral tactics, in a 
more cynical way. There are two logics at work here, on which sees the party’s rival (B) trade 
votes with A, and one which sees both in the political center parties trade votes to the populist 
challenger, but where B loses more, thus giving party ‘A’ a relative boost. In the former logic, 
party A considers that the position of its rival, B, is unpopular with a large part of the electorate, 
and it would generate vote loss for that party if only voters cared more about that issue. Because 
the issue is presently of low salience, the election is contested over other issues, on which A does 
not have such an advantage. What party A has to do is to emphasize the differences in policy 
position between itself and its rival, spurring discussion on it. It seeks to amplify the importance 
of the issue, thus shifting the electoral competition to those issues it has ownership over- this is 
classical agenda setting. 
In the 2nd logic, which makes use of populist parties as intermediaries, party A is aware 
that both parties stand to lose voters to the populist challenger, but B is likely to lose more than 
the former if the pariah party becomes stronger, thus strengthening A’s relative position in the 
center. A will in such a case emphasize position divergence (even if it means moving further 
                                                 
22 perceived among the public and electorate 
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away from the fringe challenger party that is finding growing favor with the electorate23) in order 
to increase conflict on the issue in question, thereby amplifying issue salience. Because more 
voters now pay increased attention to the issue (and realize B’s position does not lie in proximity 
to theirs), more voters are likely to abandon party B for the fringe party than would have been 
the case had the issue not been raised by party A via policy divergence. In such an instance, the 
salience of an issue interacts with the positions of the parties. All things considered, a framework 
combining these two major approaches to party politics (spatial theories and salience theories) 
best explains the strategic behavior of parties. Rather than regarding them as conflicting theories, 
they can be thought of as complementary, since they describe and address different aspects of 
party competition, which interact in producing the electoral contest we see around us (see Abou-
Chadi, 2016).  
An important lesson to take home at the end of this section is the idea that issue salience 
and the degree of issue contestation (and associated political convergence or divergence) can go 
hand in hand. If an issue is not important and lies at the bottom of the political agenda, parties 
will care very little about it and there will be little rush to adjust policy positions.  
 
Populist Contagion 
 
On the basis of Downsian Spatial Theory, Salience Theory, and the Past Election Model which 
describe and predict how parties try to position themselves relative to one another with the 
purpose of attracting voters, we can make sense of party systems’ responses to fringe party 
challenges as moves to counteract their discourse, to ignore or downplay it, or to accommodate 
and include it in their own electoral platforms. Sometimes a party system adapts by displaying a 
hostile or dismissive reaction towards the challenger. The alternative scenario is the instance in 
which a party system validates a neophyte party’s issue and position by adopting the issue and its 
position on it – effectively borrowing and incorporating that party’s discourse into its own. It is 
such instances which the likes of Van Spanje (2010), Rydgren (2005) , Mejiers (2015) and others 
term ‘Contagion’.  
                                                 
23 It considers that even if it pursued policy convergence with the neophyte challenger party, its position would still 
be too far away/the convergence too small to prevent vote loss. In that sense, it sees a certain degree as vote loss as 
being imminent, but it might as well ensure that its rivals in the center lose as many voters as possible/lose even 
more votes 
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Building on models for party convergence and divergence provided by Proximity theory 
and Salience theory, writers such as William Downs(2001, 2002) and Bonnie Meguid (2005, 
2008) have over time presented frameworks which can model the different types of responses 
that mainstream parties can display when faced with the success of a more radical challenger 
party. Whereas Meguid and W. Downs developed their framework in an attempt to explain how 
various mainstream responses to far-right and far left challengers affect the subsequent success 
of such ‘pariah’ parties, I turn the argument on its head (one can also say that I follow those 
author’s models halfway through, then stop), in that I look at how recent populist success 
prompts one kind of response or another from the mainstream, i.e. to see how eurosceptic 
parties’ success has prompted other parties to respond to their challenge. Conceptually, the 
phenomena can be termed „contagion‟ and adaptation, and describe the processes by which 
centrist parties move towards more extreme policy positions to stem or prevent a loss of votes to 
their fringe challengers. The term ‘contagion’ is used to suggest that a system is contaminated by 
an agent – in this situation it is implied that populist elements (populist discourse, frames, ideas, 
policy positions) ‘contaminate’ and spread through the political/party system of a country. The 
main idea behind the concept of adaptation is that parties have to react – somehow – when their 
political competitors (be they from the political center or new challengers from the fringes) 
threaten to do better than them electorally. Sometimes, parties adapt by copying or adopting part 
of the discourse of their challengers. They adapt by adopting the populist elements within their 
own policy position and discourse, in doing so they help spread those elements – that is how the 
political ‘contagion’ spreads. 
The literature abounds in work with this type of analytical framework. Past authors have 
focused on how green parties influence the environmental issue (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries, 
2014; Meguid, 2005, Abu-Chadi 2014), others on welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen, 2014 ), while others yet, like Bale et al (2010), van Spanje (2010) and Harmel and 
Svåsand (1997) have looked into the more thorny issue of immigration.  
Bale et al (2010) present a comparative analysis of developments in several Western and 
North European countries and show significant variation in the scope, substance and pace of 
strategic responses by social democratic parties - the authors argue that by adopting some of the 
far right’s themes, Europe’s mainstream legitimized them and amplified their salience and 
number of seats that far radical parties could bring into expanded right blocs (Bale et al, 2010, 
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70).  Schain et al (2002) also present a comparative perspective on the ways in which 
mainstream parties respond to populist challengers, and argue that the co-optation of radical right 
issues in France, Britain or Germany has met with mixed success (Schain et al 2002). Schain 
states that political parties first gain attention not when they are born, but when they achieve an 
electoral breakthrough that is sufficient to have an impact24 on the variation of support within the 
party system (Schain, 2002, 223). Such breakthroughs can be achieved in either of two ways: 
either through the conversion of voters who had previously voted for other parties, or by 
mobilizing new voters. If such a breakthrough endures, it can lead to electoral realignment within 
the party system. By altering the issue agenda, fringe challengers also alter the terms of conflict 
among political parties, and (potentially) the electoral cleavages and divisions. Thus, even if the 
upstart party does not endure, its impact can be important both in terms of the policy agenda and 
the organization of the political system (Minkenberg 2001, Schain et al 2002, 3). Naturally, 
should the populist challenger survive and prosper, its effect will be stronger. Populist or fringe 
parties who act as issue entrepreneurs could hypothetically be blocked out of power even if they 
become the largest political party in a country/if they acquire the most votes as long the other 
parties come together and succeed in forming grand coalitions that exclude the neophyte. Even if 
the centrist parties manage to block the Eurosceptics out of power, the latter still exert over the 
former’s position, because these parties ‘get the message’ by looking at election results. A 
plurality of voters is not to be taken lightly, and the centrist/mainstream parties become well 
aware that more might follow if they allow themselves to appear too slow, unresponsive (and by 
extension unrepresentative). As a consequence, all such parties will shift their position on the EU 
issue not necessarily in order to gain votes relative to other established parties (even though that 
could be a part of the explanation), but to prevent further ‘universal’ migration of voters to the 
anti-establishment parties25. The effect is there regardless of whether the populist challenger 
really ‘wins’ the election or not, the only potential difference lies in how strong the other parties’ 
shift might be, but a shift will occur nonetheless. Even when fringe and niche parties failed to 
attain too many seats, their electoral fortunes have thus influenced those of others, draining 
larger parties of voters. Such parties like to prop up and underscore issues which are either novel, 
or do not coincide with existing lines of political division. They can even appeal to groups of 
                                                 
24 The example of the UK 
25 On the assumption that parties seek not an immediate gain at the expense of their governing peers, but to remove 
the threat of eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs gaining more votes down the line 
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voters in a way that cross-cuts traditional partisan alignment, tilting the traditional political order. 
Harmel and Svåsand (1997) also point out that there are two significant ways in which fringe 
parties impact upon their party systems. One is for the new party itself to become large enough 
and successful enough to assume the status of a major player in the system. The other is for the 
new party to influence the major players, while itself remaining in the minor league. (Harmel and 
Svåsand 1997, 316).  This is mirroring the idea of Anthony Downs (1957) who used the concept 
of ‘influence parties’ whose purposes and goals are not to win elections, but to influence and 
give a nudge to the party system in one direction or another by making other parties have to 
adjust their own policy positions and offers, or to raise an issue on the agenda, like a ‘message 
candidate’ would. The intuition drawn from the literature is clear: regardless whether populist 
parties endure and become major players in their party systems or merely make enough of an 
appearance to make a significant dent in moderate parties’ support, they are able to influence 
their party systems and the co-optation by that party system of policy positions approximating 
those the challenger’s is quite often the observed consequence. 
The logic that this project employs is not novel, but its field of application (EU 
integration) is, and therein lays one of the main contributions of this dissertation. What is 
surprising is that is has taken so long for this kind of research strategy and question to be applied 
to the Europeanization debate, and while some have tried to answer it by exploring the 
phenomenon in only one time and place26, the question is only now beginning to be looked at in 
a comparative cross sectional and cross temporal approach27.  
 
Populist Contagion and Euroscepticism - The Radical Party Hypothesis 
 
Two kinds of predictions have emerged from the perspective that the ‘sleeping giant’ of 
Euroscepticism will not awaken. Some authors have stated that Eurosceptic parties cannot 
influence their party systems enough and that Europeanization effects on national party 
competition are weak (Sitter 2001, Deschouwer and Van Assche 2008) because European 
Integration does not matter to voters and Euroscepticism cannot muster enough political force to 
alter the political balance. Some have argued that Europe simply does not matter enough, at least 
                                                 
26  . Part of this is due to assumptions that have previously been made about the politicization of Integration and the 
way this has been theorized, and will be discussed below in the sections that theorize contagion and integration 
27 See Mejers, 2015 
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not in comparison to other cleavages in order to affect politics, among them Green-Pedersen 
(2012) and even Mair according to whom Europe’s influence on national politics is at best 
indirect (in his 2000 paper ‘The limited impact of Europe on national party systems’), or 
Follesdal and Hix (2006, 552) who state that national elections avoid the content of EU policy. 
A second view is that the ‘European question’ can become an issue of electoral politics, 
but that the perspective on populist contagion gets causality backwards. Addressing the more 
general literature of populist politics, Bonnie Meguid (2015) elaborated a model on the basis of 
which populist electoral success and survival can be viewed as a function of mainstream party 
behavior. For the author, mainstream parties‘ responses to populist parties are a means to 
compete against other mainstream parties and populist success is the result of interplay between 
mainstream parties. Dahlström and Sundell (2012) argued that the electoral success of populist 
parties depends on mainstream parties first politicizing an issue and legitimizing the former’s 
policy directions. Echoing such arguments and applying them to the EU question, Green-
Pedersen (2012) claimed that that mainstream parties are capable of sidelining Eurosceptic 
policy entrepreneurs and keeping euroscpetic discourse (and questions surrounding European 
Integration altogether) off the political agenda, that the mobilization of the EU issue by populist 
parties is limited by mainstream parties willingness (or reluctance) to put the issue on the agenda. 
Whether populist parties gain attention accordingly depends on centrist parties first mobilizing 
the issue, an idea similar to Hutter and Grande’s (2014) suggestion that the EU problem can also 
be problematized by the mere conflict between government and opposition. 
On the basis of intuition gained from Proximity Theory, Salience Theory and the 
literature on Contagious Populism, I apply the contagion and-past-election-results logic to the 
issue of European Integration and argue that Eurosceptic parties can and do influence their party 
systems and the policy positions of mainstream parties, determining the latter to shift positions in 
a more Euro-cautious or Eurosceptic direction - this is what De Vries (2007) refers to as the 
Radical or Extremist Party Hypothesis. The main idea underlying the hypothesis, contradicting 
the above referenced claims that Euroscepticism is not a factor in national politics, is that 
Eurosceptic parties can ‘steal’ voters from traditional parties and that when it happens, moderate 
parties will use changes in election results to decide how far and in which direction to adjust 
their EU positions because they use said election results to adjust their image of the electorate. 
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The assumption that the EU issue and opposition to European Integration can influence 
national politics is not novel. For Hooghe and Marks (2009, 5), Europe’s once reigning tacit 
consensus has been replaced by a „constraining dissensus‟ and Europe’s usually pro-European 
leaders now have much less leeway in their conduct of European politics. European Integration 
is accordingly an issue with a growing potential to influence national politics in its own right. A 
similar note was struck by Vasilopolou (2013) who urged the field of comparative politics to also 
treat Euroscepticism as an independent variable, not just a dependent one, as a catalyst for 
political developments, not just  response. Building on Carmines and Stimson’s work on Issue 
evolution, De Vries (2007) shows that the question of Integration can become an important issue 
at election time provided certain conditions are met. The author argues that EU issue voting is 
conditional on the degree of EU issue salience among voters and the extent of partisan conflict 
over Europe. In other words, do citizens care about Europe, and do Parties provide them with a 
clear or meaningful choice? While such work offer as a base on which to assume that the Radical 
Party Hypothesis holds for the issue of European Integration, many studies have either focused 
on the salience of the issue (Eurosceptic parties can politicize the EU issue), or focused on 
country-based case studies (Baker et al 2008, for the UK; Quaglia 2008, for Italy, Van de Wardt 
2015, in Denmark). What is missing in this picture is the extra final step – an analysis that goes 
beyond looking at how mainstream parties drive the EU issue, and one that looks beyond single 
countries in a cross sectional, cross-temporal manner, which is what this project is meant to do. 
The Extremist or Radical Party Hypothesis of Issue Politicization stipulates that citizens 
do care about Europe, that they hold real preferences, but that these preferences are only tapped 
into by political parties (i.e. parties only provide them with a clear choice) when new parties, or 
previously smaller, challenger parties, initiate the discussion about any given issue. In other 
words, when they respond to the untapped electoral potential of the issue, fringe parties manage 
to politicize their favorite issue and force the other parties to take a stand on it. The tail wags the 
dog. According to the radical party hypothesis, B (Eurosceptic Parties doing well) causes C 
(change in other parties’ position), and B can be traced back to A (electorate attitudes and 
position). In other words, A causes B, which in turn causes C, but A would not cause C in the 
absence of B – the Eurosceptic Parties’ electoral tally. The radical Party hypothesis can thus be 
‘drawn up’ as pictured below. In order for contagion to occur, there must be a ‘legitimate’ 
Eurosceptic alternative to whom voters can defect to. It is possible for voters to exhibit policy 
41 
 
preferences that are not reflected by the political landscape on a certain issue (in the present case 
the EU). However, as was the case with the EU issue, this discrepancy does not translate into 
more votes for Eurosceptic parties, at least not initially, (for a variety of reasons28) and the other 
parties do not see an incentive to change their position on the EU issue until such a party arrives 
that can cash in on that discrepancy.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With time, circumstances change. European Integration accelerates and deepens, generating 
more clear-cut distributional consequences and grievances, and amplified discussion. At the 
same time, riding the wave of discontent about globalization, economic change and immigration, 
populist parties start to legitimize themselves, and make opposition to European Integration a 
staple of their political platform. They amplify the salience of the EU issue and alter the political 
issue agenda. In doing so they gain more votes capitalizing on the (until then) latent potential of 
public distrust towards ‘Europe’ (‘the sleeping giant’), and steadily increase their vote tallies. 
Because of the increasing debate/discussion about the EU and the altered agenda, EU issue 
voting now becomes a reality. Voters are now also shown the possibility of voting for alternative 
EU policy positions (closer to theirs than to all other parties in the center of the spectrum), and 
they become increasingly willing to use that option. This results in more vote loss for the center 
parties, which now have to respond via policy position changes. 
 
                                                 
28 Due to populist parties not yet being visible enough, due to voters not yet being ready/aggrieved/discontent 
enough to vote for nationalists, or due to such parties not offering visible/obvious  anti-Integration policies as 
alternatives to the mainstream EU policy preferences, due to the issue not being salient enough to cast votes on 
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Graphical Depiction of the Causal Model characterized by the presence of a successful Eurosceptic Party 
 
In a way, the extremist parties can be thought of as the ‘gears’ that connect the electorate to the 
political mainstream by forcing the latter to pay more attention and heed the political preferences 
of the former on issues that previously required little or no adjustment. Eurosceptic influence can 
be seen to have a certain democratic virtue in that they can force parties to be more accountable 
to voters and address the gap in preferences, and according to Treib, “the success of Eurosceptic 
parties can be seen as the upshot of a more fundamental process of dissatisfaction with the 
political programmes, leaders and modes of decision-making of mainstream politics” (Treib, 
2014, 1542).  De Wilde and Trenz argue on a similar note that “Euroscepticism is, in this sense, 
part of the democratization of the EU. It results from the uncertainty about the quality and scope 
of the EU-Polity and the fuzziness of the underlying demos” (De Wilde and Trenz, 2012, 550). 
These populist and Eurosceptic parties force the political mainstream to ‘re-engage’ with public 
attitudes and compete politically on questions of European Integration in an environment very 
different from the first decades of the European Community. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Graphical Depiction of the Causal Model  
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Figure 10: The Radical Party Hypothesis: The gears that move the system.  
Populist Parties as the means by which Mainstream Politics is influenced by the opinion landscape of voters 
 
The main hypothesis of this dissertation, a variant of the Radical Party Hypothesis is stated as 
follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The more successful Eurosceptic Parties are at national elections, the more the 
other parties will adjust their policy position on the EU issue in an anti-EU direction.  
While other studies (Meijers, 2015) have only focused on the cumulated votes gained by all 
Eurosceptic parties, I expect that political Parties should also focus on the ‘singular’ election 
results of a country’s biggest Eurosceptic parties. While the cumulated performance of populist 
parties is undoubtedly of much analyitical use, I argue that parties and publics can also focus 
their attention on singular political parties when these dominate the populist corner of a country’s 
political landscape (like the UKIP, the Front National). I thus expect the radical party hypothesis 
to hold for both kinds of Eurosceptic indicators. Not directly pursuant to the radical party 
hypothesis, but following from the past election model is the expectation that political parties use 
the information drawn from changes in election results (in terms of percenteges of votes gained 
by various parties) in order to learn more about public policy preferences, and not alternative 
instruments such as changes in the distribution of seats in parliament. While one might 
theoretically claim that parties could be concerned with gains and losses of legislative seats and 
use such changes as cues for positional shifts, such processes simply contain and transmit less 
information than the gains or losses of vote percentage points. As such, it is expected that while 
the past election model holds with regards to the actual numbers of election results, it should not 
when substituting raw election results for legislative seat change. 
Not ignoring the competing views on the interplay between mainstream and fringe 
parties, this study also pays due attention to the hypothesis that the causal arrows runs in the 
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opposite direction. According to this inverse logic of populist parties (Green-Pedersen 2012, 
Dahlström and Sundell 2012) Eurosceptic Parties gain votes only after mainstream parties have 
themselves moved in a Eurosceptic direction because moderate parties must first politicize the 
issue and in a way ‘legitimize’ opposition to European Integration. If it is true that mainstream 
position changes actually precede the success (or failure) of Eurosceptic Parties, we would 
expect the following hypothesis to hold: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Previous position changes in the position of Mainstream Parties in a 
Eurosceptic Direction results in subsequent electoral gains by Eurosceptic Parties. 
 
The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
In the previous section I theorized that Eurosceptic contagion will occur because political parties 
use election results as a tool to learn more about the electorate, and that such adaptation occurs in 
order to secure votes and prevent vote loss in the future. That is one part of the explanation for 
the phenomenon explored here. A second part of the explanation must address the question of 
circumstances in which such contagion occurs. It has already been argued that European Politics 
have suffered from a discrepancy in opinion and policy preferences between elites and masses. 
Political leaders and mainstream politicians held views of European integration that did not 
reflect the opinions of the electorate, which was generally less inclined to view regional 
integration favorably. The logic of proximity theory and the intuition that political parties are 
vote-seeking dictates that parties should have adjusted to their less Europhile constituencies, and 
that this gap in positions should have not occurred. If political parties are using election results to 
adjust their positions in the present day, they should have done so previously as well. 
Alternatively, if parties were unresponsive to the masses on certain issues, such as the EU, one 
might expect them to care very little about those issues today as well. In explaining this apparent 
contradiction it must be remembered that the circumstances of European Politics have over the 
past few decades changed in certain important ways: the strength and appeal of populist and 
Eurosceptic parties on the one hand, and the salience of the European question on the other. 
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These two factors have gone hand in hand, and it is not unlikely that they have reinforced each 
other. 
From Deschouwer to Green-Pedersen to Mair, those authors who dismissed the relevance 
of Euroscepticism did so because they did not think Eurosceptic Parties could make significant 
electoral gains, and that assessment as in part rooted in the assumption that the European issue is 
not salient enough to be of political consequence. Should populist parties make gains, they would 
do so on other issues (for example immigration) and contagion would likely occur in that area, 
but not expand to Integration. The Problem with that assessment is that Eurosceptic parties have 
been performing better and the salience of European Integration has gone up. These trends can 
be attributed to a multitude of things but the general gist of the idea is that as European 
Integration became more profound and affected ever more walks of life, voters became 
increasingly aware of it, its implications and redistributive effects. This activated a further niche 
for populist parties to exploit, which in turn provided them with more visibility. Such parties 
used the new platform and political capital to mobilize the issue and exert pressure on their party 
systems, further driving up the salience of the issue. Simply put, as time passed the salience of 
the EU issue as well as the electoral performance of Eurosceptic parties have gone up, and it is 
logical to assume that Eurosceptic Contagion could be a function of not only electoral outcomes 
but also the passage of time. If Eurosceptic parties have been ever more successful in mobilizing 
the issue as time went on, we might expect a similar relationship between electoral change and 
the degree to which Eurosceptic parties consider the European issue salient. An increasing body 
of literature attests to the increasing significance of the European Issue including the seminal 
work of Hooghe and Marks (2009) who argue that politics in Europe have entered a new phase 
in which mainstream parties have been forced to address and adapt to the simmering opposition 
to the EU that resides in Europe’s polities. Hobolt (2014, 1534) argued that European citizens are 
becoming “increasingly aware (of) the Euro crisis and more likely to hold the EU, rather than 
their national governments, responsible for the economic circumstances in their country”. 
Various pieces in the state of the art attest to the increased public contention over 
‘Europe’reported in the media in relation to electoral and political party competition (Hooghe et 
al 2002, Kriesi et al 2006, Schuck et al 2011, De Vries 2007, Kriesi 2007, van der Eijk and 
Franklin 2004), and according to the likes of De Wilde and Zürn (2012), attempts to combat and 
oppose the trends of EU issue politicization are doomed to be unsuccessful.  
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Changes in the electoral trends of populist parties coincide with trends of growth for the 
salience of the EU issue. Arguably, EU integration has not always been as important to political 
parties (populist and moderates alike) as it has been recently. Between the early 90’s and now, 
questions about the desired shape of regional and transnational governance and integration have 
grown in importance, and the rise of Eurosceptic parties has gone hand in hand with that of the 
EU issue. Because the EU has become a more divisive and contentious issue as we move closer 
to the present day, one may expect the effect that Eurosceptic Parties have on other parties to 
interact with time, we can expect Eurosceptic contagion to be stronger as we come closer to the 
present day, in line with the New Cleavage Hypothesis according to which Europe is slowly but 
surely entering an era of ‘novel political conflict’. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The phenomenon of Eurosceptic contagion gained strength as time passed and 
moved closer to the present. 
According to Gabel and Scheve (2007), and Szczerbiak and Taggart(2008) Eurosceptic ideas can 
find refuge even within large parties under the right circumstances. This can happen when a 
party needs to adopt an issue which can turn around their worsening fortune, or when internal 
conflict within the party ‘transpires out’ and makes the world aware of the potential friction 
within the party. In this regard, Szczerbiak and Taggart are not arguing the mainstream parties in 
question are pioneering the issue, but that they find themselves in an environment where the 
issue has been put on the political agenda already. Adam and Maier (2011) have showed that EU 
issues and their articulation are more prominent in countries with many (or visible) Eurosceptic 
parties. Such arguments suggest that the likelihood of EU-related questions landing on the media 
agenda (all things being equal) is greater when domestic political actors give the issue a “face”, 
and this is in turn more likely to happen when Eurosceptic parties are pushing the issue through. 
Evidence that inter-party conflict can drive media reporting of European issues can further be 
found in De Vries et al (2011, 24-25) Wonka (2015, 135) and Schuck et al (2011 43-49). All this 
suggests, moreover, that a self-reinforcing process may be at play with regards to political 
cueing, since voters also respond to parties and the political agenda and positions they promote. 
Such a top down view is promoted by Ray (2003), and while parties in general try to cue and 
influence the electorate, Steenbergen, Edwards and De Vries (2007, 29) have shown that the 
disconnect between masses and elites is particularly strong in mainstream parties, and that 
47 
 
radical parties are the strongest and most effective political cuers. Accordingly, what matters 
most for the politicization of European Integration is the degree to which populist parties are 
willing to mobilize the EU issue. If the integration is a very salient topic for them, there should 
be more Eurosceptic Contagion than otherwise. 
In the first part of this chapter in which I presented the more fundamental literature and 
theory on party competition, I have argued that electoral politics can be seen as being not only a 
function of policy positions, but also entailing a degree agenda setting struggle. The salience 
perspective on electoral contests can be seen as complementary to proximity theory. As stated 
above, Eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs try to promote the issue of Integration to the agenda, as 
it is a dimension of competition where they enjoy certain advantages. Moreover, if a populist 
party has a somewhat Eurosceptic policy position but does not care _that_ much about Europe, 
and does not prioritize the issue, it will not have such a strong effect on other parties, since those 
parties will themselves deduce that it is not the EU issue that is costing them votes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: The phenomenon of Eurosceptic contagion is stronger when the EU issue 
highly is salient for Populist Parties. 
Following the same logic as above, there might be an interaction effect between how well 
Eurosceptic Parties do and how ‘extreme’ or radical Eurosceptic parties are. A softer Eurosceptic 
doing well might elicit a different response from a hard Eurosceptic gaining the same votes 
because the difference in position (on the EU issue) between the two types of parties would tell 
different stories to the mainstream parties that are losing votes: in one case their voters are 
defecting to a party that lies far away from them on the ‘vertical’ EU issue at an extreme ‘anti-
EU’ position. In another case, voters are abandoning the party for another party that lies 
somewhat closer to the center, just ‘somewhat’ opposed to European Integration. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The effect of Eurosceptic success on mainstream party positions depends on 
how strongly opposed to European Integration the former are. 
This hypothesis is not directional because both types of responses from mainstream parties could 
be observable. On the one hand, moderate parties might respond more strongly (in an anti-
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integration direction) if the Eurosceptic party is a hard Eurosceptic, because the distance to its 
own position would communicate to it just how far away it was from those voters that did defect. 
On the other hand, parties might employ a more tactical approach, whereby they see a moderate 
Eurosceptic party as a party that can be seen as a legitimate alternative by more voters than if it 
were very radical. In such circumstances, the moderate party might deem that it stands more to 
lose in an upcoming election to a soft Eurosceptic than to a hard Eurosceptic and display more 
energetic position shifts.  
 
What Motivates Parties to co-opt Eurosceptic positions?  
 
Previous sections of this theoretical section addressed the Radical Party Hypothesis, applied to 
the issue of regional integration. While that takes us some distance in filling the empirical gap in 
the field, there are more questions that remain to be asked. What are the dynamics of mainstream 
(and other moderate) parties’ response to Eurosceptics? If parties do change their position on the 
EU question, do some parties do it more than others? Is there a difference in parties’ 
susceptibility to Eurosceptic discourse? Ultimately, what motivates parties in their responses? 
The literature on party-based Euroscepticism has largely tended to focus on two kinds of 
explanations for the phenomenon: explanations grounded in ideological foundations on the one 
hand, and explanations of a strategic/tactical nature on the other. This underlies a deeper question 
of whether political parties view European Integration as a matter of principle, or whether they 
see it as just another piece in the tactical toolbox. The implications of this question can be huge, 
answering them could shed some light on the direction in which European Politics are heading 
in. While the central focal point of this study is to fill the empirical gap surrounding Eurosceptic 
Contagion, and does not seek primarily to do justice in the ideology and conviction vs tactics and 
strategy debate, the project takes turns in analyzing and assessing the predictions made by one 
side or the other vis-à-vis the EU issue and party based Euroscepticism. The dichotomy can be a 
useful heuristic to structure the analysis.  
The tactical/strategic/pragmatic explanations (Meguid, 2008; W.Downs, 2002; Sitter, 
2001) stress the idea that parties do not have any  sort of ‘natural’ or de facto tendencies towards 
more or less Europe and Euroscepticism, but will rather borrow elements of eurocautious or 
eurocritical discourse in an opportunistic manner, to gain an advantage over their main 
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competitors. According to such a position, parties want to win elections, win office, and keep a 
hold of voters, and the pursuit of European Integration is not intrinsically important to them. And 
if turning their back on EU integration or somehow helping Eurosceptic parties damage their 
rivals, they would do so. It is expected in this line of reasoning that parties will make use of this 
issue in order to maximize their chances of becoming formateur party or at least a part of the 
governing coalition, even if that means strengthening support for Eurosceptic parties (because 
that added Eurosceptic strength damages rivals more than it does them). 
The Radical Party hypothesis can be seen to address the question of contagion on a more 
basic level, since it postulates that moderate parties would respond to Eurosceptic electoral 
success, irrespective of where the latter gain their votes(i.e. it does not address the issue of 
whether parties need to lose votes to the populist challenger in order to respond to the latter’s 
gain). The ‘micro-logic’ of the past-election model employed in this project argues that political 
parties use changes in distribution of votes across the political spectrum to gauge public opinion, 
and implies that a political party will deduce on the basis of electoral change how public opinion 
as evolved. Two indicators it will put to use are the electoral gain/loss of Eurosceptic parties, and 
its own electoral gain/loss. I theorize that Eurosceptic Contagion should be stronger if the 
electoral gain of populists is coupled with the electoral loss of the centrist party (generating a 
zero-sum dynamic) than if the centrist party does not register any vote loss at all. Both instances 
will communicate to the political party that there is an overall change in the electorate, but in the 
case of zero-sum loss, a further lesson is drawn: that it is one’s own voters that are fueling the 
Eurosceptic Party.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The more votes political parties lose compared to previous elections, the 
stronger their shift in a Eurosceptic direction as a consequence of Eurosceptic Success. 
What happens, however, if Eurosceptic parties gain votes and the moderate party (party “A”) 
observes that it has not lost votes, but other mainstream parties have? Or what happens when 
both lose votes, but “A” much less so than other competitors from the political center (thus 
generating a relative gain for “A”)? If moderate parties do not instrumentalize European 
Integration as a means to damage their moderate opponents, if they only care about general vote 
loss/defection to Eurosceptic Parties, and are only interested in limiting own voter defection to 
50 
 
Eurosceptic parties, then the only two factors that will matter are their own electoral performance 
and those of the Eurosceptic challengers, ignoring the other mainstream parties. They will adjust 
their position to reverse the flow of supporters between themselves and populist parties, 
regardless whether such a position shift from their behalf helps or damages other centrist parties 
- this might suggest a more natural and intrinsic inclination towards transnational governance. If 
a tactical or strategic approach to populist Eurosceptic challengers is taken, then other factors, 
such as relative political gain or incumbency status would determine the phenomenon of 
Eurosceptic Contagion. 
 
EU Integration as Opposition Politics? 
One strategic view on radical party contagion and adaptation, whose primary proponent is 
Bonnie Meguid, argues that whether or not a mainstream party will move to copy the discourse 
of eurosceptics and populists depends on whether it believes it can gain votes relative to other 
mainstream contenders, regardless of its government/opposition status.  
Hypothesis 7: The way and degree to which mainstream parties react to Eurosceptic success is 
a function of strategic considerations.  
Hypothesis 7 can be further operationalized as a set of sub-hypothesis, corresponding to the 
predictions made by the hypothesis. Sometimes, the growth of a populist/Eurosceptic challenger 
can be more damaging to a rival than to oneself. Parties will try to oppose the radical party (so in 
this case argue in favor of ‘more Europe’), even if they lose voters to Eurosceptic challengers, as 
long as their centrist competitors lose even more votes to the aforementioned populist policy 
entrepreneur, because their loss is actually a relative gain within the political center, they gain in 
relative strength. Thus, if a party (for example the Greens) loses 5% compared to its last electoral 
performance, but the largest party in the country (the Christian Democrats for example) loses 
10%, then the first party will have gained 5% relative to its larger rival. As a consequence, more 
interparty competition and higher salience on an issue will favor the party that registers relative 
gains, and that party will seek to amply conflict by arguing against Eurosceptic positions. This 
would work because by opposing the Eurosceptic party, the mainstream party spurs greater 
debate on the issue of integration. This increases the visibility of the Eurosceptic party, amplifies 
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the salience of the issue and makes even more voters defect their centrist competitors and move 
to the political fringes. Because a party might feel confident that it has less to lose than its rivals, 
it could seek to maximize issue salience by opposing the Eurosceptic Party. On the flipside, 
according to the same view, if parties feel that they are losing more voters to the Eurosceptic 
challenger than their centrist competitors do, they will actually shift position in a more 
Eurosceptic direction to draw back the voters they are losing (as a sort of damage limitation 
measure). These parties realize that they cannot win the shootout, and have to ‘accommodate’ to 
the more Eurosceptic positions to mitigate voter defection and limit damage. This explanation is 
intrinsically tied to the salience approach to party politics, since the choice of position 
divergence relies on the expectation that more debate leads to more salience, which in turn leads 
to more voters for the populists. According to such an explanation, I expect that: 
H7b: Political Parties’ will change their policy position in a pro-EU direction if they are gaining 
votes relative to their biggest rivals, and will change their policy position in an anti-EU direction 
if they are losing votes relative to their biggest rivals. 
The same logic can be taken one step further. One could look at parties‘ vote changes 
relative to their rivals, but instead of comparing the changes in percentage of votes that each 
gained from the 100 per cent possible at each election, compare the changes considering how 
much percent of a party’s previous total vote the change between elections represented. So if in a 
hypothetical scenario, at the previous election the Greens won 10% of the overall vote, and at the 
most recent one only gained 5%, while the CDU went from 40% to 30%, the Greens gained 5% 
relative to the CDU in absolute terms. But because 5 is 50% out of 10, the greens will have lost 
half of their previous voters. If the CDU lose 10% between elections and go from 40 to 30, they 
will lose 25% of their voters. The question presents itself: will the Greens be emboldened by the 
fact that it gained 5% relative to the CDU, or distraught by the fact that it lost 50% of its voters, 
compared to only 25% of the CDU?  
H7c: Political Parties’ will change their policy position in a pro-EU direction if they lost a 
smaller share of their own previous vote tally than their biggest rivals did, and will change their 
policy position in an anti-EU direction if they lost a larger share of their own previous vote tally 
than their biggest rivals did 
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A number of recent works (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008, Sitter 2001, Crum, 2007, 
Hutter and Grande 2014, Van de Wardt 2015) supports the ‘strategic’ perspective that 
government-opposition dynamics govern the tug of war on questions of regional integration. 
Parties in opposition have less policy commitments to respect, and as such can be more critical 
towards policies on Europe (or policies which can be associated subsequently with the EU). 
They have more leeway to criticize the EU, and they are freer to criticize the policies of whoever 
is in power because they are not themselves represented in the European policy circles of 
Brussels. For parties in government, on the other hand, it is a bit harder to qualify their 
traditional pro-integration stance, and they are also under pressure to defend many policies that 
might seem pro-integration. On the one hand, the might be the co-authors of such policies in the 
European Council and Council of Ministers. On the other hand, even if they do not support 
policy provisions made in Brussels and Strasbourg. EU rules tend to impose certain policy 
constraints on governing parties. Lest they appear impotent on the transnational scene, or self-
contradictory towards policies they have themselves designed, governing parties will try to cast 
such policies or policy constraints in a good light. They are thus at a tactical disadvantage 
compared to those in opposition because fewer strategies are open to them. While the arguments 
which opposition parties make against the EU may be cynical and an attempt to order to piggy-
back on the populist wave, it allows them greater freedom and flexibility in qualifying their 
discourse on the benefits of EU policy. If Eurosceptic contagion is just as strong amongst 
opposition and governing parties, there is reason to believe that parties are not as willing to go all 
the way to get back into office. 
H7d: Eurosceptic contagion will happen to a higher degree for parties in opposition than for 
parties in government. 
 
An Ideological Take 
While tactical/instrumental explanations argue that electoral pragmatism is what dictates how 
parties handle the success of Eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs, others have argued that we should 
look into the ideological orientations of parties in order to find the answers. Most often, such 
views are associated with work by Marks and Wilson (2000), Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 
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(2002), E. Edwards and Catherine de Vries (2009), who suggest that the debate on Europe is 
grounded in domestic political cleavage and conflict. They argue that questions on European 
Integration are assimilated by party leaders, activists and constituencies into already existing 
cleavages, which reflect longer standing commitments on fundamental policy issues. Marks and 
Wilson’s Cleavage Theory of Party Positions on European Integration (2000) and Hooghe and 
Marks’ Postfunctionalist Theorys are maybe the foremost examples of work along these lines. 
For Lachat and Kriesi(2008a, 2012), Euroscepticism is not simply part of ‘politics of opposition’ 
– they suggest that the question of Europe is part of a new structural conflict, which they define 
as integration versus demarcation. Integration is understood by the authors more broadly as 
globalization/integration into the European and Global Community and demarcation refers to 
that of the national community. Based on the more ideological perspective29 on party-behavior 
vis-à-vis the European Question, a more general hypothesis is formulated in the first stage: 
Hypothesis 8: Political Parties’ propensity to change their policy position on the question of 
European Integration due to Eurosceptic success is a function of ideological orientations 
Should the hypothesis not hold, one would expect to find no interaction between party ideology 
and election result changes. The hypothesis is left non-directional on purpose because of the 
complex relationship that the left and right have had with European Integration over time. The 
Left and the Right have faced integration logics in reverse: parties on the left have generally been 
more pro-state and multiculturalist in orientation, while parties on the right brought together pro-
market and monoculturalist positions (Van Elsas and Van de Brug 2015, 198). Seeking to protect 
the national social space, the center left was more likely to oppose regional integration in its 
incipient phases. As negative integration came about and market liberalization became ever more 
a reality, the utility functions for the two political sides changed. Social democrats saw the 
‘possibility curve’ turning from national social democracy to single market competition regime 
to the prospect of a European organized social space (Marks and Wilson 2000, 444) while 
                                                 
29 The left-right axis can to some degree be seen as sub-optimal for measuring party ideology in a broader sense, 
since it is often used as a short-cut for positions on public expenditure and economic policy. A more recent and 
possibly better alternative is the GAL-TAN axis (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002) which measures party stances 
less from an economic and more from a cultural standpoint. Unfortunately, the main dataset used in this project, the 
Chapel-Hill expert survey does not include GAL-TAN measurements for all the years required. Fortunately, the 
survey also includes different variables/questions that distinguish between economic left-right positions (the more 
traditional usage) and general left-right positions of parties, which also touch upon more fundamental ideological 
issues, beyond the pure economic field. 
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neoliberals and nationalists began to oppose the prospect of supranational regulation or 
supranational governance (454). It would thus be possible in principle for both the center right 
and the center left to be more susceptible to Eurosceptic contagion than the other. 
To say that party responses to Eurosceptic success depend on the ideological dimension is 
not the whole story. One may theorize that how ‘centrist’ or politically moderate a party is 
influences how susceptible it is to Eurosceptic contagion. While such an explanation continues 
along the line of reasoning that party ideologies matter, it suggests that another important 
question is that of parties’ distance from the center/poles regardless whether left or right. It is by 
now almost taken for granted that fringe parties are more skeptical of European Integration than 
centrist parties (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002). But are parties closer to the political pole also 
more immobile and less susceptible to Eurosceptic contagion? While the typical Eurosceptic 
party is one that lies at the fringe of the economic dimension, there are exceptions to this rule, 
and not all pro-EU or moderate parties lie at the very center of the economic or general left-right 
axis. This begs the question, does proximity to the political center affect a party’s tendency to 
react to Eurosceptic success?  
Thus, the ideological hypothesis is specified further in a set of sub-hypotheses: 
H8b: The effect of Eurosceptic success on mainstream party positions on the EU issue is 
different for parties left and right of the ideological center.  
H8c: The effect of Eurosceptic success on mainstream party positions on the EU issue is 
stronger for parties in the ideological left-right center. 
A prediction that political parties will be particularly responsive to policy shifts by fellow 
members of their ideological family is what Somer-Topcu (2009, 826) refers to as the 
‘Ideological families’ thesis, an inference drawn straight from Downsian proximity theory. 
According to such a view, mainstream parties on the left will be more affected by the 
Eurosceptic success of far left and left wing parties, while mainstream parties to the right of the 
political center will be more sensitive to the success of far right parties. Because each type of 
moderate party has certain fringe challengers that it would be more responsive to but not others, 
there should be no overall trend or tendency for some mainstream parties to be more afflicted by 
Eurosceptic success. An alternative view to that on ideological mediators of the phenomenon of 
Eurosceptic contagion would be that either the center left or the center right would be more 
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susceptible (than the other side of the political spectrum) to Eurosceptic contagion not because of 
some intrinsic aspect of party ideology that defines how parties react, but by different electoral 
dilemmas that the left and right are faced with. In one example from the recent literature which 
carries a similar research design to this but carries certain methodological and analytical 
differences to the one present here, Mejiers ( 2015) argues that Center-Left and Center-Right 
parties are subject to different electoral kinds of pressure, this being also a function of the 
difference between the far right and the far left. The author argues that Eurosceptic contagion 
carries different strengths on the two sides of the spectrum, and that parties on the left side are 
more strongly influenced by Eurosceptic Party success than those on the right side of the center: 
right-wing Eurosceptic parties are hypothesized to have an advantage over left-wing populists 
because their ideological baggage is more flexible. Left-wing parties traditionally promoted 
economic protectionism, while right-wing parties promoted cultural protectionism, but right-
wing parties easily incorporated part of left wing discourse (concerns about economic 
liberalization) into their own under the form of welfare chauvinism; the left wing, it is argued, 
had no possibility of mirroring such a move. Thus, the implication is that right wing populists 
steal votes from both center right and center left parties, while left wing populists attract only 
from the center-left, putting social-democrats under more pressure than parties from the center 
right, and thus a stronger incentive to shift position, contagion being stronger on the left. 
Such hypotheses merit attention and will be duly tested, but one should not discard 
alternative explanations about who draws votes from whom. While it is true that center left and 
left-wing parties have traditionally been proponents of economic protectionism, the left side of 
the political spectrum has also been the one pursuing cultural liberalization; with the right 
favoring cultural protectionism and economic liberalization, many right wing parties (Lega Nord, 
The Progress Party) started out as parties with a pro-market, anti-tax, anti-statist focus) – a policy 
position inimical to left-wing voters. Such explanations question the ideological backbone of 
left/GAL voters and their consistency30, ignoring the fact that it is more likely, and probable for 
far right Eurosceptic parties to draw their voters from the center right (in line with predictions of 
the ‘ideological families’ thesis), and for far-left parties to draw their voters from the center left. 
Mejiers’ explanation also ignores the fact that in southern Europe (and not only, see for example 
                                                 
30 To argue in layman’s terms, the argument made is that while traditional voters  from the right side are chauvinistic, those who 
typically voted for the left are protectionists _and_ chauvinists, hence the ease with which their switch allegiance  
56 
 
Ireland), leftist populist Parties have traditionally been stronger, and have also made electoral 
gains that dwarf those of right wing parties (Podemos in Spain, Cinque Stelle in Italy, etc).  
H8d The effects of right-wing Eurosceptic success on mainstream party positions is stronger 
than the effect of left-wing Eurosceptic success 
H8e: Right-wing Eurosceptic success has a bigger impact on center right parties and Left-wing 
Eurosceptic success has a bigger impact on center left parties. 
 
A Geographical Take 
The view that left wing and right wing success could generate entirely different contagion 
dynamics is not unfounded, but something else might underlie it. Previous research suggests that 
south Europeans tend to be more pro-European in the general outlook than citizens from other 
countries (Conti et al 2010), and it has been shown that Euroscepticism in Italy has tended to be 
more of the ‘economic’ kind (Quaglia 2011). Based on such argumentation, one could postulate 
that different types regions of Europe (in the sense of a North-South Divide) might be more 
sensitive to different types of integration (economic versus cultural and political). Such a 
difference in the manifestation of Euroscepticism between North and South European countries 
was noted by Treib (2014, 1549) who states that austerity measures implemented in southern EU 
countries and related public discontent increased the potential support for left-wing or centrist 
Eurosceptic Parties, while fears of economic and financial risk associated with bail-outs for the 
South were a driving force for support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. Val Elsas 
and Van Der Brug (2014, 211) argued similarly that on the right citizens in more affluent 
Northern Countries are discontent with monetary integration due to concerns that they have to 
pay for Southerners’ claimed economic mismanagement. 
 
Hn-s: The dynamics of Right-Wing and Left-Wing Eurosceptic Contagion are different in 
Northern and Southern Europe. 
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The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion Revisited – an InstitutionalTake 
 
According to Hix and Marsh (2007) ‘European Effects’ are negligible in EP elections, with the 
EU position of parties being irrelevant to its electoral faring, and 40 per cent of the volatility in 
party vote shares being attributed to transfer from governing parties to opposition parties. 
Hobolt, Spoon, and Tilley (2009) advocate for the opposite view, according to which voters can 
defect from governing parties because those are deemed to be too European. Hobolt and 
Wittrock (2010) subsequently argued that while voters would likely base their party choice at EU 
elections on domestic issue preferences, the base on which the vote is cast could change provided 
contexts with sufficient information. European Elections have often been referred to as second-
order national elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif 1997). If one takes the idea at face value, 
she could be forgiven for deducing that European elections simply matter ‘less’ for political 
parties, and hence, that their results have less, or no effect on parties’ positions on various issues, 
including the EU one. Testing such a hypothesis is easy and straightforward: one simply 
substitutes the change in election results of Eurosceptic parties between the two most recent 
national elections with change in election results of Eurosceptic parties between the two most 
recent EP elections. 
H10: If Eurosceptic parties are successful at European elections, their mainstream 
competitors will co-opt their policy positions and shift their own position in an anti-integration 
direction/Eurosceptic contagion follows. 
 
Institutions and institutional design are crucial to the running of political systems. Some of 
political science’s most solid axioms are those derived from the differences between proportional 
and majoritarian electoral systems. While Duverger’s law (Duverger 1954, Riker 1982) teaches 
us, as an axiom of political science, that majoritarian and proportional rules will produce party 
systems with differing structures, there is more that can be said and expected beyond such 
differences in institutional design. Previous research shows that majoritarian electoral systems 
and systems of proportional representation produce different electoral outcomes because they 
can favor different types of parties (in the sense of their ideological orientation). Cox (1990) 
noted that different types of electoral rules can generate various types of policy-taking incentives 
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for parties and candidates, which in turn can result in some political systems being varyingly 
centripetal or centrifugal.  
Abramson et al (2010, 63-64) argue that there is little difference between proportional 
and FPTP systems with regards to the likelihood of spurring tactical, or insincere voting, others 
have shown that the differences in outcomes between the types of electoral systems can extend 
far beyond the number-of-parties equilibrium, with significant consequences for the types of 
political parties and coalitions they favor and all the way to the types of welfare states that are 
thus facilitated (Manow 2009, Iversen and Soskice, 2006). One of the most important effects of 
majoritarian systems is the increased likelihood of strategic, or tactical, voting occurring, which 
tends to suppress the vote tallies of small and fringe parties. Empirical evidence has accumulated 
over time to show that what Downs (1957) and Riker (1982) refer to as sophisticated voting does 
indeed occur to a high degree (Neto and Cox, 1997; Franklin, Niemi and Whitten, 1994; Niemi 
et al 1992), most often to the disadvantage of third parties (Riker 1982, 764). The strategic 
voting thesis postulates that voters who are afraid of “wasting” their vote on a non-winning party 
will instead vote for a party that is not their ‘first choice’ but instead for one which they think has 
a chance of transforming their vote in a representative seat. Since simple plurality and single 
ballot systems tend to generate a “winner take all” outcome, it is further postulated that voters in 
such systems are more likely to ‘vote with their mind, not with their heart’. Meffert and 
Gschwend (2011) refer to ‘insincere voting’ and demonstrate that it can occur for a variety of 
reasons. Most importantly perhaps, voters are likely to defect from their preferred party or 
candidate if they have no chance of winning, an idea in line with the argumentation that winner-
take-all first past the post systems might generate more strategic voting. This kind of mechanism 
was also described by Anthony Downs, in which he referred to as sophisticated voting “ A 
rational voter first decides what party he believes he will benefit him most; then he tries to 
estimate whether  this party has any chance of winning. He does this because his vote should be 
expended as part of a selection process, not as an expression of preference. Hence even if he 
prefers party A, he is “wasting” his vote on A if it has no chance of winning, because very few 
other voters prefer it to B or C. The relevant choice in this case is between B and C. Since a vote 
for A is not useful in the actual process of selection, casting it is irrational” (1957, 48). Because 
voters are less likely to cast votes for the parties truly closer to their position, elections results 
don’t reflect the opinion landscape or public opinion dynamics as well, and the information 
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mechanism is altered or weakened. Mainstream parties are then given less of a nudge in the 
Eurosceptic direction themselves. On this basis, one would predict less expressions of 
Eurosceptic contagion in majoritarian systems; the more proportional a party system is, the 
stronger the phenomenon of Eurosceptic contagion we expect to be. 
While I expect this interaction to have that direction with regards to national elections, 
there is reason to believe that an inverse interaction is at play when it comes to European 
elections. If a country organizes its parliamentary elections according to first-past-the-post rules, 
but is involved in a multi-level system (the EU) whose other-level elections are held on a 
proportional basis, then those other-level elections (the EP elections) might be the ones whose 
outcome better reflect the distribution of policy positions among the electorate because there is 
less strategic voting going on at European Elections than in National elections. There are bases in 
such systems for fringe, niche, and populist parties to do better in the supra-national elections 
that in the national ones and those extra-level elections might be better at conveying the 
information needed for Eurosceptic contagion to occur (thus rendering the political system of the 
country quasi-proportional). It is hence only natural to ask whether proportional and majoritarian 
systems generate different patterns of Eurosceptic contagion.   
H11b: Eurosceptic contagion resulting from the national electoral contest will be stronger in 
more proportional systems, and weaker in less proportional ones 
H11c: Eurosceptic contagion resulting from European Parliament elections will be stronger 
in more majoritarian systems than in proportional ones  
As was argued previously, the most recent European Elections were a resounding success for 
soft and hard Eurosceptic parties. According to the old view that European elections are second-
order national elections, parties and politicians don’t pay much attention to EP elections and 
voters use them as a means to commend or condemn governing parties by punishing them in the 
‘mid term’. A question begs, whether we can find evidence that voters used EP elections to 
punish parties on the basis of their positions on the EU issue. That voters punish governing 
parties in mid-term elections is no secret. The question is whom do they transfer votes to. If 
moderate parties are replaced with other moderate parties, it would imply that it is not discontent 
with EU position, but some other factors, that explain the outcome, perhaps just the desire to cast 
a negative vote. Alternatively, it could be that the EP election really is about Europe. More 
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precisely, if voters were unhappy with governing parties’ position European Integration, have 
they tended to transfer their votes to Eurosceptic parties via EP elections? In practice, this means 
measuring whether gains or losses by Eurosceptic parties at EP elections correlate with the 
distance in policy position between the electorate and the average position of governing parties. 
The assumption/thesis is that the fate of Eurosceptic parties at EP elections correlates with the 
dissonance in policy preferences between governing parties and the electorate.  The 
corresponding alternative hypothesis for this is: 
H12: Eurosceptic parties gain votes at EP elections when there is a large dissonance in EU 
preferences between the more eurosceptic electorate and more pro-Integration governing 
parties. 
 
Rounding up and Coming Round again 
 
The Sleeping Giant Metaphor of Franklin and Van der Eijk rests on certain premises about 
present-day politics in Europe, all of which can be tested. Firstly, do voters hold real attitudes 
about European Integration? Secondly, have elites displayed differing positions from (and is 
there a lack of response to) voters’ attitudes? In other words, is there a gap in preferences, a 
discrepancy between policy supply and demand? As opinion polls and surveys have showed 
repeatedly over the past decade and half, the public is increasingly cautious of European 
Integration, and political parties have not reflected such moods in their own policy positions fast 
enough to alleviate voter concerns. In most countries of the European Union, inter-party 
competition on the topic of European Integration has been weaker than on the traditional 
left/right issues, and party positions have tended to better reflect voters’ left-right preferences 
than on alternative issues (Mattilla and Raunio, 2010). Among voters however,  the divide on 
Europe seems to be as strong as the left/right one. Franklin and Van Der Eijk (2004) posit that a 
surprisingly large proportion of the electorate hold „real‟ attitudes and display meaningful 
variation in EU preferences. To a large degree, these preferences criss-cross traditional lines of 
party affiliations (and are even orthogonal to the left-right orientation).  Thirdly, are Eurosceptic 
parties in a position to promote the question of Europe within the larger political system? In 
other words, are populist parties able to influence the agenda of political discussion and turn the 
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EU into a salient issue? The sleeping giant thesis assumes that inter-party contestation on the EU 
is most likely to spur when Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs mediate public apprehension 
towards integration. This is because, so argue Van der Eijk and Franklin, even though most 
voters would be prepared to vote on the basis of EU preferences (be they for or against), elites 
(political parties, politicians) have largely had a tendency to downplay the EU issue (Pennings 
2006, 268). A key point made by Van der Eijk and Franklin is that „voter readiness is not 
enough‟ – as mainstream parties would continue to „ignore‟ Europe in elections – some policy 
entrepreneur has to come along and be willing to capitalize on these preconditions for the 
purpose of winning votes that otherwise would have gone to other parties (this is essentially the 
Extremist (or Radical) Party Hypothesis of issue politicization). 
The answer to that third question, too, is affirmative. Populist parties have over the past 
twenty years become increasingly aware of the potential weapon of Euroscceptic discourse. 
European Integration has by now become one of their premier tools, and one of the issues that is 
most important for them. One can say that fringe parties have gone from being mere populist to 
populist Eurosceptic parties over the past two decades. They noticed the political gap between 
masses and elites, occupied that niche and took advantage of its political potential. The final step 
that needs to be taken now is to see how mainstream parties themselves reacted to these 
(successful) moves by their fringe challengers. Is there evidence that Eurosceptic discourse has 
contaminated the political systems of Western Europe? And will Europe’s political establishment 
react in a way that suggests continuous belief in ‘ever closer union’, or just opportunistic drive 
that will result in them turning their backs on Brussels when the going gets too tough? 
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3. Research Design 
 
Introduction 
 
This study is cross sectional and cross temporal in design, and makes use of a panel dataset to 
explore party position changes over time. As argued when describing the empirical gap 
addressed by this project, research designs following similar logics - whereby it is analyzed 
whether changes in parties’ positions correlate with measures of support for parties (such as 
electoral results) - have been used previously (for example Van Spanje 2010; Dahlström and 
Sundell, 2012; Schumacher et al, 2013), but only for the investigation of related phenomena 
(position on immigration, environmental issues) and attention has only recently begun being 
given to Eurosceptic Contagion in a large N manner. The main idea behind it is that if we can 
measure various parties’ positions (on a certain policy issue) at regular intervals and measure the 
degree of public approval towards populist parties (or in this case, Eurosceptic parties in 
particular) likewise at regular intervals, we can measure the degree to which they correlate with 
each other. It is thus possible to test whether higher approval rates for Eurosceptic parties are 
consistently and repeatedly followed by changes in the other parties’ positions on the question of 
the EU (or the other way around). The aim is to strive for a logic whereby change between T1 
and T2 on the independent variable correlates with changes between T2 and T3 on the dependent 
variable. 
Before delving more profoundly into questions of Research Design, some specifications 
must be made with regards to the underlying logic of the study. It is important to note that the 
weight of this investigation falls on the behavior of the mainstream/centrist parties, and not the 
challenger/populist parties. It is not intrinsically concerned with what Eurosceptic Parties did that 
led to their heightened levels of support (albeit the issue is discussed in the closing part of this 
project), the focus being on the consequences of that support. An often recurring argument is that 
populist parties owe their success not only to opposition to European Integration, but also other 
political contentious issues that they have fringe or radical positions on, and indeed the argument 
is extended that their position on the EU might be barely marginal to that success. That is not an 
unfounded argument, and empirical data shows that populist parties have not always cared this 
much about Europe – the level of salience they attribute to the issue of European Integration was 
63 
 
rather low at first. But it has grown with time, and it is now one of the most important issues for 
these parties (Hooghe and Marks, 2009).  
On a related note to the objection above, the point is sometimes raised that even if these 
parties do make an issue out of Europe, the electorate actually votes for them not due to their 
opposition to Brussels, but again due to other questions, like immigration, globalization, 
worsening economic situations and welfare state retrenchment. So why should we see changes in 
EU position of the other parties, if populist success was not caused by the EU? Indeed, why 
should we? The answer, simple as it may seem, is that we shan’t. If questions and objections 
about European Integration are not responsible for the fate of Eurosceptic parties (and vote loss 
at the political center), the mainstream ones will infer as much from the political debate and 
discussion. And they will deduce that their own position on the EU issue is not consequential for 
their future electoral performance, ergo they will not exhibit such shifts in position. On the other 
hand, if they believe that their own position on the EU might make them less attractive with 
voters, if they believe that what they say and where they stand on the EU issue will affect 
whether populists take voters from them or not during the coming electoral contests, it follows 
that they believe their discourse and stance on the EU actually matters, as does that of the 
neophyte challengers. And in such cases, we will observe shifts in position. The issue in a way 
takes care of itself. If political parties did not think that it is important to display shifts in 
position, they would not do so31. And if they did not think that the EU issue causes them to lose 
votes, such changes would not systematically follow particular trends of Eurosceptic success. 
Another point typically raised in such discussions is related to the well-known statement 
that correlation is not causation.  As was already espoused in the theoretical chapter, previous 
research on the radical party hypothesis has argued that voter readiness is not enough to change 
the position of mainstream parties. Political parties pro-Integration stance can co-exist with the 
electorate’s anti-euro attitude, given an absence of a credible and legitimate eurosceptic 
alternative at the ballot box. When populist parties finally manage to make a credible challenge 
on the political center, and start luring voters away, that is when the parties in the center realize 
they can no longer ignore the position of voters. As such, the cause of change in position is – 
indirectly- the electorate, but the success of Eurosceptic parties is necessary for this to happen. It 
                                                 
31 especially considering the traditional pro-EU bias associated with catch-all parties in the middle of the political 
spectrum 
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is legitimate to ask, and take up the question of whether the relationship looked at in this study is 
a spurious one.  
The main argument in this project is that B (Eurosceptic Parties doing well) causes C 
(change in other parties’ position). Furthermore, A (electorate attitudes and position32) is what 
enables B and B causes C (ergo, A-> B-> C), but A would not cause C in the absence of B 
(election results).  
If the argument were fallacious and the relationship spurious, we would observe that 
whereas Eurosceptic parties might gain favor in the polls, mainstream parties are at the same 
time changing their position on the EU issue not because of the former, but because they are 
reacting out of their own initiative to the  populace becoming increasingly Eurosceptic. That is 
indeed the main alternative theoretical explanation to the Radical Party Hypothesis, that political 
systems and their parties are experiencing position shifts directly due to the evolution of their 
electorate’s preferences and those of their members and not due to how the fringe parties are 
doing). In such a situation, the two phenomena would be simultaneous processes, both having 
the same cause, and not causing one another. Parties’ changes in position would be a direct result 
of public attitudes towards Integration, not of how Eurosceptic parties are performing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Naturally, the salience of the EU issue can also reasonably be expected to play a role. While citizens might hold a 
skeptical view of the EU, they might not consider it important at one time point or another, and at such time points 
would not vote for a Eurosceptic Party/on the basis of Eurosceptic policy preferences. Issue Salience and populist 
success could arguably reinforce each other – as citizens care more about European Integration, they are more likely 
to vote for Eurosceptic parties, and as Eurosceptic parties do ever better, the EU issue is more likely to rise in the 
issue agenda 
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A model for spurious relationship between Eurosceptic party success and mainstream party position 
 
There are two ways around this problem, both of which are a function of research design. First, it 
is possible to control for public opinion.  By complementing the model(s) with a control variable 
that describes public support towards Integration at the same time points as the observations in 
the dataset, one can observe the correlation between eurosceptic success and the position changes 
of the other parties, all else being else constant i.e. when controlling for public support for 
integration. If Eurosceptic Success seizes to be a significant predictor of party position change 
when popular opinion is added to the model, the relationship would indeed be spurious. 
Secondly, the temporal order of measurements is an important element to relationship control. 
The dataset was designed in such a way as to ensure that changes in electoral results are anterior 
to changes in party positions. It is of course possible that the relationship goes in the other 
direction, i.e. that changes in position of mainstream and other parties are followed by changes in 
the success of eurosceptics. In such a case, one can talk about changes in the policy offer of 
mainstream parties ‘legitimizing’ the populists, as one of the hypotheses predicts. This can easily 
Figure 11: A model for a spurious relationship 
Electorate/ 
Public Attitudes 
Eurosceptic Parties 
offer credible 
alternative and 
credible threat to 
other parties by 
luring other voters 
to it 
Political Parties 
Change Position 
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be tested by inversing the model – using (prior) party position changes as a predictor and the 
(ulterior) electoral faring of Eurosceptic parties as a dependent variable. 
The Project makes use of data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which collects data 
(issues its waves) at certain set points in time (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014). The survey is a 
built in a manner that mimics Leonard Ray’s expert survey33 (1984, 1988, 1992, 1996), with 
identical questions and indicators, which encourages the appending of the two datasets into one. 
Every observation in the dataset is a party at one of these waves. A hypothetical observation 
would be a party X in 2010 – in such a case the main Dependent Variable is that party’s change 
of its position between 2006 and 2010 (assuming the party was in the 2006 dataset, otherwise the 
observation is dropped).  
Unfortunately elections in Europe’s member states have electoral cycles that differ from 
the time intervals of the CHES. The Expert Survey also mentions for each observation in the 
dataset what was the most recent election in its country prior to that measurement wave. So in 
the hypothetical example above, a country might have seen its most recent election prior to 2010 
be in 2008, and the most recent election prior to 2006 be in 2004. In this scenario, the 
observation would have as its main predictor (X) how Eurosceptic parties performed between 
2004 and 2008, and Y (the position change 2006-2010) is regressed on the fate of Eurosceptics 
2004-2008. For every observation/case in the dataset, it is made sure that the period in which 
change occurs on the dependent variable (position changes from one CHES wave to another) is 
ulterior (does not begin and end prior) to the period in which change occurs on the predictor 
(change in results from one election to another). For each country/CHES wave group, there is an 
election that is most recent to when the wave was collected and composed. It is change between 
those elections that provides the right side of the equation34. This provides a consistent way to 
operationalize which electoral cycles are most suitable for each change between CHES waves.35 
                                                 
33 Ray, 1999 
34 A table describing this in more detail is provided in the appendix. 
35 Having the same identical observation years on both variables would have been the advantage of using Manifesto 
data, since manifestos in every country are issued/published in time for elections. The measurements for party 
positions – and changes in said positions – would have a temporal structure that overlaps perfectly with that of 
elections. As such, using the same hypothetical example of party X above, it would have been possible to regress 
change in party position between 2004-2008 on change in Eurosceptic performance between 2000-2004. As I will 
show below, however, Manifesto data has certain inherent characteristics that render it unusable for such purposes 
as those present here. 
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Estimation Technique - Cluster Robust Prais-Winsten Regression 
 
A standard problem of working with longitudinal data is serial autocorrelation. Measurements on 
a time series (or a panel) are bound to be strongly correlated with previous measurements of the 
same series, and a party’s position at one moment in time is likely to correlate very strongly with 
its position at the previous moment. If parties do not exhibit wild ideological swings from one 
pole to the other, party position change is then incremental. In such cases, the best predictor for 
party position is a party’s previous position. Due to this, taking the raw values of a party’s 
position and looking at them is not very helpful. In the process of explaining the change in 
parties’ position over time, this project deals with variation between parties, across countries and 
across time. A model is needed which handles both the cross-sectional characteristics of the data 
(panel differences based on parties and countries) as well as the time-related issues (which carry 
the risk of serial autocorrelation) in it. I am interested in change between measurement periods, 
both for the dependent as well as independent variables, instead of their absolute values. It makes 
both theoretical and methodological sense to use the first difference of the data on both sides of 
the equation. By differencing data, one is essentially subtracting the value of the variable at T2 
from T1 (in effect creating a variable for change). Taking first differences on the values of the 
variables is a good way to help reduce problems of serial autocorrelation, especially when 
dealing with a panel given the prospect of serial autocorrelation. 
Nonetheless, the model might still run into problems of serial autocorrelation, in the sense 
that parties’ changes from one time to another correlate with each other, so the use of simple 
OLS regression is still not warranted. To deal with the issue, similar projects typically make use 
of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation. Following Plümper, 
Troeger and Manow (2005), I will instead use a Prais-Winsten solution to deal with the panel-
specific error structure, since introducing a lagged dependent variable on the IV side can bias 
estimates and absorb much of the theoretically interesting time-series variance in the data. 
Furthermore, unlike solutions like the Cochrane-Orcutt estimation (which was for a time 
considered the standard practice in such situations), the Prais-Winsten option does not drop the 
first observation, which can be significant in the absence of large samples. 
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One further problem that can occur with panel data is error clustering (Cameron and 
Miller, 2015). The cases and data points are nested within countries and within time points. 
Besides the risks of autocorrelation mentioned above, there is also a chance that errors might be 
correlated within certain measurements periods. Every political party has its own position on EU 
integration, separate from that of its peers, and each will have its own value on the indicator that 
measures their position. That measurement is thus ‘intrinsic’ to the party. That, however, is not 
case for the indicator for Eurosceptic success. At each election, the biggest Eurosceptic Party 
(and all Eurosceptic parties cumulated) gain a percentage of votes that can be represented by one 
value – that one value will represent the electoral performance of the Eurosceptic party and will 
be value that each observation in the dataset will receive on the variables describing Eurosceptic 
Success. So if the 2014 CHES wave in one country has, for example, 5 parties, all of them (bar 
the Eurosceptic party, which is deleted from the dataset) have their own individual values  for the 
dependent variable and will have one common/identical value on the main predictor variable, 
because that value is intrinsic to the elections, not the parties themselves. Similar situations exist 
for those variables that describe socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, etc – these are all 
values related to a country at a point in time. There might be something about a particular 
election that makes it different, and makes measurements based on that idiosyncratic election 
result in an abnormal distribution of errors.  By using cluster robust standard errors in 
combination with the Prais-Winsten option, one is in a way controlling for ‘freak election 
periods’ in one country or another. 
The base model of the project is thus as follows: 
Δ Moderate Party EU Position = β1 (Δ Eurosceptic Success) + β2 (Extremes of Eurosceptic 
Parties) + β3 (Salience of EU issue of Eurosceptic Parties) + β4 (Public Opinion of EU 
Integration) + β5 (national unemployment level) + β6 (Moderate Parties’ Left-Right 
Orientation) + β7 (Moderate Parties Government/Opposition status) + β8 (Individual Moderate 
Party vote%) + β9 (Δ Individual Moderate Party vote%) + β10 (Country Dummies) + β11 
(Time) 
Given that standard regression tables are not particularly helpful in assessing whether moderating 
or intervening variables have conditional effects on the dependent variable when reporting 
interaction effects, I will also provide the marginal effects of Eurosceptic electoral success on 
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mainstream party EU position at various mean values of the main predictor (Brambor et al, 
2005). 
 
Data and Measurement 
 
What is European Integration? What is opposition to European Integration? How does 
one measure and operationalize them? What is the best source of data to use when one seeks to 
accomplish said measurement? Is a one-dimensional scalar indicator the right choice in such a 
situation? Due to its intrinsic connection with the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that provided most 
of the data used in this project, the EU/Integration dimension is treated as a single, continuous 
dimension, ranging from support for full national independence at one end to support for further 
European Integration at another. The backbone of the dataset was created on the basis of two 
expert surveys which I appended into one: The Expert Survey conducted by Leonard Ray (1999) 
covering the years 1984-1996 and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, which picked off where the 
other left off in 1999. The dataset covers 224 political parties in 14 „West‟ European countries 
(the EU15 minus Luxemburg) in the period 1984 – 201436. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
(CHES) asked country specialists (political scientists) across Europe to estimate the position of 
political parties in their country at regular intervals. The Survey provides the data for the main 
dependent variable, Party Position on EU integration. Unlike other analytical frameworks that 
use qualitative and categorical distinctions to classify party positions and types of 
Euroscepticism (for example Taggart and Szczerbiak’s soft Eurosceptic/hard Eurosceptic 
framework), the CHES relies on a one-dimensional scale, numerical description of party 
positions, that ranges from 1 to 737.  
There has been some debate about which is the best source of data when measuring party 
positions on the issue of European Integration, and the best way to collect it. In fact, Electoral 
Studies dedicated an entire special issue in 2007 to questions of EU issue dimensionality and 
measurement.  Some attempts to describe EU issue dimensionality have gone about by simply 
asking where parties lie – such has been the approach of Taggart and Szczerbiak, whose 
                                                 
36 As many parties came and went, not all of them are present at every time point. 
37 Given that a party’s values for a country are averaged across that country’s experts, the values end up being non-
integers 
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collection of country case studies was each written by one or two country experts, or the 
approach of the team from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who also asked 
experts (just many more) where parties lie on the EU questions. Alternatively, some have coded 
the positions of political parties based on various types of documents, relying not on the 
judgment of individuals, but on textual evidence. 
A dataset that is widely used in lieu of expert surveys (and considered something of a 
best-alternative out there for similar research foci) is that of the Comparative Manifesto Project, 
which uses quantitative content analysis to evaluate parties’ election manifestos. While an 
election manifesto is indeed a rich source of data about the discourse and pledges of a party, it 
does not tell the whole story. It can be seen as a list of pledges, and measuring manifestos does 
not equate with measuring what a party says and does outside of the times when it is running in 
the electoral horse race. In a nutshell, one can always wonder whether they ‘said one thing, but 
did another’. This sort of critique does not imply that parties are knowingly/intentionally 
untruthful or dishonest in their election pledges. If that was the case, such data sources would be 
largely invalid. The arguments against their use for research questions with similar orientations 
stem mostly from the fact that they offer a temporary snapshot of the behavior and positioning of 
a party during an electoral cycle (at the very beginning of it).  
After elections, parties often have to contend with factors that ‘deflect’ or alter their exact 
policy position after elections, like coalition membership, government participation, economic 
and historical exogenous shocks, and so on. The fact that manifestos are documents intrinsically 
tied to the electoral campaign means that they have a strong ‘public consumption’ orientation. 
Statements made by members of parliament in house debates, party members’ claims in the 
press, elected officials’ legislative or executive behavior, all these can deviate more or less from 
the ‘vows’ published by parties ahead of election campaigns.  
This brings us to the question of what it actually is that one seeks to measure. If one 
wants to analyze only the public vows of a party ahead of election campaigns, then party 
manifestos might be a good way to proceed. This presumes that the researcher adopts a time-
bound definition of party position, equating it with the party’s stated position at the onset of the 
electoral horserace. If, on the other hand, one defines a party’s position on an issue, its policy 
preferences, as being described by the aggregate of what the party (especially its leadership) says 
beyond the immediate pledge before the election, then one must find a way to factor in the 
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totality of statements, positions and acts of a party and its leadership.  The question of 
operationalization is closely tied to that of choice of dataset.  
Any data source has its strengths and weaknesses, and expert judgements are no 
exception. In one article from the seminal Electoral Studies issue, Gary Marks, Liesbeth Hooghe, 
Marco Steenbergen and Ryan Bakker (2007) cross-validate various measures of party 
positioning in order to establish the validity of EU position measurements. Enumerating the 
weaknesses of expert data, the authors mentioned subjective judgment, informational 
asymmetry, temporal constraints and the conflation of preferences and behavior. On the point of 
subjective assessment, a question that one can raise is that of positional equivalence and 
comparability across countries. What if country experts in Sweden or the UK have a different 
understanding of what ‘Eurosceptic’ means compared to somebody in Italy or Spain? And the 
fact that the operationalization of the issue dimension is rather broad (and only one-dimensional) 
leaves much to the intuition of country experts to decide how to award scores in the survey. As I 
argue below when tackling the question of discretion, that is in reality an advantage. This was 
also a point recognized by the authors when describing the advantages of expert surveys, among 
them flexibility: “The researcher may gather information on any topic for which there are no 
bona fide experts, including topics that do not surface in electoral manifestos.” (Marks et al 
2007, 26 ). Another advantage of expert surveys is Direct Quantification. Given that experts are 
asked to assess party positions on a structured scale, quantification becomes easy for projects 
such as this. One other, related advantage enumerated by the authors is the high validity of the 
data, given that experts rely on multiple information sources about the party when forming their 
judgment, as well as the consistency of expert judgments (Whitefield et al 2007) 
When describing the strengths of Manifesto Data, Marks et al (2007) mentioned the 
objectivity of the data (the scores/indicators are a result of documents and texts issued directly by 
the parties), the long time series going back far beyond the time scope of the first expert survey, 
and the fact that they are good measurement tools for the assessment of salience. This last 
strength is, I argue, intrinsically tied to its biggest weakness. The biggest drawback to manifesto 
data perhaps lies with the fact that, as the authors note, “it may be difficult to code electoral 
manifestos on a single category that encompasses a large and diverse issue such as European 
Integration” (Marks et al 2007, 33). The manifesto project uses quantitative, not qualitative text 
analysis, to code the data and it does so in one dimension – just like in the case of the CHES. 
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Without any qualitative weighting, such a mechanical approach might be too rigid for the fine 
assessments that go into assessing where parties lie with precision. To ensure a high standard of 
validity and reliability, the analysis of Election Manifestos employs (a systematic) quantitative 
content analysis. In the manifestos, phrases and sentences are broken down into quasi-sentences 
and each of the quasi-sentences is checked for mentions on a list of political issues. If an issue is 
mentioned in a quasi-sentence, this mention can either be positive or negative. The total number 
of positive mentions of an issue is then added up, as are negative ones. That produces a ratio of 
positive mentions (for that particular issue) to the total number of political mentions in the 
manifesto, and that holds for negative mentions as well. If a manifesto has 200 political 
mentions, of which ten are positive mentions of European Integration, and twenty are negative, 
the manifesto will have a score of 5(%) on the EU Positive indicator and 10(%) on the EU 
Negative indicator. The ratio of positive to negative mentions (5/10) is then taken to describe the 
position (pro/anti EU) of the party.  
The system is more useful as a measure of political salience, and the CMP project has 
been directly intertwined with work on the development of Salience Theory (Budge, 
Klingemann, Volkens38), with the work resulting in the Magnus Opum “Mapping Policy 
Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments 1945 - 1998”. Many issues in 
politics are valence issues, or can be treated like valence issues. In such cases, word counting and 
measurements of salience can provide legitimate instruments for measuring party positions. 
However, when it comes to measuring party positions on issues like the EU, the CMP is less well 
suited. 
As a pure mental exercise, imagine two manifestos, one belonging to UKIP and one 
belonging to Germany’s Christian Democratic Union. Furthermore, imagine that both 
manifesto’s are equally long (word, sentence, and mentions-count wise). Both manifestos 
mention EU integration only once. In the CDU manifesto, there is a negative reference to 
something very specific, like the anti-crisis ‘Six-Pack’. The UKIP manifesto also has one 
reference of Integration, a negative one, which criticizes the EU as a whole. The CMP dataset 
would code both manifestos as having the same values (0 positive, 1 negative, and the same 
ratio), without weighting the political mentions. Clearly that raises an entire set of problems, 
since we know that such political mentions in the two manifestos cannot have empirical 
                                                 
38 Klingemann et al, 2006; Volkens et al, 2013 
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equivalence. The fact that dataset only counts references to the EU, without weighting them is a 
major drawback of the dataset. Coders and evaluators should be able to exercise qualitative 
discretion, since there is much qualitative information out there. This discretion, this qualitative 
information, is put to use when country experts decide that a party should be assigned a 
particular value on the CHES survey scale, and not another, which makes the CHES scale more 
comprehensive. 
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey contains a variety of variables pertaining to EU party 
politics. Besides describing party EU issue salience and internal party dissent, the survey also 
offers party positions on a set of sub-issues, such as EU foreign policy, cohesion policy, or 
positions on the question of expanding EP powers among others. The most important variable in 
the dataset – the one the survey is maybe best known for – is the one aggregated dimension that 
asks experts to compresses all information into one indicator. While that one variable constrains 
EU politics to one dimension, just like the Manifesto Project does, it does not suffer from the 
latter’s problems because of expert discretion in awarding scores on that one dimension. 
While treating the EU policy space in this way is obviously a simplification (European 
Integration does indeed cover a host of issues, such as reducing barriers to the single market, 
promoting social and employment policy, the creation of a common currency, foreign policy), 
and while it is in principle possible to be in favor of some aspects of integration and against other 
ones, it seems that  a general underlying coherence exists which allows us to talk about party 
attitudes towards the EU in an aggregated fashion. The data of the CHES benefits from rather 
high within-measure validity. After performing factor analysis on the variables of the CHES 
dataset, it was found that a single factor explains over 75% of variance in party positioning on 
issues such as fiscal policy, EU employment policy, EU cohesion policy, EU environmental 
policy, EU asylum policy, EU foreign and security policy, or extending the power for the EU 
Parliament (Marks et al, 2007). That factor is associated positively and strongly (r=0.85) with the 
main general measure of party position on the EU issue that lays at the core of the CHES. Asking 
country experts to estimate the position of parties is helpful because it allows them to weigh in 
all pieces of information they have on that party. If effect, it gives country experts the discretion 
to ‘fill out’ the survey with what they really think about a political parties, not limiting them to 
basing that estimation solely on the information from one instrument or document. In the Expert 
74 
 
Survey, experts are usually asked to fill in the: “overall orientation of the party leadership 
towards European Integration in the year X “. 
Naturally, it is to be expected that to some degree country experts will tend to be affected 
in their evaluation of parties’ positioning not only by electoral promises, but also by the behavior 
of the parties, and that is good. The more information the experts use when they evaluate parties’ 
positions, the better the likelihood that the experts evaluation is correct and valid. It also offers a 
solution to the ‘what they did, not what they said’ dilemma. While Budge (2000, 103) has raised 
concerns regarding the criteria on the basis of which experts estimate party positions, and the 
very fact that it is not entirely clear if experts evaluate intentions, behavior, or reputation, 
Steenbergen and Marks (2007, 349-352) have alleviated such fears by pointing to the guidelines 
that experts are given when filling out the survey, as well as the small variation across experts. 
Given that experts also rely on acts as much as statements, and statements in different 
forums/circumstances (press, legislature, campaign), they will attain a better rounded, and more 
exact picture on where the parties (and their leadership) actually ‘stand’. 
 
The Dimensionality of the EU Issue 
 
Is it in order to treat positions on European Integration as one-dimensional? Arguments can be 
made that one should not define as Eurosceptic somebody who opposes ‘this current Europe’ but 
proposes instead a different vision for Europe. The underlying idea in Kopecky and Mudde’s 
‘Two Sides of Euroscepticism’ (2002) is that Euroscepticism can indeed be a multifaceted 
phenomenon, and it might in some circumstances even be correct to speak of several 
Euroscepticisms. Even in their own conceptualization, those who reject the EU but support 
European Integration in principle are called ‘Eurosceptics’ (as opposed to ‘Europragmatists or 
‘Eurorejects’, two of their three other analytical categories). Numerous other works have treated 
‘Euroscepticism’ and ‘Opposition to European Integration’ as multifaceted or multidimensional 
concepts, one of the most acclaimed of which is Paul Taggart’s seminal article on 
Euroscepticism and Political Parties, A Touchstone of Dissent, in which he defined it as 
expressing ‘the idea of contingent opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European Integration’(1998:336). While Taggart refined his 
definition (together with Szczerbiak, 2008) by differentiating between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
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Euroscepticism, other scholars proposed alternative conceptual and analytical maps. Kopecky 
and Mudde’s work (2002) - another celebrated page in the debate surrounding the concept – 
relied on Easton’s concepts of specific and diffuse support to offer a two-dimensional typology. 
Rovny (2004) insisted on differentiating between the motivation and the magnitude of opposition 
to the EU. At the level of public opinion, similar debates took place with regard to the definitions 
of Euroscepticism. Krouwel and Abts (2007) developed a two-dimensional conceptualization 
based on the ‘targets’ and ‘degree’ of popular discontent toward ‘Europe’. Taggart’s initial 
definition (‘contingent and conditional opposition to European Integration, as well as total and 
unconditional opposition to it’) covers a broad range of attitudes towards the EU, and was later 
broken down into two different forms of opposition by him and Szczerbiak. Whereas ‘hard 
Euroscepticism’ refered to ‘principled opposition to the EU and European Integration’ (as it is 
articulated by those parties or actors advocating a withdrawal out of the EU or opposing EU 
accession), ‘soft Euroscepticism’ expresses a ‘qualified opposition’ to the EU reflecting 
dissatisfaction with ‘core’ EU policies or with the current EU trajectory, perceived to be contrary 
to the ‘national interest’. 
I, however, believe it is possible to talk about Opposition to (current and further) 
European Integration on an aggregate level just as it is possible to talk about something like the 
EU or European Integration on an aggregate level. While it is obviously not easy to pinpoint 
exactly what support and opposition to European Integration are, it is clear that at any one 
moment in time, we can talk about and assess to what degree a political actor is advocating more 
European Integration or less, and that is well-captured by a one-dimensional measurement. It 
does not help us very much for an actor to claim that they are not Eurosceptic ‘because whilst 
they might oppose the current European architecture, they are not opposed to an alternative and 
counterfactual one’ or for an actor to claim that ‘they are against the EU, not against Europe’39. It 
would not surprise anyone for Nigel Farage to claim that ‘he is not against Europe’ or for him to 
claim that ‘he doesn’t have a problem with Europe, just Eurocrats deciding for other people’. 
Neither would it surprise somebody to hear M. Le Pen claim that she is ‘pro Europe’, or that she 
wants to ‘save Europe’ especially after a discourse about returning to ‘traditional core European 
                                                 
39 which would presumably conform to their particular wishes or fantasies about what Regional 
Integration should look like – almost all political parties, even nationalist, communist or populist 
ones have some potentially alternative vision of what Europe should look like 
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values’. Still, nobody would hesitate to term these political leaders as ‘Eurosceptic’. Part of the 
problem lies with the fact that ‘opposing this Europe, not any or every Europe’ is a convenient 
way to argue for anybody who wants to roll back integration. The shadow of the future lies far 
enough in the future that political entrepreneurs can be insincere in their discourse. While there 
might be a promise for a different, better Europe, first comes the need to demolish the present 
one - to roll back integration, and that is what various eurosceptics have in common. 
What soft and hard Eurosceptics have in common, be it Parties like the UKIP, FN, PVV 
(hard) or the United Left in Spain and Sinn Fein (soft) is that they would like to see certain 
policies or the current extent of European Integration rolled back. Some might want it abolished 
completely (the FN) some might want it turned into nothing more than a market (UKIP) and 
others might actually not mind the idea of solidarity between Europe’s nations (often parties on 
the left) but oppose the freedoms of negative integration that erode their welfare states or the 
capacities of their states to regulate travel, trade, etc. Even if a party is exhibiting contestation of 
the Integration project because it has a different integration project in mind (“we are not against 
Europe, we are just against this European Union”), that is still manifested as contestation of the 
current integration project. Unless one argues that there should be more integration ( fiscal 
Union, wealth transfers, complete political Union, etc) that actor will argue that the current 
architecture of integration has gone too far and needs to be stripped down before the other one 
architecture (which conforms to her wishes) will take shape and form. And assuming that all 
parties who contest the current integration project (be it because it exerts downward pressure on 
their welfare states, or interferes too much with their lax business environment) would win 
elections or have their way, the policy outcome would largely look the same: rolling back of 
Integration. 
Unlike other analytical frameworks that use qualitative and categorical distinctions to 
classify party positions and types of Euroscepticism (for example Taggart and Szczerbiak’s well-
known soft Eurosceptic/hard Eurosceptic framework), the CHES relies on a scalar, numerical 
description of party positions, that ranges from 1 to 7. These are not treated as distinct or 
categorical, but the codebook of the CHES does provide a description of the values to aid 
specialists in their estimation. The survey question for the main variable asks experts to fill out 
the indicator for party positions in the following way: POSITION = overall orientation of the 
party leadership towards European integration in YEAR, and the seven values given are: 1 = 
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Strongly opposed, 2 = Opposed, 3 = Somewhat opposed, 4 = Neutral, 5 = Somewhat in favor, 6 
= In favor, 7 = Strongly in favor.  
One could conceptualize values lying between 1 and 2,5 as being equivalent to Taggart 
and Szczerbiak’s hard eurosceptic, while values lying between 2,5 and 3,5-4 as equivalent to 
their soft eurosceptic. Since there are many country specialists filling out the survey for each 
country at every wave, parties’ positions in the main dataset are averages that take non-Integer 
values (for example 3,54…). While one can turn a ratio scale into categories (by defining and 
labeling for example parties in the 1-2 range as ‘hard Eurosceptics’) it is harder to work in the 
other direction. Using a non-discrete scale has many advantages, and allows a researcher to track 
more precise and minute changes of party positions. Empirical data as well as history show that 
positions on the EU (and the categories these positions are ascribed to) can be fluid and change 
with time. In between policy position shifts, political parties can lie in a grey, fuzzy zone that 
renders the borders of such categories fuzzy as well.  Parties like Lega Nord or the FPÖ to some 
extent started out as pro EU integration parties precisely because the EU was seen as a 
counterweight to their countries respective states, their centralized character or social orientation. 
The EC’s neo-liberal, market creating, negative integration appealed to them as it was consistent 
with their opposition to centralization or the national welfare state. In the 1990’s they began to 
evolve and turn into ever more Eurosceptic parties. The point at which they could be classified as 
soft Eurosceptic and at what point as hard Eurosceptic is not easy to define, and a continuous 
measure is the more so useful in such circumstances than a categorical one, as it allows one to 
trace the evolution in more incremental shifts over various measurements. Such changes happen 
not only in one direction: a hard Eurosceptic can become a soft Eurosceptic can become a 
‘neutral’ and vice versa. 
 
Further Conceptualization and Operationalization 
 
The main dependent variable is operationalized as change on the 1-7 CHES scale from one 
measurement point to another. At every Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave, country experts are 
asked to rank political parties’ positions vis-à-vis the EU on a 1-7 scale, with 1 being the most 
Eurosceptic position possible (entirely opposed to European Integration) and 7 being the 
opposite (all in favor). The scores given by country experts are than used to create an average for 
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every party. In this study, the change in position is operationalized as the first difference between 
each parties’ average from one survey point to another.  
Data for the main independent variable (Electoral Results) come from Philip Manow and 
Holger Döring’s Parlgov Database (Döring and Manow, 2012), and was amended with 
information from sources such as individual countries’ electoral commissions or The European 
Election and Referendum Database of the Norwegian Center for Research Data40. The 
independent variable is operationalized in two ways, both of which will be used. Firstly, it is 
operationalized as the change in percentage of votes gained by a country’s biggest Eurosceptic 
Party between the two most recent elections prior to the that wave of the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey that offers the data point. The main Eurosceptic party is identified as the Eurosceptic 
party which at the most recent elections got the most votes. Secondly, it is operationalized as the 
change in cumulated percentage of votes gained by all Eurosceptic parties between the two most 
recent elections prior to the that wave of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey that offers the data point. 
The same source of data is used when analyzing the effect of EU election results on mainstream 
party positions, with measurements for the main predictor in this case simply coming from a 
different set of elections. 
Which Eurosceptic parties should one talk about? Eurosceptic success can be measured in 
two ways, both of which have arguments speaking in their favor. One could focus on how well 
the biggest Eurosceptic Party is doing, or could focus on how all Eurosceptic Parties are doing - I 
will now go through the arguments in favor of both operationalizations, beginning with the 
former. 
There might be more Eurosceptic parties in any one country, but only one is usually large 
enough to count to any degree, while most of the others don’t even make it into Parliament. 
While in some countries there are several Eurosceptic parties, at any one time there is one main 
Eurosceptic party which I argue is a measure of Eurosceptic success, or of the appeal of 
Eurosceptic discourse for voters in that party system – that party which I call a country’s 
‘flagship’ Eurosceptic party. Some Eurosceptic parties are often so small that they do not even 
feature in various election results databases (even some countries’ own national electoral 
databases lump them together with other parties under the category „other parties‟ or „other 
extreme right/left‟ parties). That one large party which is large enough to count usually ends up 
                                                 
40 http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/ 
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becoming the flagship Eurosceptic party of a country (the True Finns in Finland, the FN in 
France, so on), and how these parties perform is usually taken as the indicator for how prone to 
Eurosceptic ideas a party system is.  
Despite the existence of the BNP in Britain for example, most analysts and observers are 
looking at what the UKIP does to gauge public acquiescence of Eurosceptic Ideas. The evolution 
of Eurosceptic politicians is usually ‘read off’ the UKIP, regardless of what minuscule parties 
like the BNP do. While Austria has had – like most of Europe - its share of far right parties in the 
past few decades, it was Jörg Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party that rang the alarm bells in 
Brussels when it became a dominant force in Austrian politics, and has remained the focus of 
attention ever since. The Dutch Freedom Party, the Front National, the (former) True Finns and 
other such parties are equated with populism or Euroscepticsm in their respective countries. 
While the Lega Nord was for a long time considered the prime Populist Party in Italy until 
recently, all eyes turned on B. Grillo’s Five Star movement after it overtook Lega Nord to 
become the main anti-system threat to established parties. Likewise, despite the existence of 
parties like the NPD or the Republikaner, it is the AfD that is considered a gauge for German 
public disapproval with integration (and before it, die Linke was the only serious contender). The 
examples can go on. The main idea is that the media, the public, and most political actors will 
often focus on one political actor at a time as being the eurosceptic alternative in a political 
system, and will view that party as a barometer for public disenchantment with European 
Integration.To exemplify the point made above, consider these two excerpts from the media in 
the lead-up to the 2014 European Elections. They were both meant to convey to readers how 
strong Eurosceptic parties are becoming – the first is the result of exit polls on the day of the 
election (and thus more accurate than the other) while the second graph offers numbers 
according to polls made some months in advance of the election (and focuses on right wing 
Eurosceptics).  
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Figure 12: Graph from German Media on the day of the 2014 EP elections 41 
 
 
Both graphics are meant to convey the same idea, how well Eurosceptic Parties42 are doing in 
Europe, despite disregarding the fact that there are more such parties out there. The second graph 
only presents the support for one such party in each country, while the other does the same but 
offers poll numbers for two parties in 4 of the countries presented. 
 
Figure 13: Graph in English Media with vote intention polls prior to 2014 EP election43 
 
                                                 
41 http://www.wz.de/home/politik/rechte-in-europa-auf-dem-vormarsch-1.1647324 
42 the graphs more accurately describes the (single) Eurosceptic Party (no plural) is faring 
43 http://qz.com/177876/more-and-more-europeans-are-keen-on-destroying-the-eu-from-the-inside/ 
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It is obvious that there is more than one eurosceptic (right wing) party in each of those countries 
(the first graph even acknowledges it in the upper right corner) but each uses indicators for one 
party (in 4 countries two parties) as a description of how well ‘Eurosceptic parties are doing in 
general’. While other parties exist which espouse similar policy positions, these flagship 
Eurosceptic Parties ‘capture attention’. If one admits that they capture the attention of the media, 
one might wonder whether maybe other political actors also use the electoral performance of 
these same ‘key’ parties to estimate the potential for Euro-pragmatic discourse, instead of 
looking at all such parties. There is thus a strong case for measuring not only the total degree of 
support for Eurosceptic parties in a country, but also focusing on the one party that takes center 
stage, and using its electoral performance (and change) as the model’s main predictor. It is 
conceivable that moderate parties compete not against the sum of Eurosceptic votes, but against 
that one populist party that can make a difference in the formation of governing majorities in the 
legislature. Even if a Eurosceptic party declines or dies out and makes room for another (as 
happened in the UK, with the Referendum Party dissolving itself and then the UKIP moving in 
to fill the niche), it is usually one party that occupies that niche. If the title of the so called 
flagship Eurosceptic passes from one party (A) to another (B) between elections , the 
measurement in the dataset for how well the main Eurosceptic party did at the polls in the ‘latter’ 
election is operationalized as the % of votes that went to party B in the 2nd election. The 
measurement for ‘Change in vote for Eurosceptic party’ is then measures as the change in vote % 
from party A (at the first election) to party B (at the next election).  
Alternatively, it is also possible that mainstream parties look not only at how well the 
biggest Eurosceptic party has done, but also at other (second biggest, third biggest) Eurosceptic 
Parties. It is possible for a country to have a ‘flagship Eurosceptic’ party that hovers somewhere 
at around 7 or 8 per cent of votes and another few Eurosceptic parties that lie somewhere around 
the 3%-4% mark. Altogether, the cumulated total percentage of votes cast for Parties that are 
Eurosceptic would go well above ten percent and it is right to ask whether the other parties will 
look at how the flagship party is evolving from its 8% or at how the cumulated number of votes 
for all Eurosceptic parties changes in order to read support for Eurosceptic policy positions. In 
some countries, the Eurosceptic scene has identified with one specific party across the years and 
decades44, while in others, several small Eurosceptic parties have each contributed a bit to the 
                                                 
44 where the difference between that Eurosceptic leader and other parties was very big 
82 
 
cumulative vote total of populist-anti EU actors, wherein no individual party stands out but the 
aggregated percentage of votes these parties received does. In the former situation, the trend line 
describing the evolution of the biggest Eurosceptic Party is almost identical to the one describing 
the evolution of total cumulated votes going to Eurosceptic parties. In the latter, the two trends 
are distinct. All things considered, it seems wise to also conduct analyses of the Radical Party 
Hypothesis in which the assumption is that moderate parties look not at how the biggest 
Eurosceptic party is doing, but at the entire Eurosceptic scene. In the empirical analyses that 
follow in the next chapters, each analysis will be performed twice – once with the electoral 
results and evolution of the flagship Eurosceptic party as the main independent variable, and 
once with the cumulated results of all Eurosceptic parties serving that function.  
 
Eurosceptic Parties 
 
The decision on whether a party belongs on the left side or right side of the equation was based 
on the EU position variable of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey as well as Taggart and Szczerbiak’s 
Opposing Europe, a real ‘Encyclopedia Eurosceptica’. The wish to triangulate to some degree 
with another existing source had a strong influence on the decision of what constitutes a 
Eurosceptic Party and what does not, as well as the wish to not let the design of research be 
driven only by the data in the CHES45. 
Firstly, I asked if a party’s position above or below the ‘4’ (neutral on Europe46) mark in 
the CHES. Secondly, do the case studies and in depth analyses agree with the positions? Are 
there any Eurosceptic parties named in Opposing Europe that do not feature in the CHES 
dataset? Fortunately, there is nigh-universal agreement between the data in the CHES and the 
literature on who is a Eurosceptic and who is not. The only notable exception is the Belgian New 
Flemmish Alliance. While the party is a ‘very soft’ Eurosceptic according to Opposing Europe, 
                                                 
45 In Finland, the average position of political parties on the EU issue in the 80’s was far lower than in other 
countries, denoting a more hostile attitude towards EU integration, even among mainstream parties. Most parties 
actually score below 4, and the choice was used to denote those parties as Eurosceptic challengers that lie not below 
4, but one standard deviation below the average value of the Finnish Party scene. While those data points do not 
make it into the actual analysis because Finland’s observations are only used after the country joined the EU, at 
which time the average position of political parties came more in line with those from other countries, I specify this 
since this transformation of the DV on Finnish observations was carried out and was used to decide who had been a 
Eurosceptic actor prior to the mid 90’s. 
46 In the CHES, the 4 value marks the neutral neither-pro-nor-anti EU party position 
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in the CHES data it is a markedly pro-European party, across survey waves. Had the party had 
positions that were more ambiguous and close to neutral point in the CHES data, I would have 
had second thoughts about it, but because its positions are so far away from the center and close 
to the pro-EU poll (and because Taggart, Szczerbiak, Deschouwer et al agree that is is a very soft 
Eurosceptic), I decided to go with the data in the CHES, and place the party on the left side of 
the equation. Secondly, if a party was below the neutral 4 mark but very close to it, and the 
qualitative and in depth data did not deem it as Eurosceptic, or there was no reference to it as 
being Eurosceptic in the case studies (the French Greens had a CHES position of 3.88 at one 
point in the 80’s), its election results were not considered to contribute to the Eurosceptic total. 
This consideration was made only rarely, and for parties with values very close to the neutral 
cut-off point, 4. It was not made for parties (usually very small) who were omitted in the 
Opposing Europe case studies but had distinctly Eurosceptic CHES scores (they remain on the 
right side of the equation). 
Position consistency is important. For a party to be considered a Eurosceptic party (and 
belong on the right side of the equation), it must be consistent for a period of time in its position. 
Those parties whose position was constantly higher than 4 (4 meaning ‘neutral towards Europe’) 
but once or twice slipped below 4 and the moved back up are not considered Eurosceptic 
challenger parties. They are instead moderate/centrist parties whose position shifts at one time or 
another was strong enough to bring them below the neutral mark. To classify them as 
Eurosceptic Parties at that point (and imply that they belong on the right side of the equation) 
would mean that we should no longer look at their position shifts in response to the ‘classic’ 
populist/Eurosceptic issue entrepreneurs, but see their election results as contributing to the vote 
tally of Eurosceptics. Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the British Conservative Party are two 
parties whose position was sometimes below the value 4 mark. These parties are, however, 
anything but ‘challenger parties, since they formed government and held power as their countries 
biggest parties, not just mere junior parties. They belong on the left side of the equation, not on 
the right (IV). I am interested in the effect of other parties’ success on their position, even if it 
means they move from a value below 4 even further down as a consequence. 
A similar attitude is taken below the line of the neutral ‘4’ value. If a populist party were 
consistently Eurosceptic, but at one wave ‘slipped’ above 4, after which it moved back down, 
that would not make it a non-Eurosceptic party for the present purposes. Before the late 90’s, the 
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Lega Nord was a pro-integration party, and then moved to an anti-EU position (and remained 
there). It was not deemed a Eurosceptic Party until the time of its shift, after which its electoral 
results began to contribute to the independent variable. The Austrian Greens were consistently 
Eurosceptic for a time, and their party’s position moved above 4, and _stayed_ there. Their 
electoral results contributed to the IV until they switched, after which their vote tally is no longer 
considered when constructing the value on the IV. Both parties changed sides one and only once, 
staying put after the shift.  
Those parties whose electoral results were used to construct the independent variable all 
have positions lower than 4 on the CHES EU dimension, with one exception. Taggart and 
Szczerbiak identify the (very) ‘soft Eurosceptic’ United Left as the most important Eurosceptic 
Party in Spain, a fact which is supported by the data in the CHES, where it is a Eurosceptic Party 
on most waves. In most waves, it is the only Spanish Eurosceptic party in the survey. There are 
some waves, however, in which the IU’s score on the EU position indicator goes ever so slightly 
above 4. In those instances, it seems that the country experts deemed the United Left was 
basically ‘neutral’. Even when the party had a neutral position, I still used its election results to 
construct the Eurosceptic elections results variable for Spain. While its position was indeed at the 
4 mark, all other parties had positions that were very pro integration. Basically, in a country were 
all political forces were very Europhile, the experts decided that the I.U. is ‘undecided’/not 
convinced on the EU question. I argue that its distance from the other parties (in the anti-EU 
direction) rendered it as something akin to a ‘voice of caution and pragmatism towards Europe’ 
in Spain(even for those years when it is at or slightly above 4), and that it still fulfilled the role of 
party where voters could go to when they wanted a policy position that differs from the strong 
pro-EU orientation of the others, and when they wanted to send a signal of disenchantment with 
integration policies. 
It is important to address the claim that the reason populist parties are doing ever better at 
the polls is not Euroscepticism per se, but opposition to immigration, or that anti-immigration is 
their main selling point, there is no denying there is truth to that argument. Opposition to 
migrants is indeed a big issue and a big factor in such parties’ success, and there is a general 
congruence between opposition to EU integration and opposition to immigration (Kriesi et al 
2012, 99). As I have argued above, that is a not a real problem. While opposition to immigration 
and European Integration tend to load on common factors and tend to overlap in the ideological 
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party landscape, there is something different, even all encompassing about the EU issue. As 
Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002, 976) argue, New Right parties oppose a series of perceived 
threats to the national community of fate, such as immigration, foreign cultural influences, 
international agencies and cosmopolitanism – EU integration, however, is different, because it 
combines several of these threats and poses an additional one: undermining national sovereignty. 
The issue of immigration, while not entirely synonymous with integration, overlaps with the 
latter to a large degree, and many political parties have made opposition to immigration from 
within the EU their primary message in the battle against pooled sovereignty.  When such parties 
complain about immigration from the EU and the fact that the current structure of the EU 
facilitates or encourages immigration, they are essentially blasting against European Integration. 
They are deploring the fact that the EU facilitates immigration, that there is more immigration 
because of the European Union47. The argument exists that the largest part of anti-EU discourse 
is actually anti-immigration discourse, and that if a mainstream party does indeed move to copy 
such discourse, that change would respectively feature a lot of talk about immigration, ergo we 
should not be talking about the EU, but immigration instead. So the question arrives: are we still 
talking about European Integration, or is this about something else? Opposition to immigration 
from within the EU is opposition to EU integration. If a populist party complains about CEE 
migrants and workers, they are criticizing the mechanism which made it possible for those 
foreigners to move to their countries and enjoy the benefits of home national. And if politicians 
in the host nation co-opt certain elements of that position and experts consider that a party 
became more eurosceptic as a result, we are talking about a policy shift that is anti-EU 
integration. 
A common theme of the likes of David Cameron, I. Duncan Smith or Nigel Farage is that 
of EU migrants’ benefits.  As David Cameron called his controversial EU summit to negotiate 
the UK’s position ahead of the Brexit Referendum, and as the UK sought to reduce worker 
benefits for EU migrants, other western European leaders began to flirt with the idea of doing the 
same or something similar, until East European Countries threatened to torpedo the British 
position ( a la ‘only the UK gets the opt-outs, or nobody gets them’). This idea which some 
governments entertained shortly(among them Austria and Germany) was an anti-immigration 
                                                 
47 Due to open borders, integrated market, worker mobility and equal access to benefits for non-nationals/ non-
discrimination against EU nationals 
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measure (cutting benefits for foreign workers) but it was in essence an anti-integration one. As 
such, we would be hard pressed to find a party that is pro-EU and anti immigration, but such a 
party would for example be one which is in favor of European Integration and opposed to 
immigration from outside the block (but not from within)48.  
 
Cases and Data Points Omitted from the Analysis – ‘The East’ 
 
Central and East European members of the EU were not included in this study for a variety of 
reasons. First, the late accession to the EU (2004 the earliest) means for one thing that there 
would be few observations for each party, starting with the 2006.  
Secondly, given the relative youth of democracy in the region, the party systems in these 
countries are not as settled as in older member states. A large body of work in the field of party 
politics attests to the ‘idiosyncrasies’ of politics in Central and Eastern Europe. As Rovny noted 
in 2014, “An influential view of Eastern European party competition points to instability, 
ideological underspecification, and personalistic politics as defining characteristics” (Rovny, 
2014, 671). While some authors, such as Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, have argued 
that there is some evidence that post-communist societies do contain structured social and 
ideological division that shape party choices (Whitefield 2002, Evans and Whitefield 1993, 
Evans and Whitefield, 1998), it is generally recognized that party systems are not as structured 
and much more fluid. Party building in such circumstances is an elite dominated process 
(Zielinski, 2002) which leads to open and fluid party-systems (Ost, 1993) and where top-down 
party design negatively affects the robustness of party organization and leads to a high-degree of 
party-switching, general political noise and continuous rise of new parties and political actors 
(Kreuzer and Pettai, 2003, Bielasak 2005). This leads to a higher effective number of parties on 
the national scene (Bielasiak, 2005) and the lower level of party system institutionalization. To 
ensure a measure of stability, east European party systems experience a stronger penetration of 
the state to secure financing and often rely on the adoption of broad catch-all strategies vis-à-vis 
                                                 
48 While possible at least in theory it is possible in Western Europe, such combinations of characteristics are much 
more common in Eastern Europe, where there is growing unease at the prospect of migrants from the middle east 
settling there. 
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the electorate. The ideological landscape is further muddled by the exigencies that EU generated 
during the long accession period (Rovny 2015, 3). Political parties are often short lived, 
ideological leap-frogging is much more prevalent and some political parties are built as vehicles 
for individual political figures and personalities. Party mergers, dissolutions and re-foundations 
are much more common, and the lack of an ideological shadow of the past, of long ideological 
histories means parties’ ideological identities are less clear. Elections are much more contested 
around valence issues (in some countries in the late 90’s and early 2000’s candidates were 
fighting to portray themselves as the ones under which the country would accede to the EU 
sooner), corruption is often the number one issue around which voters voted. On a related note, 
the electorate in Eastern Europe had a positive image of European Integration because it saw 
political leaders in Western Europe as a potential counterweight to and salvation from more 
corrupt local elites. 
The drive to „rejoin the West‟ transformed EU membership into real national projects for 
many of these countries, meaning that the issue of EU integration for a long time had a different 
dynamic in these party systems. In the CEE context, EU membership was associated with 
modernization both in terms of living standard increases as well as a means of strengthening the 
institutional basis for democracy (Chichowski, 2000). While the recent immigrant crisis has 
fueled some outcry over ‘Brussels-imposed’ immigrant quotas, for most countries in the regions 
the 1990’s and 2000’s were races to prove their European creditentials. Even for conservative, 
nationalist or xenophobic parties, discourse was most often framed in terms of proving the 
worthiness of the nation by rejoining the West49. Opposition to European Integration was a far 
less tenable position in these countries than in Western Europe. 
Eurosceptic parties are dropped because leaving them in would mean that I measure the 
effect of Eurosceptic parties’ electoral success on their own position changes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 using the ‘East’ (the former USSR, Balkan and Ottoman history) as the ‘other’ against which nationalist sentiment 
is framed 
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Further Variables and Indicators 
 
A variety of other variables are used in the analysis. ‘Government/Opposition’ is a 0-1 dummy 
variable that is coded as 1 if the party was in government at the time of the wave and 0 if the 
party was in opposition. 
Parties’ positions on the Left-Right scale was also taken from the CHES, and is 
represented on a 0-10 scale with 0 meaning Left and 10 meaning Right. The scale used is the 
General Left-Right scale, as opposed to the Economic one, the latter being an evaluation of 
parties views towards economic policy using the traditional left to right continuum. The expert 
survey asks for both scales (economic and general), with the general left right scale denoting a 
party’s overall ideological orientation that goes beyond economic issues as well. 
The OECD recorded level of unemployment in each country is used as a proxy control for 
socio-economic conditions which might make parties more amenable to change their policy 
positions towards integration.  
The variable Time is introduced into the analysis to control for the possibility of party 
position changes on the EU issue being simply a function of time passing, or natural trends. 
Instead of using the year’s number as an indicator on every observation, the time points in the 
analysis are identified with the data waves of the CHES.  Every wave in the survey is assigned 
value from 1 to 9, with 1 being the 1984 wave and 2014 being denoted as 9. 
The Survey contains a variable which denotes how important the EU issue is for political 
parties, and measures the issue’s salience for the party’s leadership. That data is used to measure 
how important/salient the EU issue is for Eurosceptic parties – to what degree opposition to 
European Integration is an important part of their political message. Salience is coded on a 5 
point scale, with 5 being the highest possible salience. I focus on the salience of integration for 
Eurosceptic Parties keeping in line with the overall approach of this project that sees Eurosceptic 
policy entrepreneurs as agents and initiators of change in the party system. The Radical Party 
Hypothesis at the heart of this investigation specifies that voter readiness or a certain existing 
opinion landscape will not be enough to determine political parties to change their position as 
long as there is no political alternative to which the public can take their votes to. It is only after 
such an alternative appears on the political stage, gains votes and makes a real issue out of a 
certain policy question, like international governance, that changes in party positions will follow. 
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For those analyses and models in which the main predictor is change in the total cumulated vote 
percentage of all Eurosceptic Parties, the value for the variable Eurosceptic Parties’ EU Issue 
Salience is given by averaging the salience of all Eurosceptic Parties. 
One extra variable was created to denote the position of Eurosceptic parties – how 
‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ a Eurosceptic party is, acknowledging that the effect of its success on the 
other parties might vary depending on whether it is strongly Eurosceptic or only mildly 
Eurosceptic. The values on this variable are given by simply taking the position of the biggest 
Eurosceptic party on the EU issue on the standard CHES 1-7 scale for the flagship Eurosceptic 
and by taking the average from the values of all Eurosceptic parties (as is done with issue 
salience) in the case of the cumulated Eurosceptic Independent Variable.  
It is also important to control for public attitude towards European Integration. The 
argument tested in this study is that mainstream parties were ‘pushed’ into shifting their position 
on European Integration not polling the electorate, but by the success and threat of Eurosceptic 
challenger parties. It is often repeated that the voters are more eurosceptic than the parties’ 
leaderships that have dominated Europe’s political arena, and the gap in preferences is growing. 
The model thus shows the effect of Eurosceptic parties’ success on the position of mainstream 
parties when controlling for public perception of the EU. Data for public opinion of European 
Integration come from the Eurobarometer50. The values on the variable in question are given by 
the percentage of respondents in the year of the survey wave who answered with “Benefited” to 
the Eurobarometer question “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your 
country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? (with 
possible answers being a)Benefited, b)Not Benefited and c)Don’t know)”. 
By adding country dummies to the regression, one is controlling for history 
/controlling away variance that might be there due to country specific idiosyncrasies, and holding 
their unobserved effects fixed. A regional dummy is created for an analysis in the second 
empirical chapter, which replaces the country dummies and is used to test whether there is a 
difference in how Northern and Southern Europe reacts to right wing and left-wing 
Euroscepticism.  
                                                 
50 Data for public opinion of European Integration for Finland, Sweden and Austria comes from the 1992 EFTA 
Barometer 
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Variables are created from the same data to construct indicators for the electoral 
performance of right wing and left wing Eurosceptic parties (both in terms of biggest single 
party, and cumulated vote tally for all left and right wing Eurosceptic Parties). In those analyses 
relying on European election results instead of national election results, the principles remain the 
same, but data on how well populist parties performed from one European Election to another 
is used, instead of data from the national ones.  
„Party votechange‟ indicates the change in vote tally for the party in question between 
the most recent and a previous election – in essence a first difference. ‘Relative Vote Change’ is 
a variable designed to measure whether a party has gained or lost votes relative to the biggest 
other party in its party system compared to last election. It could be that both parties lose votes to 
a Eurosceptic challenger party, but one party gains power relative to its main rival, if that rival 
‘bleeds’ more votes. 
‘Relative vote change’ is operationalized by comparing each party’s vote change 
between elections with that of the biggest party (that party which at the previous election had 
gained the most votes in a country). If a party had been the one with the most votes at a recent 
election, its performance is measured against that of the second highest rated party in terms of % 
at that previous election. The idea behind the initial ‘raw’ relative vote change variable is that a 
centrist/mainstream party might lose some vote percentage points, but lose less than its biggest 
rival, in which case it would gain relative to it. The variable subtracts from each party’s change 
in electoral tally (change in vote %) the vote tally of that party which was the largest at the last 
election (and for that party which was the largest party at the last election, the change in vote 
tally of the second largest is subtracted).  For each party, the vote tally of the largest ‘rival’ party 
is equal to the vote tally of the largest political party in that country other than itself, for each 
political party. A further variable which measures relative ‘per cent’ in vote change is created. 
How much per cent of a party’s previous total vote tally does change at the most recent election 
amount to? A party (Y) that previously had 10% and now gained only 5% thus lost one half of its 
votes. If the biggest party in the country (Z) went from 25% to 20%, it too lost 5% in absolute 
terms, but only lost one fifth of its votes, compared to half of the previously mentioned party. For 
party Y, ‘Relative Vote Change’ (the first variable) would equal 0, because they both lost 5%, 
but ‘Relative Per Cent Vote change’ would be -30%. (1/5 - 1/2). Time is added as a control 
variable to make sure that one controls for history – it is possible for Party Position changes to 
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occur simply as a natural trend, and not because of the success of Eurosceptic Parties. Likewise, 
it might be that Parties’ position changes are caused by worsening socio-economic conditions 
which lead political parties to ‘blame Brussels’. 
Used in testing Hypothesis H12, Dissonance is a variable in which popular opinion of 
EU membership is compared to that of the average party position on the EU of those parties that 
are in government. The scores from the Eurobarometer (where 100 is the highest possible, i.e. 
100% of respondents thinking EU membership is a good thing) are recoded 1-7 (to imitate the 1-
7 CHES scale, if one assumes that a 100% pro-EU response rate by the public would be similar 
to a political party having the position 7 on the CHES scale (being completely in favor of 
integration)) and then compared to that of the governing coalition. Since and both public opinion 
and the average position of governing parties is then measured on the same scale, one can 
calculate the difference. Higher positive scores equals higher dissonance between the governing 
parties and the electorate (Governing parties average position – public opinion/position). 
 
In Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to describe and explain the decisions made in relation to research 
design, in particular the issue of operationalization of the variables employed in the study. The 
data for the main dependent variable (change in party policy positions on the issue of European 
Integration) was mostly data driven, but it is argued that there are very good reasons (as previous 
research on the measurement of party positions has shown) to define and operationalize attitudes 
towards the EU using the one-dimensional scale of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. 
While previous research that has investigated Eurosceptic party influence (Meijers, 2015) 
has only focused on the cumulated effect of all Eurosceptic parties in the EU’s member states, I 
distinguish between the effect of cumulated Eurosceptic performance, and that of the ‘flagship 
Eurosceptic parties’, which I argue can be used equally well as a measure of Eurosceptic 
popularity. A variety of other sources was used to measure either country and time-specific 
factors (such as socio-economic conditions) or those pertaining to individual political parties, 
which are meant to provide the control variables needed to properly isolate and explore the effect 
of Eurosceptic contagion. The following chapter is the first empirical step of this dissertation. 
After presenting descriptive information regarding Eurosceptic evolution in Western Europe, it 
proceeds to analyzing the effect of populist influence over moderate party behavior. 
92 
 
4. Eurosceptic Trends and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
Introduction 
 
Before analyzing the data and testing the main hypothesis of this study, it is important to note 
that the evolution of Euroscepticism in the countries of Western Europe has not had a linear 
character, and that it has also been expressed through various types of Eurosceptic parties. While 
this project is meant at its core to provide nomothetic, ceteris paribus results that answers the 
research question for Western Europe as a whole51 and makes the argument that the shift in 
policy positions is an EU15 wide phenomenon, it is worthwhile to see how the fate of 
Eurosceptic Parties has risen and waned at various times. The descriptive data reveals various 
noteworthy things. First, the success of Eurosceptic parties has not evolved similarly in all 
countries over time. In some countries, it has been growing slowly but steadily while in others it 
has experienced more sudden changes in support. In some countries, the Eurosceptic scene has 
identified with one specific party across the years and decades (where the difference between 
that Eurosceptic leader and other parties was very big), while in others, several small Eurosceptic 
parties have each contributed a bit to the cumulative vote total of populist-anti EU actors. In the 
former situation, the line describing the evolution of the biggest Eurosceptic Party is almost 
identical to the one describing the evolution of total cumulated votes going to Eurosceptic 
parties. In the latter, the two trends are distinct. In some instances, both types of evolution can be 
found in one country, where one period was characterized by Eurosceptic voters split among 
various populist parties and where one party managed with time to establish itself as the go-to 
anti EU alternative: that which I described in the previous two chapters (theoretical framework 
and research design) as being the ‘Flagship Eurosceptic’ party. The following descriptive section 
provides information on five indicators from each country: Total Vote Percentage for all 
Eurosceptic Parties (Total EP), Total Vote Percentage for Left Wing Eurosceptic Parties (Total 
LEP), and Right Wing Eurosceptic Parties (Total REP), as well as well as information on the 
percentage of votes gained at every election by the then biggest left wing (Biggest LEP) and 
biggest right wing (Biggest REP) Eurosceptic Party.  
                                                 
51 and generalize for the region 
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Trends and Cross-Country Comparisons 
 
Spain and Portugal 
Spain and Portugal stand out as countries where Euroscepticism has been a territory dominated 
by the left-wing. Neither country has had a far right Eurosceptic scene of sorts. In Spain the most 
important Eurosceptic party until the 2000’s has been the left-wing United Left (I.U.) and after 
2000, the party basically ‘embodied’ Spanish skepticism and caution towards European 
Integration. Like most other separatist/regional parties in Spain, the Eurosceptic-leaning basque 
party Herri Batasuna was a left nationalist/left-wing party. At the most recent election (not 
figured in the graph, the IU scored only 3.6% of votes as Podemos positioned itself as the main 
left-wing populist party). Vox, a rare sight on the Spanish political scene as a party closer to the 
left end of the political spectrum,  has formed recently (2013) and ran for office the first time at 
the recent 2015 elections, where it gained ~ 0.2 % of votes. 
 
Figure 14: Euroscepticism in Spain 
 
Vote % in national elections for Spain’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic party and cumulated vote % for all 
Eurosceptic parties 
 
While Portugal has had some minuscule right wing Eurosceptic Parties, the biggest opponents of 
European Integration have come, just like in Spain, from the far left in the form of the CDU-
APU, whose electoral results have waned since the 1980’s. 
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Figure 15: Euroscepticism in Portugal 
 
A)Vote % in national elections for Portugal’s biggest Left Eurosceptic and biggest Right Eurosceptic Parties and B) 
cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
Ireland 
Similarly to the Iberian countries, Ireland experienced opposition to the EU mostly in its Left-
wing variety. The main Eurosceptic party in the past two decades has been the Left-Nationalist 
Sinn Fein. While a number of smaller left-wing parties did oppose EU integration, the lead held 
by Sinn Fein means that the party’s vote total has largely been almost the same as the entire 
cumulated % of votes for Eurosceptic parties in Ireland. 
 
Figure 16: Euroscepticism in Ireland 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Ireland’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
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Greece 
In the early 80’s, a strong KKE in Greece meant that Hellenistic opposition to European 
Integration was much stronger on the left than on the right of the political spectrum. Following a 
political shake-up in Greece in the late 80’s, the KKE split into various warring factions and its 
electoral appeal dropped to nil until the early –mid 90’. Like in the case of Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland, Eurosceptic parties were much stronger on the left of the political spectrum, a situation 
which in Greece lasted until after the accession to the Eurozone, at which point parties from the 
right wing (LAOS, ANEL, Golden Dawn) started to play catch-up. By 2012 right-wing 
Eurosceptic parties overtook the left in terms of total vote percentage gained (not counting and 
including in this case Syriza whose Eurosceptic credentials are debatable given its policy 
demands after it took power in the wake of the Greek Crisis). 
 
Figure 17: Euroscepticism in Greece 
 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Greece’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
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Italy 
Italy stands out somewhat amongst the PIIGS as the only country that has always had a 
consistent degree of right-wing anti-EU sentiment since the 80’s. 
 
Figure 18: Euroscepticism in Italy 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Italy’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
The Italian communist party – and later the Party of Communist Reconstruction – has been 
visible enough in Italian politics to give a distinct face to Italian left-wing Euroscepticism. On 
the far right edges of the political spectrum, the now (in)famous Lega Nord has together with the 
MSI/NA been the main proponent of far right Eurosceptic populism. While the MSI tamed down 
its tone as it morphed into the NA, the Lega Nord mutated in the other direction. Like the FPÖ in 
Austria, it started as a right-wing pro-market, pro-EU party. In addition to its goals of greater 
economic freedom for the North, the Lega Nord also saw the EU and continental federalism as a 
means to counteract the influence of Rome in northern Italy.  The party began the turn from pro-
EU to anti-EU in the mid-90’s and by the turn of the century, it had become the most staunch 
opponent of European Integration in Italy. While it can be discussed to what degree the 5 Star 
movement of Beppe Grillo can be seen as a left-wing party, its GAL (GAL-TAN) credentials are 
rather strong and it not only became the biggest Eurosceptic Party in Italy at the most recent 
elections, but also gained the more votes (per cent wise) than any other Eurosceptic Party had 
done so in Italy until that moment. 
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Austria 
The Graphs  describing the fate of Eurosceptic parties in Austria can be misleading, and in a way 
they can be thought of as an artifice of who was Eurosceptic at which time point (the graphs can 
also be thought of as being accurate after Austria joined the EU). 
 
Figure 19: Euroscepticism in Austria 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Austria’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
Until the mid 90’s the populist right-wing Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) was rather pro EU, 
having a rather strong pro-market orientation, as opposed to the Green party which was opposed 
to European Integration (and until 1995 the only significant voice against accession). After 
membership of the bloc became a fait accompli and it became apparent that a majority of the 
public supported integration, the Austrian greens became – like many green parties elsewhere in 
Europe – a pro-Integration party. The FPÖ is only considered a Eurosceptic Party beginning with 
the 1995 election, while the Greens counted as a Eurosceptic party until then, hence the sudden 
swing between left and right on the graph. After 1995 Euroscepticism on the left side of the 
political spectrum in Austria has been on life support, with the communists gaining scant votes, 
while on the right the FPÖ is joined by parties like the BZÖ and Team Stronach in expressing 
scepticism towards further integration. 
Finland 
Finland should be seen in the context of its late entry to the EU. In the 80’s parties opposing EU 
membership accounted for around a quarter of votes, and opposition to the EU was more of a 
‘mainstream’ attitude than elsewhere. As its accession to the bloc approached and it became 
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clear that EU membership is a largely accepted position, socialist opposition to the EU began to 
decline as the far left SKDL abandoned its anti-EU stance, leaving only the communist SKP and 
the VSL on the left Eurosceptic barricade. Both parties were struggling to reach 1% of voters, 
and leaving the SMP agrarian/rural party as the ‘only game in town’ on the right edge of the 
political spectrum. Finland joined the Eurozone, the SMP evolved into the True Finns Party 
(recently rebranded as ‘The Finns’ Party ‘), and after the outbreak of the financial crisis, it 
became an influential element of Finnish politics, becoming one of Europe’s best known 
Eurosceptic parties. 
Figure 20: Euroscepticism in Finland 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Finland’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
Denmark 
Like in Finland, opposition to European Integration was mostly an affair of the far left in 
Denmark in the 1980’s, with the Socialist People’s Party oscillating at between 10 and 15 per -
cent of vote, and being the number one Eurosceptic party in the period, while other parties 
hovered in the 2-3 per cent region. The right wing Progress Party was the main right wing 
Eurosceptic party, and despite scoring 9 per cent at the 1988 elections and doing increasingly 
better in the 90’s, it did not manage to steal the Eurosceptic spotlight, even while the Socialist 
People’s Party was doing ever worse. Right wing Euroscepticism eventually overtook left wing 
Euroscepticism in 2001, when the Danish People’s Party (DFP) splintered from the Progress 
Party and overtook the Left. Since then, the DFP has remained the main anti-EU voice in Danish 
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politics, and while the combined votes of Left Eurosceptic Parties managed to overtake the 
combined total of the far right in 2007, the DFP remains Denmark’s flagship Eurosceptic party. 
Figure 21: Euroscepticism in Denmark 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Denmark’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden opposition to the European Integration from the far right was nigh inexistent until the 
current millenium, anti-EU discourse being for a long time the domain of the left side of the 
spectrum, with the Left Party and the Greens being the main actors in that area. While Left-Wing 
Euroscepticism has remained at rather constant levels in terms of number of votes it commands 
in national elections (with the exception of a spike in 1998), the right-wing Sverigedemokraterna 
became one of Sweden’s political powerbrokers after 2010 and is currently one of the biggest 
parties in Sweden. 
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Figure 22: Euroscepticism in Sweden 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Sweden’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the Westminster system took its toll in on the performance of fringe 
parties due to the incentive to vote ‘strategic’. Until 1999 Eurosceptic parties were nigh’ 
inexistent at the polls, and even after that year (when the rules for European Elections in Britain 
changed to a proportional system), the vote tallies for UKIP were suppressed by the rules that 
govern the race.  
 
Figure 23: Euroscepticism in Britain 
  
A) Vote % in national elections for Britain’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
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While some fringe parties flirted with and espoused Eurosceptic discourse (the Greens, the 
Democratic Unionist Party, the British National Party, the Socialist Labor Party later on), the 
rules of the electoral system prevented any of these from breaking 1% in the polls until 1997, 
when the Referendum party stood for election.  After gaining around 3% of votes, the party soon 
dissolved leaving center stage on the Eurosceptic Right Wing to the UKIP. The latter actually 
formed in the early 90’s, prior to the Referendum Party, but it never managed to make an impact 
in the 90’s. At the ’99 EP elections it managed to come 4th and gained enough attention to help 
push it above 1% of votes at the next national election (2001). While it still didn’t equal the votes 
that the Referendum Party had obtained four years prior, it comfortably laid claim to the niche 
and title of only serious Eurosceptic party; there was no other ‘big’ party on the right and the 
British far left was too weak to matter. After 2001, it did increasingly better at every election, 
although its results in the Westminster race paled in comparison to the numbers it put up in 
European elections ( 6%, 16%, 16% and 27%) – until 2015. 
France  
France also has a majoritarian electoral system whereby every circumscription sends one 
representative to the National Assembly in Paris. What sets it apart from the UK is the fact that 
there is a two-round system, with the candidates with the most votes from the first round 
competing in a run-off in the second round. This allows voters to vote with ‘their hearts’ in the 
first round, as they need not worry that voting for the party they deem closest to them will cost 
their most preferred large party against their least preferred competitor. The second round gives 
voters a chance to vote strategically and avoid a ‘worst case scenario’. Just like in the United 
Kingdom, radical and fringe parties have a hard time entering the parliament, despite robust 
election results. Because of this, the results of the first rounds of voting in France’s legislative 
elections look very much like results from proportional political systems, and it is possible to 
interpret the results of the first round  as a window into the minds of voters. 
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Figure 24: Euroscepticism in France 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for France’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic Parties 
and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
Until the early 1980’s, the French Communist Party was the main opponent to European 
integration, and the far right opposition was very much in its infancy. The National Front became 
a household name after 1986 when it approached 10% in the first round (it had previously failed 
to score 1%) and kept building on its performances from year to year until 2002, when it took its 
first electoral loss relative to its previous run (-3.8%) and in 2007 again (-6.8%). In the 
meantime, the French far left always kept faring worse with time, but managed to stabilize above 
the 4% mark after 2000. While the Front National did dip at one point to under 5 per cent, right 
wing Eurosceptic parties overall always maintained a lead in the 90’s over left wing ones due to 
a plethora of small right wing Eurosceptic parties who hovered below 1% (Rally for France, 
Movement for France and Independence of Europe, Citizens and Republican Movement). The 
Front National has over the past two decades established itself as the biggest and most 
authoritative anti-EU party in France. 
Belgium 
The Eurosceptic niche has been decidedly taken over by right-wing populism in Belgium. The 
late 80’s represented the swan song of Belgian left-wing Euroscepticism, and various right-wing 
parties have since advocated anti-Integration positions, like The Belgian Front National, the VB, 
and the Lijst Dedecker. The VB (Vlaams Belang, initially Vlaams Block), a flemmish nationalist 
party has in comparison to other Eurosceptic parties been large enough to ensure that the total 
cumulated vote % garnered by all anti-EU parties ‘moved along’ with its own election results. 
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Figure 25: Euroscepticism in Belgium 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Belgium’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
 
The Netherlands 
Holland has perhaps been the environment least dominated by a single Eurosceptic party. While 
it is common today to think of Geert Wilder’s PVV and associate them with a dominating 
position as opponents of integration (what I call the “flagship Eurosceptic” effect), half a dozen 
Eurosceptic parties have over the past 25 years held that distinction. While the right wing has 
traditionally been stronger than the left, like in Belgium, the socialist SP managed to consistently 
score above 5% after 2000 (and once even above 10%, when right wing Eurosceptic parties took 
a dive in public support).  
 
Figure 26: Euroscepticism in the Netherlands 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Netherland’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
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Until 2002 a number of small Eurosceptic parties shared votes between them (RPF, SGP, GPV, 
CD) on the right without one standing out with distinction. That changed when the Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn surprised everybody by winning around 17% of votes, and although the party fizzled out 
with the disappearance of its leader, its ‘seat’ has been taken by the PVV under the leadership of 
Geert Wilders. 
Germany 
With its central role as one of the engines of European Integration, Germany has not seen much 
success from hard Eurosceptic parties. Parties like the NPD, Die Republikaner and the DVU 
struggled regularly on the right with scores of around 1%. Soft Euroscepticism of the left-wing 
variety has been the most visible in Germany with Die Linke being for a long time the only 
serious alternative to pro-Integration political parties. The AfD brought a change to that, and 
after it positioned itself ever closer to the right, it has lately managed to spark a stronger debate 
on issues other than regional governance and European Institutions. 
 
Figure 27: Euroscepticism in Germany 
 
A) Vote % in national elections for Germany’s biggest left-wing Eurosceptic and biggest right-wing Eurosceptic 
Parties and B) cumulated vote % totals of all Eurosceptic Parties 
Electoral cycles and election years don’t overlap nicely across countries. It is hard to graph the 
election results of Eurosceptic parties in all countries within the same figure because the data 
points are spread over different years in various countries. A disaggregated (in the sense of each 
county being present in the graph with its very own line and time points) year-by-year trend line 
is thus not very informative. 
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If one wishes to visualize a ‘clean’ trend presentation for Eurosceptic success over the 
years, it helps to aggregate the data into groups of years, or time points/periods. The nine time 
points of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey each has data on the most ‘recent election in country, 
prior to the year of the survey wave in given country’. Elections most often take place in years 
that are not CHES waves, but in between, and because the waves are typically set four years 
apart (in two cases the interval is three) it is easy to produce a trend line which aggregates 
election results in all 14 countries because each country has a value on each of those nine waves. 
The graphs below provide just that kind of useful visualization. They are constructed out 
by averaging for each time point the values taken from the 14 countries from their ‘most recent 
elections’ values. Biggest EP gives the European average vote % for the ‘flagship’ Eurosceptic. 
Total REP and total LEP breaks down the data in total percentages of votes that went to Left 
Wing and Right Wing Eurosceptic Parties, while Main REP and main LEP describe the same 
information as ‘biggest LEP & REP’ above: how many votes on average the biggest single Left 
Wing and Right Wing Eurosceptic Party gained at each time point. 
 
Figure 28: Average % of votes obtained in the EU 15 across time 
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The second and third graphs in this section describes the evolution of left and right wing 
Euroscepticism. In the 1980’s left wing Euroscepticism was much stronger than the right-wing 
variety on average, and while left-wing opposition to EU integration has remained at rather 
constant levels over the years, the right wing variety has been much more dynamic, starting at 
the bottom, rising strongly in the run up to the introduction of the common currency in the mid 
90’s, falling once again below the Left-Wing in the early 2000’s and then picking up steam 
again. As it stands today, Parties from the right fringes of the political spectrum have 
monopolized discussion and media attention, and when people tend to speak of populist 
opposition to European Integration, it has become synonymous with right-wing populism (PVV, 
Front National, FPO, UKIP, True Finns, Vlaams Belang), unless debate focuses on Southern 
Europe. 
 
Figure 29: Aggregated Right Wing and Left Wing Euroscepticism (A) 
 
Average % of votes obtained in the EU 15 across the waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Total Right-Wing 
Eurosceptic Parties and Left-Wing Eurosceptic Parties 
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Figure 30: Aggregated Right Wing and Left Wing Euroscepticism (B) 
 
Average % of votes obtained in the EU 15 across the waves of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Biggest Right-Wing 
Eurosceptic Parties and Left-Wing Eurosceptic Parties 
 
Testing the Main Hypothesis 
 
The first, underlying, and principal hypothesis of this study is that the success of Eurosceptic 
parties leads to changes of policy position/preferences by the other parties (H1). Should the 
hypothesis be confirmed, we would find that position changes of centrist parties on the EU issue 
correlate with the electoral success of Eurosceptic Parties in those aforementioned parties’ 
countries, when controlling for a variety of factors, such as public opinion/sentiment on EU 
integration, socioeconomic factors, time, as well as characteristics of those parties whose 
position-changes we are measuring: their size, their ideological orientation, their electoral fate, 
and government/opposition status. 
Having said that, there are a few different ways in which the electoral success of 
Eurosceptic Parties can be operationalized. To say that Eurosceptic Parties are successful can be 
taken to mean a number of things. Firstly, one could refer to what overall percentage of votes the 
flagship Eurosceptic Party gained in a country at the most recent elections. In the same vein, one 
could refer to the total cumulated % gained at the most recent elections by all Eurosceptic parties 
in a country, taken together. Alternatively, one could refer to how Eurosceptic parties have fared 
at the most recent election when compared to the previous one. From that point of view, one 
could operationalize Eurosceptic Success as either change in vote percentage for all Eurosceptic 
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parties in a country, or change in vote % (between the two most recent elections) of the biggest 
Eurosceptic party in a country – this latter operationalization is the one that this project set off 
from and is used as a benchmark: the very first model in the dissertation, M1. Given this, the 
very first set of analyses test four related models. The models are all identical, bar the very first 
predictor – the measure for Eurosceptic performance. The four models in table can be thought of 
in a 2x2 framework. Two of the models (M1 and M3) deal with change in electoral outcomes 
between elections as main independent variables, while the other two (M2 and M4) use the vote 
result of the most recent election prior to each CHES wave as the main predictors, regardless of 
what that number is like compared to the previous value. 
This very first table confirms that the Radical Party Hypothesis is correct, and that it 
holds when one uses change in vote from one election to another as the main Independent 
Variables. The coefficients for the main predictors in M1 and M3 are statistically significant, 
mirroring De Vries’ (2007) findings about the necessity of Radical Parties for the politicization 
of the EU issue. The base model as such is robust, the coefficients for the other variables (which 
in this chapter are used as mere control variables) remain similar across the 4 iterations of the 
models. Interpreting the regression table, we learn that mainstream parties do not react to the 
absolute levels of Eurosceptic party vote tallies. Instead, they react to vote gains or losses by 
such populist parties relative to the last election at each point in time. It is change in the main 
Independent Variable from T1-T2 (Δβ1) that is significant, not the absolute level of the indicator 
(β1). The negative sign in front of the coefficients (Votechange_BiggestEuroscepticP and 
Votechange_all_ES_Parties) is to be expected, and indicates that as Eurosceptic parties gain 
votes, the other parties position will move in a negative direction on the EU issue on the 1-7 
Chapel Hill Scale. If the Front National goes from 11% in one election to 11,5% in the next 
election, that might not be as big a reason to panic for French parties as Sinn Fein going from 3% 
to 6% would be for Irish parties. The political establishment in a country that has gotten used to a 
Eurosceptic party gaining around 10% at every election will expect such a party to gain another 
10, all things considered. If the Eurosceptic party succeeds and lives up to that expectation, it 
will be just that: confirming expectations. That communicates to the parties on the political 
center that the Eurosceptic appeal is not increasing among the electorate, that it is not drawing 
more votes away and the fact that the EU issue is not a significant one, or at least not a decidedly 
significant one. If populist Eurosceptics in a country gain 6 or 7 per cent of the vote, one might 
109 
 
be tempted to think that there should be less cause for alarm than the situation described above, 
where they obtained 10. 
However, if the 6 or seven per cent come on the back of an improvement from 2 or three, 
it points to a change and disruption in the equilibrium of the political system, a change in the 
mood of the electorate and a possible distribution of voters. The fact that the other variables (in 
this case control variables) retain their coefficient signs, strength and significance speaks to the 
robustness of the model. In all four instances, mainstream parties Left-Right orientation, their 
participation in government/opposition and their own electoral performance relative to the last 
election are significant predictors. While parties’ government/opposition status is the strongest of 
the three coefficients (.13), it is a dummy variable, which limits the possibility of policy drift 
from one election to another to a certain boundary. The positive sign indicates that all things 
considered (when controlling for all variables, including Eurosceptic electoral performance or 
success) parties in government are more likely to experience a positive change in attitude 
towards the EU. Party_votechange indicates that for every extra one per cent in votes that a 
moderate party improved compared to its previous electoral performance, it will by default adopt 
a position that is more pro-EU by .01 on the 1-7 CHES scale. The strongest effect among the 
control variables belongs to the Left-Right placement of parties. The negative sign indicates that 
the further to the right a party lies, the more skeptical of integration it will be, all else equal 
(higher values on the indicator indicates right wing ideologies and lower values indicates left-
wing ones). The coefficient suggests that for every one point further to the right a party lies on 
the 0-10 left right scale, its change in EU position will be default be .06 in the negative direction. 
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Table 1: the first regression analysis, disaggregated models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02**    
 (0.007)    
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.01   
  (0.009)   
Votechange_All_ES_Parties   -0.02**  
   (0.006)  
Totalvotes_All_ES_Parties    -0.00 
    (0.008) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties   0.03 0.05 
   (0.042) (0.045) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties   -0.04 -0.02 
   (0.088) (0.087) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.06   
 (0.043) (0.042)   
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.01   
 (0.086) (0.088)   
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.13* 0.15** 0.13* 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 
 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.73 0.64 0.78 0.69 
 (0.672) (0.669) (0.611) (0.603) 
     
Observations 527 533 527 533 
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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So far, it seems that both variables predict position change among the mainstream parties, and 
almost equally well. It is fairly easy to see from the graphs in the first part of this empirical 
chapter that the line describing how well Eurosceptic parties are doing in a country often runs 
hand in hand with how well the biggest Eurosceptic party in that country does. This is the 
“Flagship Eurosceptic Party” phenomenon – Eurosceptic success is often synonymous with one 
party’s fate. Sometimes however, the Flagship Eurosceptic phenomenon can coexist with the 
effect of cumulated Eurosceptic parties’ success, in instances when a Eurosceptic party does 
command sufficient electoral clout to dominate public attention, but is surrounded by some 
Eurosceptic parties whose electoral tally added together can match that of the flagship 
Eurosceptic (and thus double the overall value of Eurosceptic success). 
The mechanism I use here works on the assumption that mainstream political parties react 
to the defection of voters towards anti-EU or euro-critical political actors. There will be a 
noticeable effect if these parties lose ten per cent to a populist Eurosceptic party, and less so if 
they lose another one per cent to a small fringe party. But if instead of losing an extra one per 
cent (besides the original 10% to the big populist), they lose an extra nine per cent spread across 
three smaller Eurosceptic parties (say, for example each with 3%), then the effect is bound to be 
much stronger because while each of these parties are only gaining 3%, the mainstream are 
losing voters at a high cumulated rate. All things considered, there are arguments in favor of 
looking at the success of the biggest Eurosceptic Parties of a country as well as the success of all 
such parties. 
Table 2 combines the models (models 1 and 2 in one and models 3 and 4 into one). It 
shows that the coefficient for Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP (from one election to another) 
retains its coefficient and significance when controlling for the absolute percentage of votes 
gained by the Eurosceptic Party. It reinforces the conclusion that it is Δβ1 (the change in votes) 
that matters, not the value of β1 by itself. The same holds true when analyzing the cumulated 
vote tally of all Eurosceptic parties. As before, Left-Right, and Gov_Opposition remain 
significant. 
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Table 2: the first regression analysis, aggregated models 
 (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*  
 (0.009)  
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.00  
 (0.011)  
Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.02* 
  (0.008) 
Totalvotes_All_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.009) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.04 
  (0.046) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  -0.04 
  (0.085) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04  
 (0.043)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03  
 (0.088)  
Time -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.054) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
 
Country Dummies not reported 
 
 
(0.184) (0.183) 
Constant 0.76 0.69 
 (0.641) (0.564) 
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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The inverse model 
 
According to the likes of Green Pedersen (2012), Mair (2000), Dahlström and Sundell (2012) or 
Meguid (2008) mainstream parties create or eliminate the opportunities and political agenda that 
allow radical parties to thrive, and the latter are supposed to only flourish when their party 
positions and preferred issues are first validated and legitimized by mainstream parties via policy 
position changes by the former. Models 7 and 8 test the hypothesis in the opposite direction 
(Hypothesis 2) – it asks whether change in how many votes a) the biggest Eurosceptic party (m7) 
and all Eurosceptic parties (m8) receive is determined by how the other parties, the political 
mainstream, previously change their position on the EU issue. In both models, the coefficient for 
mainstream parties 'Change_Position_on_EU (typically the dependent variable in the other 
models) is insignificant, contradicting the ‘alternative’ hypothesis that mainstream party shifts 
ocurr first. In model 7, the dependent variable is change in votes for the country’s biggest 
Eurosceptic Party, and in model 8, it is change in the cumulated vote tally for all Eurosceptic 
parties. Some variables (pertaining to individual characteristics of mainstream parties, such as 
their Left_Right orientation, and Government status, etc) were dropped since there was no need 
to control for them, as was their own position that is the dependent variable. The variables in the 
regression tables carry the prefix ‘lead’ because the values on those indicators were lead into the 
next time point (the opposite of taking a lag). 
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Table 3: testing whether Eurosceptic success is actually a function of mainstream party position change 
 
 (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Change_Position_on_EU 0.07 -0.31 
 (0.773) (1.018) 
leadextremeness_biggestES -1.27  
 (1.232)  
leadsalience_biggestES -0.62  
 (1.326)  
leadextremeness_allES  -1.36 
  (1.141) 
leadsalience_allES  0.26 
  (1.328) 
Time 0.26 0.24 
 (0.307) (0.354) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU 0.10 0.15 
 (0.085) (0.107) 
unemployment 0.17 0.26 
 
Country Dummies not reported 
 
 
 
(0.222) (0.290) 
Constant -3.90 -9.88 
 (10.290) (11.085) 
   
Observations 421 421 
R-squared 0.09 0.11 
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.06 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Eurosceptic Contagion and the Electoral Threshold 
 
Table 4 includes the output from two models/regressions, one (model 9) in which the main IV in 
the equation, ‘Votes over electoral threshold’ denotes how far over (or under) the electoral 
threshold the country’s Eurosceptic Party scored at the most recent elections ( if there is no 
electoral threshold, then the score on this variable is given by how  many votes per cent the 
flagship Eurosceptic gained at said election, i.e. 0 is taken as a default base value); the other 
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variables are identical to those in models 1 and 3. The second regression (model 10) adds the 
variable ‘Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP, the main IV, thereby testing the effect that ‘‘Votes 
over electoral threshold’’ has on party position change, while controlling for this study’s main 
predictor. 
Table 4: testing the radical party hypotheses when controlling for Eurosceptic proximity to the electoral threshold 
  
 (9) (10) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold 0.11 0.30 
 (0.575) (0.527) 
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.02* 
  (0.009) 
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.12 -0.30 
 (0.578) (0.529) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.06 0.04 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.090) (0.090) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.13* 0.15** 
 (0.056) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01** 0.01 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 1.19 2.29 
 (2.792) (2.574) 
   
Observations 533 527 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.12 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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In both cases the coefficient ‘Votes over electoral threshold’ is insignificant, while 
‘Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP’ retains its properties when added to the model – the model 
becomes identical to M1 plus the added predictor of ‘Votes over electoral threshold’. In effect, 
the regression is testing the main model, when controlling for the threshold factor as well. The 
reverse is also true, the model is testing for the effect of ‘Votes over electoral threshold’ when 
controlling for Eurosceptic success as measured in votechange of the biggest party ( testing for 
the influence of the threshold factor only makes sense for the individual, largest parties, the 
flagship Eurosceptics: as for the change in cumulated vote tally of all parties, it is hard to relate it 
analytically to the above mentioned threshold). Eurosceptic Success relative to the Electoral 
Threshold is not a significant predictor of other parties’ positional changes. Attesting to the 
robustness of the original model, the strength of the other coefficients remains the same as in 
previous models, as is their statistical significance. Adding the one extra predictor produces 
negligible changes.  
The electoral threshold determines, among other things, what parties don’t make it into 
the legislature. A country’s threshold might prevent a country from gaining seats even if it scored 
some votes (for example 3%). To say that a populist party’s proximity to entering parliament is 
what makes the other parties react, but not their actual vote tally would suggest that parties are 
not really concerned with Eurosceptic challengers if these are 2 or 3 % away from entering 
parliament. Let’s assume for a moment a situation in which a Eurosceptic party gains a lot of 
votes compared to the last election (maybe even getting into the 5% region) but falls just short of 
the electoral threshold (akin to how the AfD narrowly missed out on Bundestag representation at 
the most recent national elections in Germany). Analogously we could assume a situation in 
which several small Eurosceptic parties all gain votes, but all stop short of passing the electoral 
threshold – in such a situation the combined votes of all Eurosceptic parties would constitute a 
cumulated total that is well above the threshold, and that cumulated total might be comparable to 
the vote tally of the biggest parties. 
Such an electoral performance would not change the distribution of seats in the 
parliament. If we were to assume that ΔSeats (change in number of seats) is what political parties 
react to, the value on ΔSeats following such an election would be zero. There would be no 
information on the changes in voters’ preferences because such changes did not materialize in 
representation. Naturally, we would not assume based on such an election that nothing is 
117 
 
happening in the electorate. And of course, neither would the centrist parties that lost the votes. 
Even if they have not lost seats, they are losing votes and become aware of the need to adjust 
their own policy position, even if a Eurosceptic party gains 2% of votes, and finds itself another 
2-3% away from a possible threshold. 
For the same reason, it would not make much sense to look at changes in the distribution of seats 
within parliament and changes in said distribution over electoral cycles. Data on seat gains and 
seat changes can mask vote % changes if parties gain votes without translating such gains into 
seats (and the corresponding lack of seat loss from other parties). It would be folly of political 
parties to dismiss information about a 3 or 4 per cent change in the distribution of votes (their 
loss and populists’ gain) as ‘no information’52. Such a change is valuable information about the 
changing preference of voters, even when not accompanied by changes in the distribution of 
seats. 
Yet another reason why electoral performance relative to the electoral threshold is not 
useful as an information mechanism is institutional. It is hard to compare across countries. Some 
countries have high elector limits to parliament entry. In some countries, the threshold equals the 
% of votes required to win one seat ( below 1% in the Netherlands), while other countries have 
no national threshold, and finally, majoritarian systems impose a de facto threshold that depends 
on winning a constituency. It thus becomes hard to compare the effect of proximity to the 
electoral threshold cross-sectionally, because the values on the variable mean very different 
things across country contexts – being within one percent of the threshold can mean very 
different things in Holland, Germany and Italy, while I argue that a one per cent increase in the 
overall vote tally for Eurosceptic parties has meaning which is more easily and meaningfully 
compared across these countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This first empirical part of this project was structured along two themes. The first part dealt with 
presenting some of the trends of Eurosceptic performance in Western Europe over the past three 
                                                 
52 especially if that happens with several Eurosceptic Parties whose cumulated vote tally goes well over the electoral 
threshold, to repeat what was said above 
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decades, comparing the success of Eurosceptic parties across countries as well as political poles.  
There are differences across time within and between countries with regards to the type of 
Eurosceptic Parties that have been the most preeminent critics of regional integration, as to 
whether and when the ratio of left wing and right wing populism swung one way or another. 
From an aggregate cross-sectional perspective, in the 1980’s left-wing Euroscepticism held 
center stage, as such parties were faring much better at the polls than right wing ones. In the 
early 90’s, far left populism began to lose its appeal, at the same time as right wing parties were 
registering growing voter support, eventually overtaking left-wing populism as the strongest 
Eurosceptic fringe parties. Right wing Eurosceptic parties have been on an improving trend (vote 
count wise) since the early-mid 2000’s, while a similar upward trend in left-wing Eurosceptic 
party support started to materialize in the mid to late years of the previous decade. The second 
part of the chapter took on the radical party hypothesis and tested it in various iterations, in doing 
so it looked at different ways to describe and operationalize Eurosceptic success, with the 
conclusion that change in success from one election to another, both in the case of the Flagship 
Eurosceptic as well as that of the cumulated vote tally of all Eurosceptic Parties, is the best way 
to describe such an indicator. The results show a robust, statistically significant coefficient for 
the main predictor, which confirms the radical party hypothesis (hypothesis 1) and proves that 
Eurosceptic Parties can and do influence their national party systems by forcing other 
parties to adopt and co-opt parts of their policy positions. The results stood even in models 
which mixed the first differenced values with the absolute ones (essentially testing the two 
indicators while controlling for one another), showing that moderate and mainstream parties 
react first and foremost to change to the political status quo. Political parties use changes in 
electoral outcomes from one election to another to ‘update’ their map of the electoral landscape, 
the attractiveness of various policy positions and the distribution of voter preferences.  Two 
models in this chapter tackled what can in a way be described as ‘the opposite’ to the radical 
party hypothesis, i.e. question of direction of causality. That section showed that contrary to 
those theoretical standpoints that place Eurosceptic success on the left side of the equation 
(treating them as a function of mainstream party behavior) there is no evidence to support the 
hypothesis (hypothesis 2) that party system position shifts come first and cause Eurosceptic 
success. 
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5. The Circumstances and Dynamics of Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
Introduction 
 
The very first empirical chapter concerned itself mostly with testing the Radical Party 
Hypothesis: finding out if there actually is an effect that Eurosceptic parties have on the other 
parties. This second empirical chapter delves deeper into the question of Eurosceptic populism, 
by asking whether the Effect of Eurosceptic Contagion is itself contingent on other factors. The 
first section of the chapter explores when and where contagion happens and ties this to 
discussion about temporal trends, the premises for self-reinforcing processes (is contagion a 
recent phenomenon, has it always been there and happened to the same extent?), and to the 
characteristics of the Eurosceptic parties (how Eurosceptic must a populist party actually be to 
make and impact, and to what degree does the EU issue have to be an issue of importance for 
those Eurosceptics?). The second section looks into why contagion happens, it takes the first look 
at the motivations of pro-EU mainstream parties when they are confronted with the growing 
public appeal of Eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs. It investigates how centrist parties treat that 
threat in various sets of circumstances: if they lose or gain votes, if their rivals perform poorly, or 
if Eurosceptic contagion is contingent on parties being either government or opposition parties. 
All in all, it represents the first steps in the discussion between tactical-cynical and conviction-
ideological motivations behind parties’ responses to the Eurosceptic rise. The third section of this 
chapter tackles the ideological element of the phenomenon, looking into what kind of 
Eurosceptic Parties the mainstream reacts to, and whether we can discern any important 
difference in how Eurosceptic Contagion manifests itself based on ideological differences.  
The previous empirical chapter has shown that both measurements depicting the electoral 
progress of the biggest Eurosceptic Party in a country as well as measurements describing the 
progress of all Eurosceptic parties are useful indicators of Eurosceptic success. I believe here that 
there is real analytical value in investigating further the phenomenon of Eurosceptic contagion 
through the lens of both independent variables, and the further analyses conducted here will 
include both predictors. The regression models in this chapter use the same variables as the base 
model from the previous chapter, with the main difference that some of the variables that were 
used previously as control variables are allowed one at a time to interact with the main predictor. 
120 
 
The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
In what circumstances does Eurosceptic Contagion happen? This section tries to assess to what 
degree the process studied in this project is itself influenced – mitigated or amplified – by the 
decorum in which Eurosceptic Parties do well, and in the process will test the corresponding 
hypotheses from the theoretical framework. This contributes to completing the picture of the 
‘Radical Party Model’ in several ways. As was already suggested, the rise of Eurosceptic actors 
has been a dynamic phenomenon, closely intertwined with the later development of the European 
Union, as well as more general socio-economic processes that took place within member states. 
The theoretical part of this project alluded to the possibility of a self-reinforcing 
mechanism existing in the case of Eurosceptic Contagion, whereby growing public discontent 
with integration, growing popularity of anti-systemic fringe parties and the growing salience of 
the EU issue might go hand in hand, strengthening each other’s effect over time. It is stated that 
Eurosceptic Parties have not always been as opposed to European Integration as they presently 
are (some where even pro-Integration as a counterweight to statist socialist policies on the 
national level). As these parties became more aware of the political and electoral potential that 
public policy positions opposing further or current Europeanization could convey, they added the 
EU issue to their repertoire and began to promote the issue ever more. Simultaneously, some of 
these parties doubled down on their anti-EU position, thus becoming more extreme in their 
opposition.  With growing success at the ballot box came more public attention to the issues they 
promoted, further driving electorate interest in their positions, and thus increasing the potential 
voter base of these parties. 
The factors looked at in this section are exogenous to the mainstream parties that undergo 
shifts in position on the EU issue, they pertain to the election itself or the characteristics of the 
populist challengers. I will here look at the effects of time, how radical Eurosceptic Parties are, 
and the degree to which the latter promote the EU issue in the electoral contest. This will be 
followed by a discussion on multilinearity – how well must Eurosceptic parties do, to actually 
force the mainstream to respond? Answering such questions will provide a closer and more 
minute look at the mechanism behind the information via elections mechanism, and the kind of 
information that parties actually employ when responding to Eurosceptic Success. 
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Table 5: The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion (A) 
 (11) (12) (13) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.036) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.00   
 (0.003)   
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  0.01  
  (0.008)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP   -0.01 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
  (0.010) 
Constant 0.60 0.66 0.70 
 (0.683) (0.681) (0.669) 
    
Observations 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6: The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 (11b) (12b) (13b) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.01 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.039) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time*Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.00   
 (0.003)   
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.01  
  (0.008)  
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties*Votechange_All_ES_Parties   -0.01 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
  (0.011) 
Constant 0.75 0.77 0.75 
 (0.632) (0.607) (0.617) 
    
Observations 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Euroscepticism and Time 
Does time matter for Eurosceptic Contagion? Is the phenomenon a function of the passing of 
time and various trends? Figures 31 and 32 show us that the phenomenon of Eurosceptic 
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Contagion becomes strong and significant enough to matter after the middle of the period in 
analysis in this study. Until 1999, there was little to no contagion, and mainstream parties were 
less likely to pay attention to Eurosceptic performance, or to adjust their policy position as a 
consequence of said performance. 
Figure 31: Time and Eurosceptic Contagion (A) 
 
The Interaction Between Eurosceptic Success (Flagship Eurosceptic Party) and Time 
 
 
 
Figure 32: The Interaction Between Eurosceptic Success (Flagship Eurosceptic Party) and Time (B) 
 
The Interaction Between Eurosceptic Success (All Eurosceptic Parties) and Time 
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That is around the same time as the period of the adoption of the single currency, the setting in 
motion of attempts to draw up a European constitution, and the ever stronger materializing 
prospects of Central and East European countries to join the Union.  
As time passed, as the European Communities became ever more coalesced into one, 
currency Union abolished national monetary power and eastern expansion brought in ever more 
immigrants from the CEE’s. With the financial crisis came the Euro crisis, the strains caused by 
the refugee crisis and the ever better performance of populist parties. All these contribute to 
make the impact of Eurosceptic Success on other parties’ positions ever stronger as we move 
forward in time. The literature on the opic at hand as already alluded to the growing salience of 
regional integration, as well as the growing likelihood of EU issue voting increasing with time 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Kriesi et al, 2008, De Wilde and Zürn, 2012). If we consider the 
growing effect of Eurosceptic Success with time in light of the evolution of the salience of 
European Integration, we get a more complete picture of how issue has come to influence party 
politics in the way it does. 
 
Eurosceptcisim and EU issue Salience 
 
In discussing Eurosceptic influence, it merits asking whether the phenomenon of Eurosceptic 
contagion is stronger for higher values of issue salience. After all, salience theory teaches us that 
if an issue is not important, it will not generate political interest and debate, and there will be less 
conflict around it. Moreover, in keeping with the underlying idea of this dissertation, if 
mainstream parties don’t think that the question of Integration matters, they would not address it, 
and would not undertake efforts to appease their electorate and to shift their position on it. Figure 
33 paints a compound picture. Firstly, European Integration was not always the contentious, 
inescapable issue that it is today. On a scale running from one to five, where five means that the 
EU issue is the most important issue of all for a political party, both Eurosceptic and moderate 
parties were less attentive to the integration question in the past. As time passed and the EC 
morphed into the EU, more attention was being awarded to the EU in national political contests. 
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Figure 33: The Salience of the EU issue over time for Eurosceptic Parties and Non-Eurosceptic Parties 
 
 
 
 
With time, populist parties turned from being just populist to becoming populist-Eurosceptic. 
Secondly, after the adoption of the common currency, and the debates it generated, moderate 
parties tried to ‘turn down the fire’ and quiet the debate about Europe – the issue became less 
salient for these parties. As the Euro crisis erupted, EU integration was again forced onto their 
open agenda, and while they have tried overall to tone down discussion about the EU, for 
Eurosceptic parties there was no going back. These parties have made opposition to Integration 
an internal part of their armory since the 90’s, and are unwilling to give it up. While various 
accounts attest to the growing politicization of European Integration (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; 
De Wilde and Zurn, 2012), some authors chose to leave the door on the issue open for debate 
(see Hoeglinger, 2016). 
A series of regressions were performed, amongst them also a pair in which the Salience 
of the EU Issue was used not only as a control variable, but as part of an interaction with the 
main predictor (Models 13 and 13b). The variable describing the Salience of the EU issue is the 
same as the one from Model 1 in chapter 1: it describes how salient the issue of Integration was 
for the flagship Eurosceptic party. Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties is an average of the values 
of the salience of the EU issue of all Eurosceptic Parties that contribute to the value of the 
‘Votechange_All_ES_Parties’ variable. Figures 34 and 35, describing visually the interactions 
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from those respective models, show that a) the effect/impact of Eurosceptic success on the other 
parties positions becomes stronger as the issue of Integration gains in importance, and b) the 
effect is insignificant if the salience is of the EU issue not high enough. 
 
 
Figure 34: Eurosceptic Contagion and the Salience of the EU issue for Eurosceptic Parties (A) 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Eurosceptic Contagion and the Salience of the EU issue for Eurosceptic Parties (B) 
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This plays in rather well with the previous two analyses: as time goes, the EU grows in 
importance as an issue of political contest, and Eurosceptic contagion became a significant 
phenomenon after the issue became important and contentious enough. An issue needs to be 
politically salient in order for it to ‘matter’ for the political contest. When Eurosceptic parties 
mobilize the issue and increase apprehension about European Integration, they raise awareness 
among the population about the debate, stir discussion and provoke political conflict around the 
issue at hand. 
The fact that the effect is stronger at higher levels of salience also points to another thing: 
the effect is lessened when Eurosceptic parties do not care about Europe. If a populist who barely 
cares about the EU gains votes, the moderate parties will be less likely to change their own 
position on the issue, because it is harder to infer from such a case/situation that the electorate 
has a different policy position from them, than from a scenario where to populist party actually 
cares strongly about stopping EU integration. These results suggest that a) Eurosceptic contagion 
is more likely and grows as we approach the present and b) populist parties must be not just 
populist, but also care about Europe in order for contagion to occur, supporting hypotheses H3 
and H4. 
In models 12 and 12b, the variable Extremeness of Eurosceptic Party describes the 
position of the flagship Eurosceptic on the classic 1-7 (in this case 0-6) EU position, and 
describes just how Eurosceptic a party actually is. The variable describing the average 
Extremeness of Eurosceptic parties is the average position of all Eurosceptic Parties that 
contribute to the value of the cumulative Eurosceptic indicator – again constructed using the 
same 1-7 scale. It simply describes the average ‘euroscepticness’ of populist parties for each 
CHES wave/country set. Graphs 36 and 37 show that the more ‘radical’ or anti-Integration 
Eurosceptic parties are, the bigger the impact of their electoral results. 
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Figure 36: Eurosceptic Contagion and the Extremeness of Eurosceptic Parties (A) 
 
 
 
Figure 37: Eurosceptic Contagion and the Extremeness of Eurosceptic Parties (A) 
 
 
 
If Eurosceptic parties are ‘hard’ Eurosceptics, the effect is stronger than if it were a soft 
Eurosceptic. This project uses continuous measures for most indicators in its analyses to avoid 
the loss information associated with categorical indicators, and uses the CHES EU position 
indicator to construct the indicators for the euroscepticness of populist parties. The state of the 
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party
Average Marginal Effects of Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP with 95% CIs
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties
Average Marginal Effects of Votechange_All_ES_Parties with 95% CIs
129 
 
art and literature on Europeanization and populism does include examples of research where 
Eurosceptic Parties are split in (qualitative) categories, the most famous one being perhaps 
Taggart and Szczerbiak’s (2008) soft-and-hard-Eurosceptic framework. While that approach is 
not used here, one could attempt to ease interpretation by drawing paralells between Taggart and 
Szczerbiak’s framework and the 1-7 CHES scale.  
The Chapel Hill scale runs from one to seven, with 1denoting “overall orientation of 
party leadership towards European Integration” that is Strongly Opposed, while 7 denotes an 
orientation that is Strongly in Favor. 2 Denotes Opposed and 3 denotes Somewhat Opposed. In 
the middle of the scale, 4 denotes Neutral.  As such, the 3 interval wide space that runs from 1 to 
4 is the area denoting Eurosceptic Parties on the scale. If we were to divide that analytical space 
into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Eurosceptics we would classifyparties in the 1-2,5 space as hard 
Eurosceptics and those parties between 2,5-3,5/4 as soft Eurosceptics.  When looking at Figure 
38 we see that the interaction holds (in the same fashion as in Figure 37) for the cumulated 
electoral results of all Eurosceptic parties, with the interaction being significant for hard 
Eurosceptics, then the effect loses significance as it approaches 3 and enters ‘soft Eurosceptic’ 
territory.  
At first, these findings might seem a bit counter-intuitive. One could argue that 
mainstream parties should not feel as threatened by hard Euroscpetics as by soft ones, since the 
soft ones are bound to look less ‘scary’ to the swing voters, and thus ‘more electable’. Undecided 
voters should be able to vote with an easier conscience for a party that flirts lightly with 
populism than one who is a hard-core populist, and as such, centrist parties might feel that there 
is less potential for a hard-core Eurosceptic to lure their voters because of a lower ceiling on 
potential maximum votes. A soft Eurosceptic should appear acceptable to more voters, so that 
when a soft Eurosceptic gains votes, more alarm bells should go ringing for the political 
mainstream in theory. 
There are, however some good reasons why the reverse is highly plausible. Firstly, if the 
mainstream parties are abandoned by voters for parties who lie not that far away from them (or 
not that far close to the pole), the parties that lose votes learn that the mean policy position of 
voters does not lie that far off from where they currently are. In other words, they do not need to 
shift their own position as much to keep up with public sentiment, especially that part of the 
public which has already taken the decision to transfer their votes. This fits in nicely with 
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information via elections model, whereby parties use electoral results to learn how far they need 
to adjust their policy positions, and in which direction.  
Secondly, when a populist party that is very opposed to European Integration is being 
successful at their expense, it is likely that centrist, moderate, traditionally pro-European 
politicians will be more worried about the future of European Integration than in a situation in 
which the party luring away their voters is mildly or barely Euroscepti A party that is growing in 
the polls and states its intent to withdraw the country out of the EU is higher a cause for concern 
that a party that set on the journey to abolish ‘only’ the single currency or roll back the common 
agrigultural policy. When the former scenario happens, centrist politicians have a choice: to stay 
put and either hope for the best, or accept that their policy position is increasingly unattractive to 
voters, and admit the need to qualify their former pro-Integration position. Via such a position 
shift, they reduce the potential of future gains by the Eurosceptic pariah by capping it closer to 
those voters that it has already attracted away, they might even claw back some voters by 
showing they are responsive and accountable, and perhaps most importantly, they try to maintain 
control of European Integration. If the country is to be governed by parties that are less warm to 
the idea of European Integration, centrist parties think that it might as well be them, instead of 
the populist ‘pariahs’.  
In the hypothetical nuclear scenario, mainstream parties don’t adapt, the electorate drifts 
further and at the next election a Eurosceptic Party does well enough to become formateur party 
(provided the EU salience is high enough) and gains massive leverage of over a country’s 
position within the EU. From the moderates’ perspectives, it is better if they themselves stop 
being as pro-European as they were before, but at least retain control of the harness. Research 
has already addressed the theme of political elites and actors of the political establishment being 
by default more pro-Integration, often even more so than the electorate (Wessels; 1995; Mattila 
and Raunio 2006; Mattila and Raunio, 2012 ). It is assumed that mainstream parties usually do 
not want to see European Integration rolled back, in any case not as much as the electorate and 
populist parties, and if that (integration roll-back) needs to happen to any degree, it should at 
least happen under their aegis, instead of under that of populist political actors. The urgency to 
act and display a change of policy position is greater when a hard Eurosceptic is being successful 
than a soft Eurosceptic, because the former scenario is more dangerous from their perspective. It 
is entirely possible, of course, for both explanations to apply. It is possible that when more 
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radical Eurosceptic parties gain votes, mainstream take notice of the greater change in electoral 
preference than would otherwise be the case (ergo it would be a sincere policy adjustment in 
pursuit of constituency support), and are panicking more about the potential nuclear scenario of a 
party such as the Front National or the Dutch PVV winning elections. 
In graphs 36 and 37 showing the interactions of Eurosceptic electoral success with 
‘average Eurosceptic extremeness’ and ‘average sceptic salience’, the confidence intervals widen 
at the left edges of the graph. This suggests that such indicators are better suited for analyses 
with the electoral tally of the flagship Eurosceptic performance. In graph 38 the confidence 
interval approaches 0 as ‘Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties’’ approaches 1, while significance is 
not an issue at such values in graph 3653. Maisntream parties do pay attention to the total 
percentage of votes gained by all Eurosceptic parties, and not only the flagship Eurosceptic, bu it 
seems that more attention is given to the policy position of the flagship Eurosceptic. They will 
care more strongly about whether the flagship Eurosceptic party is a strong or soft Eurosceptic, 
but will spend less time analyzing the positions of the smaller Eurosceptics that contribute to the 
total tally. Hypothesis 5 is confirmed.  
The analysis so far shows an interaction between the time variable and the phenomenon 
of contagion, with the success of Eurosceptic Parties becoming a significant phenomenon at the 
turn between centuries. At the same time it was shown that a) Eurosceptic parties were not 
always as concerned with European Integration as they are today (in effect populist parties have 
become Eurosceptic with time) and b) there is an interaction between how salient the issue of 
European Integration is for populist parties and how strong their Eurosceptic contagion effect 
will be. If the EU issue not salient for a Eurosceptic Party, the other parties in its country will not 
adjust their own position on the EU issue, even if the populist challenger is successful, because 
they have more grounds to assume that the populist builds its success on other issues as well (the 
‘it’s not about EU Integration, it’s about other issues’ argument). If a populist party does 
however make opposition to EU integration a staple of its policy position and ideology, the other 
parties will be more inclined to attribute its success to its opposition to EU integration and update 
                                                 
53 The larger confidence intervals in the ‘cumulated Eurosceptics’ figures might be due to the characteristics of the 
data: the indicators ‘average_EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP’ and ‘Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties’ are 
averages of the values of ‘Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party’ and ‘EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP’ of all 
Eurosceptic parties in a country at a CHES time point. This moves the values of the two (cumulated/aggregated) 
variables away from the absolute possible value, the poles of the scale, providing less observations with values 
closer to the poles. 
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their image of the distribution of voter preferences accordingly. It is shown that as populists care 
more about the EU issue, the effect of their own electoral success grows stronger. This generates 
a sort of self-reinforcing process, whereby Eurosceptic parties become more visible and stronger 
as they gain votes, which help amplify the salience of their favorite issues more, which in turn 
creates the basis for further voter defection from the other parties. This self-reinforcing process is 
line with the state of the art on the development of policy issues such as European Integration, 
globalization, or ‘denationalization’ (Kriesi, 2007; Kriesi et al, 2008, 2012) as factors in electoral 
politics, as well as the post-functionalist thesis more generally. 
Linear Contagion? 
 
Chapter 4 includes a discussion of why the electoral threshold (proximity to it, over or under) is 
not a suitable instrument for measuring Eurosceptic success, or at least not as suitable as the 
change in vote % from one election to another. So far, this chapter has tested to what degree the 
impact of Eurosceptic success is contingent on other factors. The following analysis tests to what 
degree the impact of the change in percentage of votes gained or lost by the biggest Eurosceptic 
Party (the flagship Eurosceptic) is amplified or mitigated by where the party is situated relative 
to the electoral threshold. Model 14 is essentially the same as model 10 from Chapter 4, but 
includes an interaction term. In model 14, Votechange_Biggest_Eurosceptic is added to an 
interaction term with the variable ‘Votes_over_electoral_threshold’, while in model 15 one has 
the variable interact with itself, essentially forming a quadratic. 
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Table 7: Non-linear and Threshold Contagion 
 (14) (15) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02 -0.02** 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold -0.00  
 (0.013)  
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04 0.05 
 (0.048) (0.044) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.085) (0.085) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.001)  
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.00 
  (0.001) 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
Constant 
0.76 0.67 
 (0.655) (0.654) 
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Figure 38 shows that it does not matter if a Eurosceptic party is below the electoral threshold or 
immediately at or above it, but that the effect approaches significance as one moves further 
towards high values on the right (the higher above the electoral threshold, the stronger the 
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effect). This is the view that as Eurosceptic parties do better and better, their impact on other 
parties’ subsequent position shifts is likely to be significant. However, at such high values above 
the threshold, on ponders whether the threshold still matters, or maybe parties are reacting to the 
high number of votes that Eurosceptic parties are gaining. Recall the discussion from chapter 4 
about the insufficiency of the electoral threshold indicator as a variable for this study. The 
somewhat similar kind of relationship (does the impact of vote gains by Eurosceptic parties 
differ at different values of such vote gains?) can be more easily plotted by letting the main 
predictor interact with itself. As is to be expected, the average impact Eurosceptic success is 
stronger if that success is higher. 
 
Figure 38: Eurosceptic contagion and national elextoral thresholds 
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Figure 39: The non-linear character of Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
 
Eurosceptic contagion does not interact with the success of Eurosceptic Parties relative to their 
countries electoral thresholds, and the effect of Eurosceptic success is not mediated by a party’s 
position relative to the threshold.. At 5% points below to 5% above the threshold, there is no 
significant interaction between Eurosceptic vote gain and parties position vis-à-vis the 
‘Sperrklausel’. In a range of 5 percent below the threshold and 5 percent above the threshold, 
there was no significant interaction between the variables, and the average marginal effects 
maintained a slopeless, horizontal line across the ranges. Eurosceptic Contagion is however 
stronger when the gains of Eurosceptic parties are larger in terms of voteshare. The average 
effect of electoral improvement by the populists is stronger at higher vote tallies than if they are 
barely ‘scratching the surface’. The relationship is non-linear – in other words, the bigger the 
gain of a Eurosceptic Party compared to previous elections, the stronger the effect of said success 
on the position of the other parties.  
The analysis is in line with the expectations of the past-election model as well as that of 
the radical party hypothesis. Political Parties use election results (in terms of the distribution of 
votes across parties, and changes in said distributions) to gauge changes in public opinion. Using 
merely the knowledge of whether a political party crossed the hurdle of parliamentary threshold 
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or not to gauge changes in the landscape of opinion would communicate far less information 
(and in cases where a party makes significant strides but barely misses the threshold, it would 
communicate downright false information) than looking at changes in the percentage of votes 
received compared to the last election. Because they are interested in obtaining said information, 
they will disregard the threshold, and will at the same time be particularly interested in the 
salience of those political issues promoted by challengers as well as the latter’s positions on said 
issues. This tells political parties a) who gained votes compared to last time, b) what issues these 
parties advertise (and by inference, what voters seem to care about), and c) what positions (how 
extreme) on these issues are popular. 
Would a political party decide to adjust its position every time a Eurosceptic Party gains 
votes? The inference in this project is that if a political party gains votes (or at least does not lose 
votes), the information that the election result is communicating to it is that it is doing something 
well. A party might take notice of the fact that populists are growing across the board (stealing 
voters from other parties present on the political scene) but decide according to the ‘if it’s 
working, don’t fix it’ logic that it should not adjust its own position, because voters are telling it 
that its own position or choice of issues to ‘push’ is fine. According to the same logic, it would 
be important, in order for the past election model and radical party hypothesis to hold, that a 
political parties will react, or will react more virulently, when it is losing votes itself at the same 
time as a Eurosceptic challenger is gaining them. The next section of this chapter explores 
precisely that dynamic, and investigates how parties adapt to fringe party improvement when 
they or their mainstream rivals are losing votes. 
 
The Motivations and Dynamics behind party policy adjustments 
 
Elections are a zero sum game and the gain of one party equals the loss of another party. 
Likewise the vote gains of some groups of parties have parallel losses among other party groups. 
When Eurosceptic parties are successful pro-European parties lose votes. As the theoretical 
chapter shows however, various predictions exist as to what the result of that eurosceptic 
electoral fate is, depending on how the other, pro-european, parties are doing electorally. 
Political Parties do not operate in isolation. Meguid (2008) offers an in depth investigation into 
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the reaction of mainstream parties to populist success in France, using the example of Socialist 
Party behavior vis-à-vis the Front National in support of a strategic behavior thesis according to 
which some mainstream and centrist parties might be willing to act in such ways that increase the 
short-term support of fringe parties as long as these hurt other mainstream parties (in the French 
case the center-rigtht) more than they hurt them. In a nutshell, maybe it is not only the electoral 
results of Eurosceptic parties matter for EU issue position changes, but also the electoral results 
of the other political actors and the environment around them. In this second section, I ask 
whether it makes a difference to political parties how the other parties’ vote gains or losses are 
distributed while the Eurosceptic challengers gain votes. These models test hypotheses 6 and 7. 
The eight models that follow (four for the Flagship Eurosceptic independent variable, four for 
the Cumulated Eurosceptic Success variable) and the graphs depicting their associated 
interaction terms tackle the issues of vote loss and vote change on the side of mainstream parties. 
There are different ways to conceptualize change in votes for political parties and each of 
the following models specifies it in a slightly different way. In the very first regression models of 
this  dissertation (those of chapter one), the variable Party_votechange simply denotes for each 
case/observation what percentage of votes each party got at the most recent election prior to the 
CHESwave compared to the previous election. That variable is used in models 17 and 17b, in 
which the Party_votechange variable interacts, in turn, with Votechange_Biggest_Sceptic and 
Votechange_all_Scpetics. 
Relativevotechange is a variable which also measures how parties have done compared to 
the last election, but with a twist  - they compare their votegain/loss from the last election 
relative to their rivals’ votegain/loss from the same previous election. Thus, if a party (for 
example the Greens) loses 5% compared to its last electoral performance, but the largest party in 
the country (the Christian Democrats for example) loses 10%, then the first party will have 
gained 5% relative to its larger rival. This indicator is used because it is a good way to test the 
hypothesis according to which mainstream parties will not be upset by Eurosceptic success as 
long as their mainstream rivals lose more votes than they do, thereby strengthening their position 
at the political center. Not only does it go towards directly testing a hypothesis and theory of 
party behavior under certain conditions, it also adds evidence to the discussion about the degree 
to which  mainstream political parties view EU integration (and rollback) more with a measure 
of conviction or instrumentally. 
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Relativepercentvotechange takes the same logic one step further. It looks at parties’ vote 
changes relative to their rivals, but instead of comparing the changes in percentage of votes that 
each gained from the 100 per cent possible at each election, it compares the changes considering 
how much % of a party’s own previous total vote the change between elections represented (in 
other words, controlling for own party size).  
Models 16 and 16b see the main IV’s interact with the Governement_Opposition Dummy 
Variable. This provides the test to the sub-hypothesis that Parties are more likely to respond to 
the Eurosceptic challenge with their own shift in a Euro-critical direction if they are in 
opposition.  There is a fundamental difference between the interaction of the two main IV’s with 
Party_votechange, and the other two measures measuring relative performance (relative and 
relativepercent): because the latter ones describe a party’s performance relative to its peers in the 
political center, they describe a facet of party behavior that is much more strategic/cynical, that 
has more to do with strategic/tactical consideration. As theorized previously, if the results of the 
analysis show that Eurosceptic contagion does not affect those parties who stand to gain (relative 
power in the political center) due to the populist surge, it would lead credence to the view that 
political parties ultimately use shifts on the integration issue as a way to maximize their utility, 
with less conviction with regards to the European project than if we discovered that parties don’t 
care how their rivals are doing. 
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Table 8: Eurosceptic Contagion and Strategic Considerations 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02* -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.15* 0.15** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Relative_Votechange   0.00  
   (0.003)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange    0.00* 
    (0.000) 
Gov_Opposition*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.01    
 (0.012)    
Party_votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  0.00   
  (0.001)   
Relative_Votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP   0.00  
   (0.000)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP    -0.00 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
   (0.000) 
 
 
Constant 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.72 
 (0.673) (0.670) (0.688) (0.704) 
     
Observations 527 527 508 497 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 9: Eurosceptic Contagion and Strategic Considerations (B) 
 
 (16b) (17b) (18b) (19b) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Gov_Opposition 0.14* 0.15** 0.15* 0.15** 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Relative_Votechange   0.00  
   (0.003)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange    0.00* 
    (0.000) 
Gov_Opposition*Votechange_All_ES_Parties 0.01    
 (0.010)    
Party_votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.00   
  (0.000)   
Relative_Votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties   0.00  
   (0.000)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties    -0.00* 
 
Country Dummies Not Reported 
 
 
   (0.000) 
Constant 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.78 
 (0.615) (0.611) (0.622) (0.632) 
     
Observations 527 527 508 497 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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I discuss the output from models 17 and models 17b first – dealing with the interaction of the 
main predictors and the ‘basic’, absolute vote-change variable.  
 
Figure 40: Party Votechange and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
 
Figure 41:  Party Votechange and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
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The conditional effect of Party_votechange on the impact of predictors Flagship Eurosceptic 
Votechange and Cumulated Eurosceptic Votechangeshows that Eurosceptic Success generates 
more Eurosceptic contagion upon a mainstream party when that party loses votes. In the case of 
the flagship Eurosceptic (Graph 40), the effect ‘lasts’ until the moderate party has gained around 
5% more votes at this election than at the previous one, at which point the influence of 
Eurosceptic success seizes. As one moves to higher values of Party votechange, the effect of 
Eurosceptic success stops being significant, meaning that if a mainstream party gains enough 
votes compared to the last election, its sense of urgency and need to change its position on the 
EU issue simply washes away. This makes sense if one considers the fact that the information 
gained in elections in such cases consists of somewhat of mixed message: on the one hand the 
gains of Eurosceptics prompts parties to change their position, but when they are themselves 
successful enough, they can be hesitant to do so. There is, however, a caveat. The fact that 
Eurosceptic success results in Eurosceptic contagion even between vales of 0 and +5 for 
Party_votechange shows that mainstream parties can be truly concerned with the challenge of 
Euroscepticism even if they are doing marginally moderately well, and are not losing votes 
themselves. In the case of the Effect of the cumulated success of all Eurosceptic Parties (Graph 
42), that conclusion is strengthened. Mainstream parties will be prompted into shifting their 
position on the EU even if they gain as much as 6%, if the Eurosceptic parties are doing well 
enough; the confidence interval only intersects 0 at around the 6 mark. This suggests that 
political parties use not just the information drawn from their own electoral faring, but will also 
‘look around’ and will also take notice of what is going on in their national political system more 
generally in updating their map of the constituency. If they observe that Eurosceptic Parties are 
making significant gains at the expense of all parties, they will infer a general shift in the 
electorate in a more Eurosceptic direction, and will only ignore such signals provided that they 
themselves are doing well, meaning that their position is not yet a reason for voters to punish it. 
The ‘if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it’ logic only works up to a certain point. In instances where 
Eurosceptic success occurs at the same time as a party is losing votes, the effect on that party 
will stronger, and the bigger the loss of the centrist party, the bigger the effect of Eurosceptic 
Contagion will be. It is shown that parties use not only their own electoral score to decipher the 
state of the political system, but also look at what is happening around them when deciding what 
to do next. Parties are mindful of what is going on around them, and they take notice of changes 
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in voter distribution or preferences that is sweeping their party system. Having concluded that 
parties a) are more susceptible to reconsider their position on the EU position when they lose 
votes, and b) will up to a certain point also take cues from their political environment when 
adjusting position, the time comes to analyze how parties react to said cues. 
The tactical (or strategic) perspective on party responses predicts that political parties will 
try to use the advent of populist parties to strengthen their relative position among moderate 
parties at the center of the political spectrum, even if they themselves are losing some voters. As 
a consequence, one would expect (in line with sub-hypotheses 5b and 5c) to find a difference in 
how parties respond to Eurosceptic success depending on the performance of their rivals. The 
next two figures (42 and 43) present graphically the interactions in models 18 and 18b, and plot 
the average marginal effects of Eurosceptic success at various values of Relativevotechange. The 
conditional effect of Relativevotechange on the two main predictors is significant at all ranges, 
and it does not matter whether they are gaining or losing relative strength, the effect of the 
Eurosceptic challenge is the same. There is no difference in strength or significance of 
Eurosceptic Contagion at various values of relative votechange, which goes against the strategic 
behavior thesis (Sitter 2001, Crum, 2007, Meguid, 2005, 2008, Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008).  
How parties respond to eurosceptic success does not seem to depend on whether that success is 
altering the balance of power at the top, which permits the rejection of sub-hypothesis 7b.  
One reaches the same conclusion when investigating the interaction between Eurosceptic 
Success and Relativepercentvotechange. There is barely any difference in the effect of Flagship 
Eurosceptic Votechange and Cumulated Eurosceptic votechange, regardless whether parties’ 
relative performance is good or bad vis-à-vis their rivals. Similar conclusions are reached when 
investigating figures 44 and 45, which present similar types of interactions, for relative percent 
votechange – political parties’ reaction to Eurosceptic success or failure does not depend on the 
performance of their largest national rivals. 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
Figure 42: Relative Electoral Performance and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Relative Electoral Performance and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.
0
5
-.
0
4
-.
0
3
-.
0
2
-.
0
1
0
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Relative_Votechange
Average Marginal Effects of Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP with 95% CIs
-.
0
4
-.
0
3
-.
0
2
-.
0
1
0
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Relative_Votechange
Average Marginal Effects of Votechange_All_ES_Parties with 95% CIs
145 
 
Figure 44: Relative % Electoral Performance and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Relative % Electoral Performance and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
 
 
Finally, it is time to look at how parties Government/Opposition status influences parties’ 
responses to Eurosceptic pressure (On the Gov_Opp dummy, 1 signifies government parties at 
the time of the CHES wave). 
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Figure 46: Government/Opposition Status and Electoral Performance 
 
 
Figure 47: Government/Opposition Status and Electoral Performance (B) 
 
 
Figures 46 and 47 show what the effect of Eurosceptic success has on EU position changes at 
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for Opposition Parties becomes siginificant ar the right edge of the graph. For Government 
parties, the prediction is positive and significant when Eurosceptic parties are losing votes (i.e. 
when the flagship Eurosceptic loses votes). The linear prediction points down in the expected 
direction (stronger negative prediction when Eurosceptic parties do better) but on that (positive) 
side of 0 on the horizontal, the prediction loses statistical significance for Governing Parties.  
When it comes to the cumulated electoral results of all Eurosceptic Parties (Figure 47), 
both types of parties get a significant, positive prediction when Eurosceptic Parties lose votes, 
but only opposition parties’ have a significant negative linear prediction when Eurosceptic 
parties are doing well. In other words, when the cumulated performance of Eurosceptic parties 
improves past a certain degree, opposition parties adjust their own position in a Eurosceptic 
direction but not governing ones. The two slopes differ in steepness, with the one for Governing 
parties is much milder, suggesting that Governing parties are slower in adapting their position in 
a Euro-critical direction as the Opposition parties are. 
In the case of both interactions the results must, however, be taken with a grain of salt, 
given the constant overlap in confidence interval. While non-overlapping confidence intervals 
would indicate a definite significant difference between the two groups, overlapping intervals 
leave much room for doubt, making it hard to provide a conclusive, definitive answer. 
Hypothesis 7d is tentatively rejected, in contradiction to views presented by the likes of Sitter 
(2001), Crum (2007), Hutter and Grande (2014) and Van de Wardt (2015), who provide backing 
for the ‘opposition politics’ perspective of party-based Euroscepticism. 
The lesson to take home from this section is that political parties are not as interested in 
cynical power play as the strategic hypotheses about Eurosceptic contagion predict. Had these 
been proven true, we would have found that mainstream parties don’t mind the rise of populists 
when these are sabotaging their rivals and increasing their relative strength. That is obviously not 
the case. All things considered, these results reject Hypothesis 7, which purports that Eurosceptic 
contagion is a function of opposition politics and tactical motivations. If Eurosceptic Parties do 
well and a mainstream party gains plenty of votes, that party will not change its own position on 
the EU issue. If Eurosceptic parties are doing well, and they gains a few votes, or lose votes, it 
‘learns’ that it must adapt adapt its own policy position in a direction that less pro-EU. While 
there is a bit of output to support the idea that opposition parties are more mobile and likely to 
adjust their positions to Eurosceptic success, the evidence is scant. So far, there seems to be a 
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real measure of conviction that influences political parties’ behavior towards Europe, not 
strategic/tactical zero-sum considerations.  
 
An ideological Take on Eurosceptic Contagion 
Authors of what Mudde (2012) has termed the “North Carolina School on Euroscepticism” have 
tended to associate party-based Euroscepticism and party behavior vis-à-vis European 
Integration with parties’ ideological backgrounds (Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe, Marks and 
Wilson, 2002; Edwards and De Vries, 2009). According to such perspectives, how political 
parties react to Eurosceptic success is not a function of opposition politics and strategic 
considerations, but a function of their more general ideological stance. 
What kind of parties respond to Eurosceptic Success: what is their ideological 
orientation, and to what degree are they catch-all parties? Models 20, 21 and 22 (for the Flagship 
Eurosceptic predictor) and 20b, 21b, 22b (for the predictor pertaining to all Eurosceptic parties) 
introduce a set of interaction terms whose aims is to learn to what degree the impact Eurosceptic 
success (and phenomenon of contagion) is conditional on parties’ Left-Right orientations, and 
parties’ GAL-TAN positions. 
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Table 10: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations 
 (21) (22) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.019) (0.011) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.10 
 (0.044) (0.075) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.12 
 (0.086) (0.110) 
Time -0.01 0.01 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05***  
 (0.014)  
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.09 
 (0.055) (0.068) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Left_Right*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.00  
 (0.003)  
galtan  -0.03** 
  (0.010) 
galtan*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.00 
  (0.002) 
Constant 0.73 0.23 
 (0.672) (0.562) 
   
Observations 527 340 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.11 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 11: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations (B) 
 (21b) (22b) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.016) (0.011) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.03 0.06 
 (0.043) (0.084) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.088) (0.091) 
Time -0.02 0.00 
 (0.023) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.02 0.03 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
Left_Right -0.05***  
 (0.014)  
galtan  -0.03** 
  (0.010) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.11 
 (0.056) (0.070) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Left_Right*Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.00  
 (0.003)  
galtan*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.00 
 
Country Dummies not reported 
 (0.002) 
 
 
Constant 0.78 0.11 
 (0.612) (0.515) 
   
Observations 527 340 
R-squared 0.17 0.16 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.10 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Does a party’s ideological orientation matter to the way it reacts to Eurosceptic Parties? Figures 
48 and 49 show the conditional effect of a party’s left-right orientation on the impact of populist 
Eurosceptic success on that party. The Left-Right indicator used in this project is the general 
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Left-Right orientation, not the economic one (which focuses more on parties’ preferred 
economic policy) – since the general Left-Right spectrum includes more aspects of party 
ideology than just economic orientation, using this option it reduces the risk of looking adopting 
too narrow a view of ideological stance. Hypothesis 8 is tested here.  
 
Figure 48: Left-Right Placement and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Left-Right Placement and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
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For both Flagship Eurosceptic and cumulated Eurosceptic success, the effect is significant in the 
middle, and seizes to be so towards the poles where the confidence interval steps over the zero 
mark. This supports the idea in sub-hypothesis 8c, which predicts that contagion should be 
stronger in the political center. Two explanations for this are equally plausible, and might also 
both be true. Firstly, if (non-Eurosceptic) parties are on the fringes of the left-right spectrum, 
they might not be the catch-all kind of party that is interested in adapting and qualifying its 
stance on the EU issue, because its rigid ideological position at one extreme of the political pole 
renders it more inflexible. This might also be due to the fact that contagion can be weaker for 
parties that are not part of the mainstream. Since parties closer to the political poles are smaller, 
they would not feel the catch-all pressures of larger parties. Secondly, there aren’t that many 
parties are on the political fringes and are not Eurosceptic. As shown by Hooghe, Marks and 
Wilson’s ‘U-Curve’ of party positions, centrist parties are typically pro-European and fringe 
parties Eurosceptic (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson, 2002, 970) - hence there are too few observations 
on the edges of the spectrum in the dataset that are left to analyze on the left side of the equation.  
In Figure 48, the effect is significant in the 3-7 range and for Figure 49, in the 4-8 range. 
These numbers show a slight skew towards the right: parties closer to the right pole are affected 
in model 21b than ones closer to the left (where the effect seizes to be significant short of 3). 
There is a slightly larger ideological range on the far right than on the far left in which parties are 
affected by Eurosceptic success.  
It must also be recalled from Chapter 4 (and even models from chapter 5) that a variable 
with one of the biggest coefficients in the regression tables (and consistently significant) is 
parties’ Left-Right orientation, which always carries a minus sign – that tells us that ceteris 
paribus, the further to the right a party is on the left-right scale, the bigger its shift on the EU 
issue in a Euro-critical direction (controlling for all other things, including Eurosceptic support). 
All things being equal, there are some reasons to believe that parties on the right are more 
naturally Eurosceptic (or have become so) than parties on the left. As a possible consequence of 
this, when Eurosceptic parties do well, parties on the right might feel more threatened and 
consider that they stand to lose more voters. European Integration has often been associated with 
political orientations such as Christian Democracy or market creating policies, and Social 
Democratic Parties have in the past tended to be more cautious towards it. Nevertheless, the 
relationship of the political left and right with European Integration has changed with time 
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(Marks and Wilson, 2000; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). As regulated capitalism has come 
more on the European political agenda, social democratic parties have increasingly dropped their 
opposition to integration and became more pro-European, while parties on the right opposed 
regulating capitalism at the national and supranational levels, leading them to selectively oppose 
Integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002, 974). For social democratic parties, the possibility 
curve of social policy evolved from national social democracy, through single market regime 
competition to the prospect of ‘European organized space’, and “by mid to late 1980’s social 
democrats came to the conclusion that the European Community was the only game in town” 
(Marks and Wilson 2000, 446). This was an evolution similar to that of Green parties: Green and 
environmentalist parties have with time become more in favor of integration following a similar 
change in opportunity structure as that faced by social democratic parties: the prospect of 
concerted environmentalist policy at continental level (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson, 2002, 983). As 
center-left parties slowly became more pro-European, center right parties underwent a movement 
in the opposite direction. Neoliberals wish to prevent supranational institutions from diminishing 
regime competition, and while most neoliberals support economic and monetary integration, they 
are opposed to further integration, regardless if it is to democratize the Euro-polity or to shift 
competences to the continental level. Their fear is the social democrats hope, or goal: the 
prospect of political integration creating the authoritative capacity for market regulation at the 
EU level (Marks and Wilson 2000, 454). National opposition to regional integration can both 
complement and simultaneously conflict with the neoliberal view, because while nationalists 
share the neoliberal opposition to political integration at the European level, they oppose some 
neoliberals’ willingness to tolerate less national sovereignty (Marks and Wilson 2000, 455). The 
same authors also noted that parties on the right experienced struggles just like parties on the left, 
only in reverse, whereby nationalists oppose the dilution of national sovereignty, while 
neoliberals were more ready to accept it. Such struggles were apparent in parties like Fianna fail, 
the RPR and British Conservatives, that experienced struggles between neoliberals and more 
nationally oriented conservatives (Marks and Wilson 2000, 455). Such tensions where parties on 
the same side of the ideological dimension might have rather different policy preferences 
contributed to the adoption and employment of the GAL-TAN54 policy scale in place of the more 
                                                 
54 Gal-Tan is a way to measure party positions that is alternative to the traditional Left-Right dimension. GAL stands 
for Green Alternative Libertarian and TAN stands for Traditional Authoritarian Nationalist 
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traditional left-right one. Banking on the intuition that parties’ EU positions correlate with their 
‘new politics’ position Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002, 978) investigated the relationship and 
concluded that there is a distinct relationship between the two policy dimensions, with parties 
closer to the Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist pole being more likely to oppose 
European Integration.  
The Chapel Hill Expert Survey also includes information on parties GAL-TAN positions, 
and while GAL-TAN correlates with the Left – Right dimension, it does not overlap perfectly. 
Hence, it might be possible to gain additional analytical leverage by investigating to what degree 
the effect of Eurosceptic contagion is itself influenced by parties’ GAL-TAN orientation. It is 
important to note that CHES only started collecting information on parties’ GAL-TAN 
orientation starting in 1999. As such, there is a loss of information and statistical power in 
Models 22 and 22b as the N/number of observations in the regression drops by around 200. In 
Model 22 (corresponding to figure 51), GAL-TAN’s interaction with Eurosceptic success (of 
flagship Eurosceptics) is significant in the 3 to 9 range. The linear prediction does point down 
towards right, as in the models depicting Left-Right orientations. In model 22b (interaction effect 
represented graphically by figure 52) things become more interesting. The confidence interval 
tightens down and more area of the graph lies in the area of statistical significance, which is 
wider one the TAN side of the center.  
 
Figure 50: GAL-TAN placement and Eurosceptic Contagion 
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Figure 51: GAL-TAN placement and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
 
 
All things considered, it would seem based on these observations that there is some evidence in 
favor of the ideological hypothesis of Eurosceptic contagion: the fact that the linear predictions 
are always sloping in a negative direction on the right side of the continuum suggests that overall 
Eurosceptic success has a mildly bigger effect over the right side of the political ecology.  It was 
suggested above that this might provide some backing to the ideological families approach 
(Somer-Topcu, 2009), as parties on the right of the spectrum might be more susceptible to 
Eurosceptic ideology, especially if they have high TAN scores. In the existing piece of research 
which to date has come closest to investigating Eurosceptic Contagion in a smiliar fashion, 
Meijers (2015) argues and shows that political parties on the left side of the political spectrum 
should be more influenced by Eurosceptic success than those on the right, in contradiction to 
findings here. The author goes on to investigate which type of Eurosceptic parties affect which 
type of mainstream parties, and suggests – on the basis of right wing populists higher ideological 
flexibility which also allows them to attract voters from the left – that center-left parties should 
feel under heavier strain than center-right parties, because they compete against both ideological 
poles. The next section will address that perspective. 
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The targets of Eurosceptic challengers 
 
Previous studies have argued the left-wing and right-wing should have unequal influence 
and be unequally powerfull in generating Eurosceptic contagion, with issues promoted by the far 
right influencing parties both right and left of the political center (Bale et al, 2010; Van Spanje, 
2010; Meijers, 2015)  After all, right-wing populism has been more successful than left wing 
populism overall in the past decade and half (Kriesi et al, 2008; Kriesi, 2009), with right-wing 
populists being able to adopt elements of left wing discourse (protection of the welfare 
state/workers’ rights via welfare chauvinism for example) while the left was less flexible. One 
thus might expect right wing-populists to have a greater influence over moderate parties than the 
left-wing variety (or to wield influence over a wider array of moderate parties).  
The regression table below (and afferent 4 graphs below) describes the interactions from 
models 23, 24, 25 and 26 in which the effect of Eurosceptic success is disaggregated in two 
independent variables: one describing the fate/success of Right-Wing Eurosceptic Parties, and 
one Describing the Success of Left-Wing Eurosceptic Parties. This split is made for both 
predictors describing Eurosceptic success: that describing the electoral performance of the 
flagship Eurosceptic as well as that describing the cumulated electoral performance of all 
Eurosceptic parties. This results in the following predictors: Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES and 
Votechange_All_Right_ES (Rightwing), Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES and Votechange_ 
All_Left_ES (Leftwing).   
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Table 12: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations (C) 
 (23) (24) (25) (26) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES -0.01 -0.03**   
 (0.021) (0.010)   
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.007) (0.019)   
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.05   
 (0.045) (0.045)   
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.089) (0.090)   
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES*Left_Right -0.00    
 (0.004)    
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES*Left_Right  0.00   
  (0.004)   
Votechange_All_Left_ES   -0.02 -0.03** 
   (0.022) (0.010) 
Votechange_All_Right_ES   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.006) (0.018) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties   0.04 0.04 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties   -0.04 -0.04 
   (0.086) (0.087) 
Votechange_All_Left_ES*Left_Right   -0.00  
   (0.004)  
Votechange_All_Right_ES*Left_Right    0.00 
    (0.003) 
Constant 0.57 0.57 0.82 0.82 
 (0.700) (0.698) (0.619) (0.617) 
     
Observations 517 517 525 525 
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R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Models 23 and 24 show us whether the impact of the largest right-wing parties, and then the 
impact of left-wing parties, is contingent on the left-right placement of those parties who they are 
supposed to impact. In other words, it shows us who reacts to whom, and by extension who 
perceives that they are most under threat by whom. Corresponding to these models are graphs 52 
and 54.  
In three of the graphs, the linear prediction slopes right in a negative direction, suggesting 
again that center-right parties are under more pressure to adjust their position, in contradiction to 
what Meijers observes in 2015. The only interaction effect with the same tendencies as those 
predicted by previous literature is that which models the effect of Cumulated right wing 
Eurosceptic (figure 53), and even there there is no statistical significance mong the marginal 
effects. 
 
Figure 52: Right-wing Eurosceptic Success and Eurosceptic Contagion 
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Figure 53: Right-wing Eurosceptic Success and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
Figure 54: Left-wing Eurosceptic Success and Eurosceptic Contagion 
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Figure 55: Left-wing Eurosceptic Success and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
 
Strangely, and in contradiction to the ‘ideological families’ approach, it appears that center-right 
parties are also influenced by left-wing populist parties, which one would not expect. The 
combination of the two disaggregated predictors is cause for confusion: the results seem to 
indicate that political parties are more likely to react and respond to parties from the other 
extreme of the political spectrum than their own. In other words, while some would not feel 
threatened by populist challenges from their side of the spectrum, others would fell threanted by 
the entire spectrum of populist eurosceptic actors, a finding which is begs credulity. H8d seems 
to be rejected, while we find mixed support for the ‘Ideological Families’ (H8e) thesis (Somer-
Topcu, 2009). It seems it is hard to pronounce a definitive judgement with regards to many of the 
ideological sub-hypotheses. How can we explain these results?  
One possible answer is that such results are obtained here due to the limitations of the 
data. Recall the descriptive first section of Chapter four, which describes how far right and far 
left Euroscepticism have had the upper edge at various times in various countries. Some 
countries, like Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece until recently have experienced a Eurosceptic 
scene that was almost exclusively the territory of the far left, while having very anemic, nigh-
inexistent right-wing Eurosceptic population. In other countries, like Belgium or the UK, 
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Euroscepticism was almost always strongly associated with the right wing of the political 
spectrum. In other North-European countries, left-wing Euroscepticism was dominant in the 80’s 
and 90’s, and was later eclipsed by right wing Euroscepticism, and yet in other countries, the two 
extremes of the political spectrum have taken turns alternating as the more prominent national 
forces opposing European Integration. In other words, there is only a rather weak equivalence 
between left-and right wing Euroscepticism with regards to when the values of their electoral 
success have been high or low. It is hard to undertake a disaggregated analysis of the effects of 
far right and far left Euroscepticism because while it might seem that one is comparing their 
effects across the same observations, the fact that their values are distributed differently across 
observations/cases means that the comparison is a flawed one55. 
Many observations in the dataset have high values for left wing populists and low ones 
for the opposite pole, and many observations face the opposite situation. In such instances, the 
values de facto create situations in which there ‘in no euroscepticism of the other kind’. It is hard 
to investigate to what degree political parties of the center left or center right react to either left 
wing or right wing Euroscepticism, when they only have one of these two types of 
Euroscepticism to contend with. In an ideal situation, all observations would stem from countries 
in which there is at least a half decent Eurosceptic Party from both the left and the right, and one 
could in such a situation properly investigate which mainstream parties react to whose success 
and failures. Unfotunately, that is not the case all over the dataset.  
Another factor to take into account is that left-wing and right wing Euroscepticism are not 
entirely similar in the degree to which they are radical. As I have shown earlier in the chapter, 
the salience that populists award to the EU issue is a factor that can influence Eurosceptic 
contagion, as is the degree to which Eurosceptic parties are hard or soft Eurosceptics. Figures 59 
and 60 describe a difference between right-wing and left wing Euroscepticism which might 
explain why it is hard to get any expected results when splitting the main Predictors among the 
left wing and right wing. Right-wing Eurosceptics have always been more opposed to EU 
integration than left-wing Eurosceptic parties have, and the split has gotten larger with time. 
                                                 
55 It must be added that the only other current existing study of Eurosceptic contagion, that of Meijers (2015) does 
not take into consideration the effects of flagship Eurosceptic parties, focusing only on the effects of comulated 
Eurosceptic performance, which restricts the scope of that project; that may also influence the analytical steps of 
said study, providing a further explanation for the divergent conclusions 
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While the EU issue was more salient for the left fringe in the past, after 2000, the far right has 
mobilized around the issue of EU integration more than the left fringe did. 
Figure 56: The Salience of the EU issue for Right wing and Left Wing Eurosceptics 
 
Figure 57: The average Positions of Right wing and Left Wing Eurosceptic parties 
 
Graph depicting the average Positions of Right wing and Left Wing Eurosceptic parties. The scale is the normal 1-7 CHES scale, low values 
indicate harder opposition to EU integration 
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One must not ignore the heterogeneity that marks the continent, even within the core of the 
EU15 (Conti et al, 2010; Quaglia, 2011). When considering the ways in which the Euro crisis 
affected Europe, it must be kept in mind that the crisis dynamised different political forces in the 
North and South of the EU. In the south, where austerity and sense of top-down imposition from 
the North galvanized anti-capitalist sentiment, it strengthened the hand of left-wing Parties. In 
the North, were rhetoric often surrounded the idea of bailing out the slack or indolent South, and 
losing tax-payers money in the process, the nationalist far right was better able to use the 
situation to its benefit (Treib, 2014; Van Elsas and Van Der Brug, 2011). Thus, one might ask if 
it is not better to maybe analyze the effects of left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism with an 
eye to the difference between regions? Maybe Left-Wing and Right-Wing Euroscepticism affect 
the other parties differently in the two parts of Europe. If the intuition is correct that left-wing 
and right-wing Euroscepticism carry different weight in different countries (the first empirical 
chapter already hinted to that) we should be able to see some sort of interaction between 
geography and Eurosceptic success, and differences between the regions.  
 
The Geographical Take on Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
Does Eurosceptic contagion manifest itself differently depending on geography? Does the 
effect of Eurosceptic parties depend on where they are? Models 27-29 and 27b-29b replace the 
14 country dummies with a regional one, and then take turns letting the dummy interact with the 
indicators for Eurosceptic success. The next graphs below include the predictive margins for the 
two aggregate models, which do not distinguish between the success of Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Eurosceptic parties. The first graph presents the interaction in model 27 where the regional 
dummy interacts with Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP, and the second one the interaction of 
the regional dummy with Votechange_All_ES_Parties (model 27b). 
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Table 13: Eurosceptic Contagion and Geographical Variation 
 (27) (28) (29) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
South_EU -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.091) 
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*   
 (0.007)   
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES  -0.03 -0.02** 
  (0.015) (0.008) 
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
unemployment 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Left_Right -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP*South_EU 0.01   
 (0.012)   
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES*South_EU  0.01  
  (0.017)  
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES*South_EU   0.01 
   (0.008) 
Constant 0.62 0.60 0.60 
 (0.433) (0.455) (0.441) 
    
Observations 527 517 517 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
165 
 
 
 
Table 14:  Eurosceptic Contagion and Geographical Variation (B) 
 
 (27b) (28b) (29b) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
South_EU -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.02*   
 (0.008)   
Votechange_All_Left_ES  -0.04** -0.03** 
  (0.013) (0.009) 
Votechange_All_Right_ES  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
unemployment 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Left_Right -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.17** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_All_ES_Parties*South_EU 0.00   
 (0.009)   
Votechange_All_Left_ES*South_EU  0.03  
  (0.015)  
Votechange_All_Right_ES*South_EU   0.01 
   (0.010) 
Constant 0.62 0.61 0.63 
 (0.403) (0.387) (0.394) 
    
Observations 527 525 525 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 58: Geographical Variation and Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
Figure 59: Geographical Variation and Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 
 
 
It seems at first sight that the regional dummies do not add much predictive power. While the 
slopes of the linear prediction are ‘correct’56, the confidence intervals don’t help the evidence 
                                                 
56 In both graphs, the data would tend to conform to the intuition of the radical Party Hypothesis. On both 
lines (one depicting the prediction for SouthEU, the other for the rest) the linear prediction goes into 
negative (Eurosceptic) territory as the values on the X increase (as Eurosceptics gain more votes). And as 
one moves further left on the X, meaning situations in which Eurosceptic Parties lose votes, the predicted 
change in position of centrist parties goes into positive (pro-Integration territory) , which also conforms to 
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present itself as too strong or robust. In both cases, the confidence interval for Eurosceptic 
electoral performance in Southern Europe crosses zero, not enabling us to draw any solid 
conclusions about the area. In the rest of Europe, the confidence interval stays above 0 in regions 
of the graph that describe electoral loss for Eurosceptic Parties, but once these parties’ 
performance turns positive and they gain votes, the interaction is no longer statistically 
significant. The regional dummy does not seem at the moment to make a difference on 
Eurosceptic contagion when the populist challengers are doing well. While it might be tempting 
to argue that the effect is stronger in Northern Europe than in Southern Europe, because at least 
part of the effect for the region (when SouthEU = 0) is significant, the evidence so far seems to 
scant to draw unambiguous conclusions. When the effect enters into ‘positive vote gain for 
Eurosceptics’ territory, the prediction loses significance. We might, however, be able to gain 
more insight and leverage by disaggregating at this point the effect of Right-Wing and Left-Wing 
Eurosceptic Parties in Europe. The graph below, for the interaction from Model 28, shows what 
happens when Left Wing Eurosceptic Parties do well. In both cases (SouthEU 0 and 1) the 
predictions slope to the right (negative prediction when Eurosceptic parties do well, and positive 
prediction (change in a pro-EU direction) when the populists fare poorly).  
 
Figure 60: Geographical Variation and Left-wing Euroscepticism (A) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
the intuition of the Radical Party Hypothesis because Eurosceptic Parties losing voters communicates to 
the other parties that voters are defecting/going  _away_ from Eurosceptic discourse 
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Figure 61: Geographical Variation and Left-wing Euroscepticism (B) 
 
 
 
Unlike in the aggregated models (which did not distinguish between left wing and right 
wing success), the effect is significant and the confidence interval fully dips below 0 for southern 
Europe in those cases when left wing Eurosceptic Parties do well. In other words, in Southern 
Europe, when left wing flagship Eurosceptic Parties gain votes, the other parties adjust in an 
anti-integration direction. 
 
Figure 62: Geographical Variation and Right-wing Euroscepticism 
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Figure 63: Geographical Variation and Right-wing Euroscepticism (B) 
 
 
 
 
Left-Wing Eurosceptic has a tendency to influence the mainstream in Southern Europe, 
and less so in the North, which conforms to the intuition presented above about the differences 
between regions (confirming Hypoothesis Hn-s). In Graph 61 (plotting the interaction between 
the regional dummy and cumulated left-wing Euroscepticism), both linear predictions lope 
downward on the right side of the graph, meaning that the tendency is for Political Parties both in 
North and South Europe to react to the success of Left-Wing Eurosceptic Parties by moving in a 
Eurosceptic Direction. However, only the linear prediction for Southern Europe is statistically 
significant. Again, as was the case with the interaction of the regional dummy and the results of 
the biggest Left-wing Eurosceptic Parties, (m27) Left-Wing success is more likely to prompt a 
response in southern Europe. 
Figure 62 includes similar information, but this case describes to what degree the impact 
of Right-Wing Euroscepticism is a function of regional setting. The linear prediction for North 
Europe, like in the previous graphs, slopes down when Eurosceptic parties gain votes. The effect 
starts out and ends with statistical insignificance, and the confidence interval flirts with above-zero values 
shortly in low positive values of Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES. The linear prediction for Southern 
Europe (SouthEU = 1) never approaches statistical significance.  
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In the case of the success of Right Wing Eurosceptic Parties, the linear prediction is 
negative when Eurosceptic Parties gain votes. While the situation is the opposite in Southern 
Europe, the large standard errors however, render the prediction insignificant on both sides of 0 
on the X axis – no robust conclusion can be drawn about Right-Wing Eurosceptic Parties in 
Southern Europe regardless of whether the Eurosceptic are gaining or losing votes. In northern 
Europe, there is some measure of response from mainstream parties to right wing party success: 
according to the last interaction term (figure 63): when Euroceptic electoral performance is in the 
negative (they lose votes), the linear prediction for other parties’ position changes is positive, 
meaning they change their position in a pro-European direction. As right wing Eurosceptic vote 
loss is reduced and their performance improves, the mainstream parties’ pro-EU response 
weakens. No such response to right-wing Euroscepticsm is seen in the South. 
To sum up this section, tentative evidence is found to support the geographical 
hypothesis. Right-wing and Left-wing Eurosceptic Contagion is mediated to some degree by 
geography, with Right-Wing Eurosceptic parties eliciting some responses from the mainstream 
in Northern Europe and none significant ones in the South, and Left-Wing Eurosceptic Parties 
eliciting party responses in the South but not in the North. The results must again, however, be 
interpreted with a bit of caution, given the overlapping confidence intervals. While they do not 
outright discredit the information obtained in this section (especially in light of the fact only one 
of the two confidence intervals sometimes crosses zero), it reduces our confidence in the results 
gained. 
 
Conclusion  
 
After the first empirical chapter showed us that populist parties are mounting an increasingly 
successful assault on the mainstream of European politics, and that the threat of anti-Integration 
discourse spreading across the continent is real, in this chapter it was time to learn the ‘when, 
where, and why’ of this contagion.  
Is Eurosceptic contagion a phenomenon that applies everywhere in Europe generally, 
equally and linearly? Are all mainstream parties equally susceptible to feeling the threat and 
pressure of Eurosceptic challenge? Is there a trend to Eurosceptic Contagion? Is it a phenomenon 
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that is accelerating or slowing down? And what does that tell us about the near future of 
European Integration? What motivates those parties that adjust and qualify their pro-EU position, 
and what are their incentives? These were just some of the questions tackled here. 
I discussed what type of elections contagion is likely to be strongest after. These were 
shown to be elections where Eurosceptic parties mobilize the EU issue, where Eurosceptic 
parties are vehemently and strongly opposed to EU integration, and elections that are… recent. 
The main predictors of this study interact with the time variable in a meaningful way: 
Eurosceptic Contagion not a significant phenomenon in the 80’s and 90’s, but became a reality 
as integration deepened more and more. One of the two interactions with time showed that the 
phenomenon is picking up speed as we move closer to our present day, which some would 
interpret as a worrisome prospect for the future of European Politics and Integration. 
The fact that the impact of Eurosceptic electoral gains is likely to be stronger when hard-
core Eurosceptics threaten to win elections, as well as the fact that mainstream parties do not 
distinguish between situations when populist advances are actually benefitting them vis-à-vis 
other moderate parties indicate that centrist parties actually care about European Integration. 
These parties are not just using the issue as a means to expand their power and electability, and 
look further than just the horizon of office/government attainment. There seems to be a real 
measure of concern with Europe among these parties, which should not surprise, given that were 
long time associated with default pro-integration positions. When eurosceptic policy 
entrepreneurs are good enough at bleeding them of votes, they will respond and seek to mitigate 
damage by copying the policy position of the fringe party, even if they might be better off 
tactically stimulating pro-anti EU debate and forcing voter defection from across the political 
center towards the populist fringes.  
This chapter also looked into how ideology interacts with Eurosceptic success in 
predicting contagion. The first set of analyses does confirm that parties at the political 
Left_Right center are impacted by populist progress, as well as supporting the ideological 
familes hypothesis (Somer-Topcu 2009), in contradiction to prior research on Eurosceptic 
Contagion. When splitting the predictors and dividing them into variables that indicate right-
wing and left wing eurosceptic success, the evidence was murky. In some cases, there was no 
statistical significance that would facilitate inference and conclusions, in other cases the evidence 
was counter-intuitive. I discussed shortly the pitfalls of disaggregating the indicators describing 
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Eurosceptic success into left and right-wing populism, and why cross-sectional differences make 
it hard to use this approach. A proposed solution, to see if Eurosceptic success differs in its 
impact in north and southern Europe did produce some results which tempted with analytical 
clarity in light of the differences between Euroscepticism in various countries: evidence, meager 
as it is, suggests that Left-Wing Euroscepticism is likely to be more potent (in inducing 
Eurosceptic Contagion) in Southern Europe, while right wing populism seems to be a more 
likely culprit in northern Europe. The evidence was, however, inconclusive. An option for future 
research focusing on this question might employ an interrupted time series design to better 
address the limitations of the data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
6. An Institutional Take on Eurosceptic Contagion 
 
Do European Elections matter to the centrifugal forces unleashed by populist success? Do they 
matter with regards to rise of Eurosceptic parties and associated phenomena? At the onset, this 
project assumed that the main arena for political struggle is the national one. One of the most 
influential approaches in the study of European and European Union politics has been the second 
order election thesis (Reif and Schmitt, 1980) according to which elections to the European 
Parliament have actually functioned as somewhat less important national elections (hence second 
order, akin to US midterm elections), and according to which the main arena for political conflict 
over EU policy lies at the national level. This study has largely shared these assumptions and 
premises, and has as a consequence focused on the effect of Eurosceptic Parties’ success at 
national elections on the positions of moderate and mainstream parties. That does not mean, 
however, that one should outright discount the possibility of Eurosceptic contagion being 
initiated by competition on the supranational level, or that the information carrying mechanism 
of the past election model could not also work on that level as well. It is possible, that political 
parties use not only national, but also European elections as part of the information-gaining 
mechanism, and that the Radical Party Hypothesis might also hold for elections that decide who 
goes to Strassbourg. 
This chapter addresses a set of queries and issues regarding conditions of Eurosceptic 
contagion, beginning with an assessment of the utility of European Elections as a conducive 
medium for Eurosceptic contagion. While there are arguments – especially against the 
background of increasing politicization of the EU issue – for assuming possible contagion in the 
future, it is shown below that EP elections for the moment continue being less impactful than 
national ones. In discussing the circumstances under which EP elections could become 
significant, an added perspective is taken into consideration -  the institutional one. It is argued 
and shown that under certain conditions (those of low electoral system proportionality), EP 
elections actually function as the medium which convey information about landscape of public 
opinion, and not national elections. This is shown by using the example of British politics over 
the past two decades (perhaps the most dramatic instance of Euroscepticism shaking the national 
system given the recent occurrence of Brexit) where majoritarian rules distorted the information 
delivering mechanism of past election results for mainstream parties, and muffled the potential of 
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Eurosceptic Contagion. With the switch to proportional European Elections in 1999, an avenue 
was created in which political parties could proportionately approximate public preferences as 
well as providing a clearer image of the opinion landscape in the British electorate. Moreover, 
employing the example of British political developments adds to the insights of this project 
regarding the radical party hypothesis. It shows again the importance the past election logic has 
for Eurosceptic Contagion, and brings added support for the Radical Party Thesis, strengthening 
the argument that it is necessary for a fringe party to be successful in some electoral medium for 
other parties to adjust their policy position on the EU. The argument made in this sense is that 
the change to proportional European Elections created the arena necessary for a fringe party to 
show mainstream ones how ‘out of touch’ they are with public opinion. It is suggested that one 
might thus draw a connection between institutional set-up and the role of European Elections, 
and it is inferred that EU elections might actually fulfill the role that national ones do in 
propagating populist contagion when the national elections do not follow proportional rules. As 
elaborated upon in the theoretical part of the dissertation, one gains a more complete image of 
the phenomenon of European contagion when taking into account, firstly, the multi level nature 
of the European Polity, and secondly the fact that different kinds of electoral systems are likely 
to lead to different manifestations of political competition.  
 
European Elections Revisited 
 
The second-order elections thesis was first formulated by Reif and Schmitt (1980) and has 
received strong empirical support since in the exploration of European Elections (Gabel  2000, 
Hix and Marsh 2007, Marsh and Mikhaylov 2010) being often compared to US mid-term 
elections. One of the main ideas behind the second-order argument is that voters do not treat EP 
elections as they are in principle meant to (deciding who should represent them in the Strasbourg 
plenum on the basis of ‘Euromanifestos’), but as a means to punish or reward political parties in 
the middle of the electoral cycle based on their national performance57. The EU-issue-voting 
model (De Vries et al, 2011, Hobolt et al, 2009) was developed as a response to the second order 
approach and posits that EU Parliament elections are not just about domestic issues but have 
                                                 
57 Relative to their national election promises and policy propositions. 
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increasingly become contests about different visions of Europe (Treib, 2014, 1547). While more 
evidence is somewhat mixed, Treib (2014, 1547) notes that aggregate election results (even for 
the most recent elections) seem to match the expectations of the 2nd order model, but argues 
further that there might be more to the story, and that the hypothesis should not be cast aside 
outright. The author further observes (Treib, 2104, 1551) that the surge of electoral support for 
Eurosceptic parties in recent European Parliament Elections cannot be dismissed as mere protest 
vote against unpopular governments.  
The very first analysis in this chapter tests a radical party and Eurosceptic contagion 
version of the second order election thesis. Table 15 presents similar models (30 and 31) to those 
that were presented in the first empirical chapter, but the main predictors describe not how well 
Eurosceptic parties have done between the previous and the most recent national election. 
Instead of the usual main IV, the predictors (EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti) measures 
Eurosceptic vote gain/loss between the previous and the most recent EP election. Like in the case 
of previous analyses, the hypotheses are tested for both vote gain of the biggest Eurosceptic party 
(30) as well as cumulated vote gain of all Eurosceptic parties (31). 
As can be seen in table 15, neither vote change of the biggest Eurosceptic Party, nor 
cumulated vote change of all Eurosceptic parties have a significant effect on the position of 
mainstream parties towards EU integration, rejecting hypothesis H10. That would seem to 
suggest that when it comes to European Elections, political parties do not use changes in election 
results to update their position on the EU issue, and the Eurosceptic contagion does not occur as 
a result of EP election results, adding further weight to the second order election perspective. 
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Table 15: Eurosceptic Contagion and European Elections 
 (30) (31) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.01  
 (0.005)  
EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.004) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.11**  
 (0.042)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.02  
 (0.076)  
Time 0.03 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
unemployment 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Gov_Opposition 0.10* 0.08 
 (0.052) (0.053) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.09* 
  (0.037) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  -0.00 
  (0.076) 
Constant -0.67 -0.46 
 (0.525) (0.439) 
Country Dummies not Reported 
 
  
Observations 519 526 
R-squared 0.13 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.08 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Does that mean that one can discard the effect and influence of European elections for good? I 
argue that before drawing a categorical conclusion about the entirety of Western Europe, there 
might be certain circumstances in which EP elections can have a role to play, if we adopt an 
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institutional take on the phenomenon (that it might again be wrong to aggregate, just as in the 
case of the investigation regarding ideological contagion from the previous chapter). Before 
proceeding with an analysis of Eurosceptic Contagion that takes into account institutional 
differences among electoral settings, the following section represents an invitation to 
contemplate the role that various election rules and electoral systems might have on the past 
election model.  
 
Strategic Voting, Euroscepticism and Contagion 
 
Previous Research has already postulated that proportional and majoritarian electoral systems 
differ in the kinds of political behavior they elicit (Lijphart 1990; Neto and Cox 1997; Manow 
2009), and that proportional and majoritarian systems may favor different kinds of political 
parties. Depending on the different electoral rules present in a country, political parties might 
behave differently, as may voters. In the case of voters, the biggest difference maybe found in 
the area of voting incentives, which are changed by the phenomenon of strategic voting. Such 
points of view depart from what Riker(1982) has termed Duverger's Law: the idea that "the 
simple-majority single-ballot system [i.e., simple plurality rule in single-member districts] favors 
the two-party system" (Duverger, 1954, 217), and have been shared by other scholars over the 
years, including Anthony Downs (1957, 48) who alluded to ‘sophisticated voting’ as a 
mechanism by which voters would not vote for the party that lies closest to their own policy 
preferences, thus muddling the image and information about the ‘true’ landscape of public 
opinion in a country. While some authors (Abramson et al, 2010, 63-64) have doubted there is 
much difference between proportional and FPTP systems vis-à-vis strategic voting, the work of 
other authors others (Niemi et a,l 1992; Meffert and Gschwend, 2011;  see also Iversen and 
Soskice, 2006, 169) have offered strong support to the argument that third parties stand to lose 
the most from strategic voting. 
When strategic voting happens to a high degree, the results of elections are in a way 
„skewed‟, and not only in the commonly accepted sense that the distribution of seats in the 
elected body does not optimally represent political preferences, but also in the sense that the 
election does a less good job -compared to proportional systems- of communicating the 
distribution of policy preferences among the electorate. In layman’s words, in first past the post 
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and single constituency system, past elections are not as good at revealing to politicians what the 
true landscape of public opinion looks like because when voters are afraid of wasting their votes 
when their preferred candidate stands little change in winning the constituency, they will opt for 
one of the strongest two or three candidates, even if they are a lesser preference for the voter.  
Until 1999, UK elections to the British Parliament and the European Parliament were 
held according to majoritarian rules. The initial set-up (pre-’99) mirrored national elections, and 
made it harder for the contagion effect of Eurosceptic discourse to manifest itself. A highly 
majoritarian system, or one with single member constituencies, increases the incentives for 
strategic voting. A voter might see party “A” as her ideal policy choice, in the sense that it lies 
closest to her own policy preference, and party “C” as the party most distant from her own 
preference. If she does not believe that her party/candidate stands any real chance of getting 
elected or forcing the other parties to change their position with the threat of vote defection (from 
the latter), then that voter will vote for party “B”, which it might see as the lesser evil, just to 
prevent „C‟ from winning. Such tendencies are even stronger when the distance   between A and 
B are smaller than between B and C, or if the former lie on the same side of the political 
spectrum, in which case the voter might already have some sympathies for Party B.  In such a 
scenario, a voter who votes for party A (the smaller one) would essentially be taking votes away 
from another party she sympathizes (B) relative to the party she likes least (Party C), thus 
increasing C’s chances of getting the all precious seat that is the object of the contest. All things 
considered, the voter is incentivized to vote for a party other than the one representing her ideal 
policy position. A voter may thus cast a strategic vote in order to support the candidate she 
supports most of the electable ones, or may cast a vote to keep the ‘most disliked candidate’ out 
of office (Heath and Evans, 1994). There are constituencies where, for example, voting for the 
Labor candidate reduced Labor’s chances to win elections because in those circumscriptions 
(where the two strongest candidates were conservative and liberal-democratic) a vote for Labor 
meant a loss for the Liberal Democratic Candidate and a relative gain for the Tories (Green and 
Prosser, 2015). In such cases, voting for Labor meant a larger chance of the Conservatives 
winning the elections.  
The tendency to vote strategically is mitigated by a few factors. One is the degree to 
which a voter is a partisan of the small party in question. She might consider voting for A to be 
so important that she will not alter her vote in favor of B, even if it means that C will win. 
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Another might be whether party A manages to overcome a crucial „threshold of attention‟, and 
even though it is credited with lower chances than the front runners to win the contested seat, 
still retains some chance of winning the election. Even if it is not a front runner, it means that the 
party is not one of the plethora of small candidates who go unobserved, but is instead large 
enough to receive media attention, and prompt discussion among the large parties („B‟ and „C‟) 
about the potential to lose votes relative to each other due to the „A‟ appearance. Where exactly 
this threshold lies (how big must party „A‟ be before it is large enough to attract attention, while 
at the same time still being small enough to not be one of the favorites) is debatable, and might 
even differ with every constituency, but once that threshold is passed the voter might abandon 
strategic voting, in the knowledge that voting for her favorite party will firstly force the other 
parties to adjust their own policy preference, and secondly will attract more attention to party A, 
which might make it a serious contender at future elections. 
The problem is that if a party does not manage to cross that „influence‟ threshold, or the 
rules of the electoral system do not change in a more proportional direction, the incentive for 
strategic voting remains high, as is the likelihood that a party will remain in the „lower league‟ 
of national politics. That deprives the system of information about voters’ preferences, and 
muffles the effect of Eurosceptic parties unless an alternative avenue is given for such parties to 
show the true extent of support they have in the public perception. If such an avenue is given, 
however, Eurosceptic parties can exert their influence even in a majoritarian system, because 
they no longer rely only on the original majoritarian system to show how much sympathy voters 
have for its policy position. That in turn emboldens it to field more candidates, which in turn 
makes it more visible, which results in more support, thus helping set up a self-reinforcing 
process. The introduction of a proportional system for the 1999 EP elections reduced the 
insulation that the Westminster system provided to Labor and Conservatives against electoral 
threats by Eurosceptic parties. It gave smaller parties an outlet and means to punish the bigger 
parties with real losses of seats, even if it was not in the House of Commons. The effect of the 
change in rules for EP elections did not take place instantaneously, although the UKIP started 
doing ever better from one election to another for the EU parliament. 
The change in the system is not only crucial because of the enhanced influence it afforded 
to the UKIP in Brussels, but also because it reduced the threshold effect of the Westminster 
system on UK politics. After 1999, UKIP started to add more and more pressure to the British 
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electoral system, despite not entering the national Parliament for a decade and a half until this 
year. The UKIP could continue to retain public attention and exert pressure on the other parties 
despite not being present in the British Parliament. It can be argued similarly, to some degree, 
that the Afd in Germany managed to stay clear of oblivion because it managed to secure seats in 
the European Parliament in 2014. At the 2013 national elections, it narrowly failed to get into the 
German Parliament, and there was real discussion about the party’s dissolution, having lost the 
possibility to access parliament. Whether the Afd’s presence in the EP will have any effect on 
national elections in Germany can, however, be contested, since the German national electoral 
system is more proportional than the British one. At the 1999 EP elections held 2 years after 
elections to Westminster the UKIP obtained a stunning 7 percent of the vote in Britain, making it 
the 4th best represented British party in Brussels and Strasbourg. The 1999 EP election was a 
strong vehicle for transmitting information towards politicians, information that until then had 
not been communicated as well through national elections. As such, it acted in correspondence 
with the Past-Election model, and can be the thought of as the first time that the model applied to 
the UK. It told Labor and the Tories how much support there is among the electorate for the 
Eurosceptic position, and how distant they are themselves from the position of a significant part 
of the electorate. When considering also those voters who were not yet voting in consideration of 
the EU issue, who were less interested or undecided until the UKIP grabbed their attention, that 
election helped the mainstream parties get a clearer picture where they stood relative to the 
median voter (on the EU question), and it acted as a confirmation for the UKIP to „keep going‟. 
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Figure 64: The performance of the UK independence party in national and European elections 
 
 
Graph showing the performance of the UK independence party in national and European elections, and the number 
of electoral districts they have competed in national elections in. 
 
After the 1999 EP election, UKIP started fielding candidates in ever more of the UK’s single-
member constituencies (from a total of 650 seats presently in the House of Commons). It is 
important to note that while this meant they were fielding significantly more candidates in 
national elections, their performances kept improving at EP elections. That showed that there 
was real support among the electorate for its policy positions, but that voters (still) regarded their 
vote as too precious to use on them in elections to the House of Commons. 
The British political scene nevertheless exposed to proportional representation, and the 
results for the EP elections that followed since strengthened the message to the mainstream about 
where the heart of the public lies with regards to Europe, and offered a clearer view of the 
opinion landscape present at the time. The UKIP could now more efficiently work as a Downsian 
„influence party‟, painting the picture of the electorate for the mainstream parties, something 
that was harder to accomplish in a more „restrictive‟, single constituency system. It also acted as 
a means to increase public visibility of the UKIP, as well as the issue they promote the most, the 
question of integration. Leaving aside voters who had previously refrained from voting for them 
out of strategic consideration (as described above), that election also helped introduce and make 
UKIP and Nigel Farage more popular with voters who might have been less informed, politically 
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engaged and disinterested previously. Eversince the 1999 EP elections, the UKIP has been on a 
roll ever since. It became the third best represented party of the UK in 2004, obtaining 16 per 
cent of the vote at that election. The 2004 and 2009 Elections to the European Parliament 
strongly displayed the growing appeal of a hard line Eurosceptic discourse in Britain and 
signified that an important line had been crossed electorally. The party’s tally increased by less 
than one per cent from the 2004 to the 2009 EP election, but the distribution of voters among the 
other parties made the UKIP the 2nd strongest British party in the EP, achieving what many 
would have found impossible a few years prior – breaking the monopoly of Labor and the 
Conservatives on the top two positions in British politics. The UKIP not only registered another 
rise in vote count, but also managed to outperform one of the two traditional dominating parties 
in Britain. It became Britain’s second best represented party in the EU Parliament, and 
subsequently – at the most recent EP elections, the biggest British party in Strassbourg. 
The fact that at national elections the UKIP was still polling in numbers below their 
figures at the European Elections showed that strategic voting was still going on to some degree 
among the British electorate. Nonetheless, its support was growing, as was its influence. In 1997 
it had scored 0,3%, in 2001 1,5%, in 2005 it past the 2% mark and in 2010, eventually, passed 
3% for the first time. As its tallies were adding up in national elections (and more so in European 
elections) its influence on the mainstream parties started to become ever more noticeable. The 
argument made here is that European elections made a difference in Britain due to the 
Westminster system (a difference they would not have made if Britain had had proportional 
representation).  Because in such a system it is harder for political parties to gauge the policy 
preferences of the electorate, the role of conveying such information to mainstream politicians 
was taken over by European Elections, an avenue that opened when elections to the EP in Britain 
became proportional in 1999. In a way, Britain’s EP (multi-level) elections have turned the 
country’s electoral system into a quasi-proportional one, where the proportionality comes not 
from the contest for Westminster, but the one for Strassbourg and Brussels. As for the 
information mechanism that underlies the theoretical (and analytical) framework of this project, 
the EP elections fulfill that role in majoritarian systems. It is thus inferred that the less 
proportional a country’s national electoral rules are, the more likely it is that Eurosceptic 
Contagion will manifest itself through European Elections. While EP elections (and the 
performance of Eurosceptic Parties there) might not normally matter for centrist parties’ EU 
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position (as was evidenced by regression models 30 and 31), they might do so in political 
systems that are not proportional. In those circumstances, we should find that there is an 
interaction effect between how well Eurosceptic parties do at EP elections, and a country’s 
electoral system, in line with hypothesis H11b. 
Before conducting that actual test which looks at the interaction of EP elections and 
Electoral Proportionality, I first present a very similar analysis, where I look at the interaction of 
national election results and the above-mentioned proportionality. This is in keeping in line with 
hypothesis H11a, and with the overall spirit of this project which started with the assumption that 
it is Eurosceptic national performance that determines EU position change. If one assumes that – 
and tests whether- Eurosceptic success at EP elections interact with the type of electoral system, 
it is only rational to test whether such an interaction might hold for the main Independent 
Variable in this dissertation (election results at national elections). Models 32 through 33 test 
precisely that. The first two models imitate the original models (m1 and m3) while adding the 
variable System_Proportionality – basically the original models while controlling for one extra 
factor. The models also include an interaction term of the respective main IV and the 
proportionality variable. Below table 16, the interactions are presented graphically. 
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Table 16: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral Proportionality 
 (32) (33) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*  
 (0.009)  
System_proportionality -0.03* -0.04** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.02  
 (0.045)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.087)  
Time -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.025) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.02 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.16** 0.17** 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
System_proportionality*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.002)  
Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.02** 
  (0.008) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.01 
  (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.090) 
System_proportionality*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.001) 
Constant 0.99 1.05 
 (0.706) (0.640) 
Country Dummies Not Reported   
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.15 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure 65 shows how strong the effect of Votechange_Biggest_Sceptic is for different values of 
System_Proportionality. Because the latter variable is constructed using the Parlgov 
Proportionality (Dalton) index, low values (to the left) indicate a system that is highly 
proportional, while high values (to the right indicate majoritarian systems like Britain and 
France). There is no slope to the linear prediction – the effect would seem to be equally strong 
for all values for ‘System Proportionality’, but at high values, the confidence interval expands 
until it crosses and includes zero, rendering the interaction insignificant.  
 
Figure 65: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral System Proportionality 
 
 
This can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, we need to remember the fact that most of 
Europe’s polities are highly proportional – that means that very few of the observations/cases in 
the Chapel Hill database that actually score high on that variable (only those from the UK and 
France). For a certain value range, there are simply too few observations, and the regression 
lacks the power to provide numbers with certainty, hence the large Cluster-robust standard errors 
and broad confidence intervals that grow to include zero. The lack of statistical significance on 
the right side of the graph might also be an artifice of the numbers/data. On the other hand, it 
-.
1
-.
0
5
0
.0
5
.1
E
ff
e
c
ts
 o
n
 L
in
e
a
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
System_proportionality
Average Marginal Effects of Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP with 95% CIs
186 
 
might actually be due to the fact that majoritarian systems suppress the information carrying 
potential of election results because of the incentives for strategic voting, and we should not 
expect contagion in the absence of proportionality. Figure 66 sheds a bit more light in that 
direction and shows how strong the effect of Votechange_all_Sceptics is for different values of 
System_Proportionality. As was the case above, the confidence interval crosses zero and renders 
the interaction non-significant at high values of ‘System Proportionality’. 
 
 
Figure 66: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral System Proportionality (B) 
 
 
One difference from the former graph is the presence of the linear prediction pointing to 
the bottom left corner. The graph suggests that when operationalizing the main IV as cumulated 
vote gain for all Eurosceptic Parties, the effect is stronger in highly proportional systems (to the 
left on the graph). Arguably, in less than perfect proportionality, very small Eurosceptic parties 
(which would contribute to the total number of votes going to all Eurosceptic parties) might not 
raise as many eyebrows because mainstream parties are more focused on the flagship 
Eurosceptic Party. In extremely proportional systems, even small parties that contribute to the 
Eurosceptic overall tally but would otherwise lie well in the shadow of the flagship Eurosceptic 
stand a chance to gain attention, and hence their influence might just be stronger because of this 
in such systems. Moreover, as I argued above already, the less proportional a system is, the 
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stronger the incentive is to vote strategic, and not with ‘the heart’. Some voters are 
disincentivised from voting for their preferred (potentially eurosceptic) party and the election 
does not convey the complete picture to the other parties about the electorate’s preferences vis-à-
vis Europe.  
So far, I have argued that the proportionality of an electoral system can interact with the 
Eurosceptic performance at national elections with regards to the influence it casts over moderate 
parties, confirming hypothesis H11b. Returning to the question that I raised earlier in the chapter, 
how does it interact with European Elections? In other words, does the proportionality of 
national elections amplify or mitigate the effect of Eurosceptic success at supranational 
elections?  
In models 34 and 35, I let Eurosceptic performance at EP58 elections interact with the 
Proportionality variable (again, maintaining the dual single Eurosceptic/all Eurosceptic format).  
Figures 67 and 68 plot the two interaction effects and hint at some interesting prospects. In both 
cases, the linear prediction turns negative towards the right, suggesting that the effect of 
Eurosceptic gains (at EP elections) on party position changes tends to be stronger in less 
proportional systems (as was argued above). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 In the regression table “EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti” and “EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics “  
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Table 17: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral Proportionality 
 (34) (35) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.00  
 (0.007)  
System_proportionality -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.10*  
 (0.041)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.04  
 (0.080)  
Time 0.02 0.01 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Unemployment 0.04** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Gov_Opposition 0.11* 0.09 
 (0.051) (0.052) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
System_proportionality*EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.00  
 (0.001)  
EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.005) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.07 
  (0.039) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  0.02 
  (0.082) 
System_proportionality*EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.001) 
Constant -0.63 -0.39 
 (0.531) (0.448) 
Country Dummies Not Reported   
   
Observations 519 526 
R-squared 0.14 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.08 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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In both cases, the lack of observations for the right side of the graph expands the confidence 
interval greatly for high values on the horizontal. In both cases, the confidence intervals cross the 
zero mark at all values of ‘System Proportionality’ – the interaction isn’t significant anywhere. 
However, the fact that the linear prediction again turns negative on the right, and the fact that the 
only observations from France and Britain populate the database with values high enough to be 
in that region leads me to suspect that the large standard errors are in this case not a consequence 
of a lacking relationship but of the small number of cases. I suspect that had there been similar 
numbers of cases/observations for majoritarian systems as we do for proportional ones, we might 
have found a significant interaction, in line with my hypothesizing about the influence of EP 
elections above, where discussing the UK situation. As it stands, there is not enough robust 
evidence to confirm H11c. 
 
 
 
Figure 67: European Elections and Electoral System Proportionality 
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Figure 68: European Elections and Electoral System Proportionality (B) 
 
 
 
European Elections as Protest Voting or EU Issue Voting 
 
In the first empirical chapter, the hypothesis was tested that the success of Eurosceptic policy 
entrepreneurs is actually a function of how the moderate parties manage the EU issue and 
question. An analogous hypothesis (analogous in the sense that Eurosceptic success is again the 
dependent variable) is H12, according to which the success of Eurosceptic parties (or lack 
thereof) at European elections is the result of factors pertaining to voter disenchantment with the 
mainstream on the topic of integration. The hypothesis states that EP elections are a mechanism 
by which the public can punish incumbent governing parties by taking away votes from the 
previous winners (the current governing parties) and giving them to the populist parties. An 
inference from the ‘second order elections’ literature is that European elections can be used by 
national electorates as a stick or carrot against ruling parties. The difference in the mechanism 
tested here, however, lies in the hypothesis that the public punishes the ruling parties not by 
taking away their votes and giving them in exchange to other moderate parties, but instead by 
giving these votes to Eurosceptic populists. The former would imply that casting a vote against 
the government in EP elections is a form of protest voting. The latter would indicate that the EU 
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issue voting is occurring in ample manner and that people are not voting so much against their 
government in the traditional sense of second-order mid-term recoil, as much as penalizing their 
government parties for their EU positions. If the public is discontent with the government’s 
positions and finds these too pro-European, so the inference goes, we might see that the public 
sends a signal of discontent to governing parties – by voting for the Eurosceptic Parties. Treib 
(2014, 1542) has stated that at the 2014 EP elections, more voters than ever chose to vote for 
parties advocating radical reforms of the EU, campaigning for an exit from the Union, or pushing 
to scrap the entire EU project. Research has shown that while governing parties tend to 
underperform at European elections compared to domestic ones, Eurosceptic Parties perform 
better in EP elections (De Vries et al, 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012; Hobolt et al, 2009). 
The hypothesis is thus that the electoral results of Eurosceptic parties is correlated to the 
dissonance between the position of governing parties and the measured public opinion of 
European Integration. Assuming that the public does use this dissonance between its position and 
that of the ruling coalition in deciding how to cast the ballot, then if the public and the 
government have similar policy positions/preferences on European integration, there should be 
no increase in votes for Eurosceptic parties. If the government and the public lie far apart, the 
punishment in European Elections should be stronger. nCurrent Public Support of EU integration 
is measured using the well known Eurobarometer question that asks people if they think their 
country’s membership of the EU is a good thing, and has a scale going from 0 to 100 (%),  with 
0 meaning nobody in the country is happy with EU membership and meaning all voters are 
behind it. The average current position (on the EU) of parties in government is measured on the 
classic 1-7 CHES scale, 1 equals positions completely against Integration and 7 completely in 
favor. By dividing the values of the Public Support variable by 14.2 (10/7 = 1.42), one can obtain 
an indicator for public support of the EU that runs on the same 1-7 scale as the one describing 
the position of parties in government59. The former is subtracted from the latter to create in 
indicator (“Dissonance”) of the gap between public support for integration and that of the 
average government party. Model 36 tests whether Dissonance predicts subsequent vote gains or 
vote losses by Eurosceptic Parties.  
 
                                                 
59 If 7 is the most pro-European position a party can have, and 100 is the most european position an electorate can 
have, the 0-100 scale is converted into a 1-7 scale on which 7 corresponds to 100 per cent of respondents having 
favorable views of European Integration. 
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Table 18: Government-Public Dissonance and European Elections 
 (36) (37) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Dissonance -0.10 -0.25 
 (0.369) (0.502) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.13** -0.13* 
 (0.039) (0.054) 
unemployment 0.11 0.34*** 
 (0.069) (0.094) 
eu_salience -1.05** 0.02 
 (0.323) (0.441) 
Constant 10.35*** 5.31 
 (3.019) (4.119) 
   
Observations 568 568 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.15 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
The dependent variable measures the Electoral success (when running for EU parliament) of the 
flagship Eurosceptic parties, while model 37 measures the cumulated vote gains or losses of all 
Eurosceptic Parties. The two indicators are constructed by creating a lead for the 
‘EP_Votechange_Biggest_Eurosceptic’ and ‘EP_Votechange_ALL_Eurosceptics’ indicators 
from the beginning of this chapter. Instead of looking at the change in votes between the two 
most recent elections, the regression uses change in votes between the most recent EP election 
and the next EP election lying in the future. The coefficient for Dissonance is not significant, and 
there is little evidence to be found here for a ‘eu issue vote’. 
 
Conclusion: Second Order Elections and Eurosceptic Contagion? 
 
In this third empirical chapter of the project, I looked more closely at European elections and 
their relationship to Eurosceptic dynamics. Two of the analyses performed looked first at 
weather the Radical Party Hypothesis holds when substituting Eurosceptic success at national 
with success at European elections, and secondly at whether European elections are ‘about 
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Europe’ in the sense that voters unhappy with their governments’ position on the issue of 
Integration would cast their votes at EP elections for more Eurosceptic Parties. In both cases, 
there was little evidence to support the hypotheses that EP elections are used either by voters or 
political parties to shape or influence EU positions. The large N analysis in which Eurosceptic 
results at supranational elections interact with the proportionality of party systems did not 
produce any statistically significant outcomes. It was argued that the lack of statistical 
significance, the small number of cases exhibiting low proportionality, and the shape of 
confidence intervals (following the interactions in models 34 and 35) combine to suggest that the 
average marginal effects tend to grow stronger towards the less proportional end of the spectrum.  
Moreover, while the evidence at hand would suggest that EP elections are a non-factor in the 
larger picture of mainstream-Eurosceptic interplay, there are reasons to think that this state of 
affairs might change in the near future. The second-order election thesis has for a long time held 
center view, but recent research into European Parliament elections are beginning to paint a 
nuanced picture, and while the debate between the second order perspective and the EU issue 
voting one has been robust in the past, it remains to be seen to what degree that will remain so 
and whether the second-order perspective will still command attention in the years to come. It 
must be remembered that this study analyzes elections and party behavior retrospectively, over a 
period a large part of which EU integration was not as salient. The time periods contained in the 
dataset can suppress results due to the evolution of the EU issue over time (which was not as 
salient or electorally influential previously), and contagion could grow stronger in the near future 
as a feature of both national and supranational elections. As recent research has shown (De Vries 
et al, 2011; Hobolt and Spoon, 2012) EP elections can be ‘about Europe’ in the eyes of voters 
provided sufficient contextual information and politicization of European questions exists. In 
other words, we should not exclude the possibility of first order European elections in the near 
future. As Giddens (2014) noted, the most  ‘European’ movement was perhaps – ironically – that 
of the Eurosceptic parties as they tried to put up a common front of European nationalists 
opposed to the EU, in which they timed and co-ordinated their campaigns in such a way as to 
give an impression of ‘people across Europe united against integration’. Sensing the public 
weariness and apprehension about integration, these parties tried to influence the issue agenda of 
the elections and frame the elections as ‘putting Europe to the vote’. Whether these parties 
attained their goals remains an open question, but it has not been uncommon to ascribe the 2014 
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EP election results to ‘integration fatigue’ on the part of the electorate, Treib (2014) noted that 
more voters than ever backed parties opposed to regional governance and integration. Such 
findings imply that this was an election in which the electorate used the European mid-terms to 
punish not by transferring votes to the regular opposition, but to the anti-EU one. Whether the 
other parties – those that have lost votes massively to populist parties60 – will react the same way 
they do vis-à-vis national election loss and use the election to update their position remains a task 
for research in the years to come. While I suspect that a similar analysis of EP election outcomes 
might with time yield significant results given data from the next electoral cycles, I have argued 
in the this last empirical chapter that there are certain circumstances in which EP elections 
already play a major role: in less-proportional party systems. The presence of proportional 
supranational elections (beginning with 1999) kick-started a self-reinforcing process in Great 
Britain which facilitated the eventual rise of the UKIP as one of the country’s three biggest 
parties and the accelerated evolution of EU issue conflict in the UK. The majoritarian rules of the 
British electoral contest typically worked to suppress the electoral potential of fringe parties 
because of the built-in incentives for strategic voting. The incentives ‘broke’ the information 
mechanism that works in more proportional systems. In majoritarian systems, the effects of the 
second level (EU level) electoral contest has been to turn the majoritarian system into a quasi-
proportional one, where European elections represent a parallel proportional arena of conflict to 
the traditional national one. This also generates a self-reinforcing process, whereby Eurosceptic 
Parties gain more visibility, legitimacy, and resources61, which helps them better conduct 
subsequent national elections, and which in turn puts them in a better position for the next 
supranational elections.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 turnout was similar to 2009 
61 Which they might otherwise not have gained 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
It would seem that European Politics are currently enrolled in a constant flux of uncertainty and 
anxiousness. The rapid succession of crises seems to taking its toll on the EU, its unity in 
decision making, as well as countries’ commitment to ever closer Union. After the Euro crisis 
shook the financial footing of the block and brought its economic order into question, after 
waves of refugees fleeing war and violence put pressure and tested member states’ commitment 
to European open borders, Europe has now experienced its first secession by a member state. 
Against the background of wave of success that populist political actors have had over the past 
few years, the continent’s polities are contemplating the prospect of further gains by Eurosceptic 
parties (and in nuclear scenarios, new EU secessions) in upcoming elections across the continent. 
This project centered on studying how political parties and politicians react to these changing 
circumstances, and whether they amend, qualify and change their traditional ‘pro-Euoprean’ and 
pro-integration stances in the face of growing electoral pressure by populist Eurosceptic parties 
who take advantage regional integration fatigue among the public to alter the dynamics of 
Europe’s party systems.  
Discussions about Eurosceptic and populist success are currently a rather timely topic 
(Mudde, 2012), but policy positions opposing European Integration are not an entirely new 
feature of the politics of the continent. Eurosceptic success was, however, more incremental and 
grew more slowly in the past. Given that the data used in this study goes back to the 80’s, the 
project explores Eurosceptic contagion in times and circumstances which were less conducive or 
favorable to Euroscepticism than today. For a range of reasons, opposition to European 
Integration has not been used as a political weapon to its full potential from the get go, its 
salience was rather low even if the premises among the electorate were there for more conflictual 
positions on the issue. The salience of regional integration has grown over time, and the issue has 
gone from being a marginal one in the 80’s to one of the most important ones over the past 
decade. Given that we find evidence for Eurosceptic contagion even in times when the social and 
political ground was less fertile for it62, then what is in store for Europe now and in the near 
future when populist parties seem set to influence the political agenda even more? Under the 
                                                 
62 across the period described by the CHES, including the late 80’s and early 90’s 
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right circumstances, contagion might grow and accelerate with hard to predict consequences for 
the EU.  
In investigating the interplay between populist behavior and the question of regional 
integration, this study contributes to the growing literature on populist programmatic contagion 
(Mudde, 2004;  Rydgren, 2005; Meguid, 2008; Van Spanje 2010, Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen, 2014), general party position shifts (Somer-Topcu, 2009; Ezrow et al, 2011; Adams 
et al, 2012) as well as that on the growth of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2009, De Vries and Edwards, 2009). It provides further evidence that fringe 
parties can and do influence the political systems in which they operate, as well extending the 
argument about the growing potential of Euroscepticism as a political force. Moreover, given the 
this study’s focus on frige party performance, the text also contributes directly to the literature on 
the influence of Niche Parties over the political mainstream, including that on Green and 
Environmentalist Parties (Spoon, Hobolt and De Vries, 2014; Abu-Chadi 2014). The state of the 
art on populist parties and parties’ position shifts is in constant enrichment, nevertheless, no 
other studies have taken up an investigation of Eurosceptic Contagion (to my knowledge), 
besides the one present here and that of Meijers (2015), which has a more reduced scope. By 
touching upon issues of wider and consequential political change in Western Europe, the present 
dissertation offers a link to each of these literatures while at the same time linking up with 
theories on more ample social and political evolution (Mudde, 2004; Hooghe and Marks; 2009; 
Kriesi et al, 2012) 
After recapping the empirical findings of this project, I will discuss how changes in 
Europe’s political environment and the EU’s development helped set the scene for the 
Eurosceptic and populist onslaught witnessed today, and made it easy for such parties to take aim 
at the EU. I argue that the evolution of political parties from mass parties to catch-all parties (and 
their ideological convergence in the ideological center) in combination with the depoliticized 
character of integration, especially in the pre-Maastricht period, helped create a niche for anti-
polity, anti-establishment and anti-EU political positions. The tacit and consensual approach to 
regional integration sidelined the need to cater to public attitudes towards the EU, and that in 
turn helped foster the public impression of it being distant, unresponsive and unaccountable. 
Social, economic and historical changes helped bring back populist parties, and gave them a new 
lease on life. All these parties had to do was to tap into public discontent about catch-all 
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mainstream parties, the EU, and globalization in order to benefit from the niche and political 
capital that was available. In threatening the established political order, Eurosceptic parties thus 
forced mainstream parties to be more reflective of the electorate’s less Europhile attitudes 
(mainstream, moderate parties now finding themselves forced to adjust their positions in order to 
cater to voters’ own policy preferences). Thus, political conflict is ignited (and grudgingly 
accepted) on the dimension of Integration. The final part of the section discusses the implications 
of multi-dimensional political conflict in Europe, the literature on Europe’s new fault lines and 
what the future holds. 
 
Recap and Empirical Review 
 
The first empirical chapter of this project confirmed the radical party hypothesis of Eurosceptic 
Contagion, and found it to hold when exploring the effects of both flagship Eurosceptic parties as 
well as the cumulative effect of all Eurosceptic parties. Significantly, it was found that 
mainstream parties react not the absolute level of support for populist challengers, but to change 
in support for the latter, suggesting there is a certain dynamism at play, with political parties 
using election results to gauge the direction in which public opinion is shifting. It was further 
revealed that parties react not to the change in the distribution of seats in parliament, but to the 
change in distribution of votes, which, as was argued above, reinforces the belief that political 
parties use election results to measure public support for Euroscepticism. The distribution of 
votes can change without having an effect on legislature seat distribution, and thus carries more 
information. While the age old adage that correlation is not causation holds true, various 
measures were taken here to ensure that the analysis gets the relationship between the predictors 
and explanandum as correctly as possible. First of all, the estimation technique and temporal 
structure of the dataset were chosen so as to minimize the chances of serial autocorrelation or 
reverse causation. Moreover, various control variables were added, such as Public Opinion of the 
EU and socio-economic variables, meant at reducing the chances of exploring a spurious 
relationship and controlling in the actual estimation for all factors that might account for change 
in party EU position other than that specified in the radical party hypothesis. Last but not least, 
this project also tested an ‘alternative’ model in which the temporal ordering of change in party 
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position and election results is swapped, meaning that it directly tested whether the causal 
direction between the main variables runs in the other order as that assumed throughout the 
project. Further confirming the radical party hypothesis, the alternative model failed to generate 
significant effects for its respective predictor. 
The second chapter moved on to the circumstances and more minute causation of 
Eurosceptic contagion. A double dynamic was exposed in which the strength of Eurosceptic 
contagion increases with the passing of time as well as the degree to which Eurosceptic parties 
promote the salience of the issue of European Integration. With the passage of time in the post-
Maastricht-Treaty era, as the redistributive consequences of European Integration became more 
evident and tangible, and as voters became more aware of the mismatch between their policy 
preferences and those of elites, the opportunity space for populist parties to take advantage of 
Euroscepticism grew bigger. Such parties tapped into said available capital which contributed 
their already growing popularity and electoral performance on the basis of other political issues, 
such as opposition to immigration. This promotion of the EU question to the top of the political 
agenda in turn helped fuel further voter defection towards them, which then further amplified the 
importance of the EU issue, strengthening the cycle. As Eurosceptic Parties become more 
Eurosceptic, as Eurosceptic parties mobilize and politicize their opposition to the EU ever more, 
the shifts of mainstream parties in response to populist success become stronger, and this also 
reflects itself in the fact that the effect of Eurosceptic success over moderate political actors 
grows with time. Such phenomena have already been attested to in the literature which describes 
or postulates populist or anti-cosmopolitan tendencies in Kriesi et al’s New Cleavage Hypothesis 
(2008, 20012) or Cas Mudde’s Populist Zeitgeist (2004), but unlike this project have tended to 
focus either on wider societal predisposition towards said political changes due to the evolution 
of social cleavages, or focused on anti-globalist sentiment more broadly without zeroing in more 
precisely on the EU issue or the interplay of political contagion. The second empirical chapter 
further took a step into the realm of the motivation or centrist parties that adjust their policy 
positions. It was shown that parties do not undertake policy shifts as a measure of opposition 
politics, and that they will react not to the voter defection from their mainstream rivals, but to 
their own vote loss in combination with Eurosceptic success. This shows that they are concerned 
with what they learn about how their constituency views their position, and will react to their 
voters’ preferences, but not engage in strategic power-play behavior. When exploring the role of 
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ideology in the process of Eurosceptic success, the outcome of the analysis was somewhat murky 
and conclusive evidence scant, with the ideological families hypothesis receiving the most 
support. It must be mentioned, as was noted in the beginning of the fourth chapter and further on 
in the empirical section looking into geographic effects in the fifth chapter, that it might be very 
difficult to disaggregate the effects of left-wing and right-wing Euroscepticism due to the 
different roles and trajectories of the two fringes, which might account for the results of that 
section.  
The premise of this work – along the lines of the second order election thesis, is that 
national elections (and not EU elections) are the main arena for interparty competition, even 
when the political agenda includes questions of European Integration. The third and final 
empirical chapter challenges that premise and looks into whether Eurosceptic contagion can also 
take effect in the competition over the European legislature. While adding to the existing 
evidence in favor of the second order election thesis, the chapter cautions that in the right 
circumstances ( under disproportional electoral systems), European elections can be the electoral 
arena that parties use to poll the electorate via recent election results. The past election model 
requires that elections transmit an accurate as possible a picture of electorate preferences, which 
is easier in proportional systems. It is implied that mainstream position shifts in a Eurosceptic 
direction would not occur following majoritarian national elections, but would do so if the 
former are supplemented with proportional supranational ones. The final empirical chapter thus 
delves deeper into the micro-level logic characterizing the past election model, describing how 
the growing threat of UKIP and further voter defection helped contribute to the evolution of 
British politics that eventually lead to the UK’s secession from the EU. 
 
Discussion 
 
Europe Evolving 
 
Ever since David Marquand coined the term „Democratic Deficit‟ in reference to yesteryear’s 
European Community in 1979, it has become a widely discussed topic in the literature on 
European Politics. Discussion surrounding the democratic deficit is multi-faceted, and refers 
among other things to the unelected position of various offices in Brussels, lack of input 
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legitimacy, the weakness of representative institutions such as the EP, the insulation of 
technocratic decision-making, and last but not least, the seeming absence of political conflict and 
choice over Europe in its incipient phases, something that has alienated many citizens over time. 
According to those who worry about the aforementioned democratic deficit, the 
continuous, slow but steady integration of the European Union witnessed in the second half of 
the 20th century has been an ‘elite project’, driven by a Europhile, pro-Integration political 
elite(so common wisdom dictates), which maintained a consensual discourse on the European 
level. This period in the development of the EU is often referred to as the so called Permissive 
Consensus (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970) of the incipient stages of the European Community. 
As Mair (2007, 1) noted:  “In the absence if any serious outbreak of opposition, agreement was 
taken as given. This was the essence of the so-called permissive consensus: there was a 
consensus in the sense that here was agreement across the political mainstream that European 
integration should be furthered, and it was permissive in the sense that high levels of trust in the 
political elites during these years ensured thee was almost always popular deference to their 
commitments.” 
The initial ‘quiescence’ of the masses (especially pronounced in the immediate post-war 
period) and the apparent consensus (sometimes referred to as collusion) within the mainstream 
political elites that more integration is intrinsically desirable fed into themselves in a sort of self-
reinforcing process whereby lacking discussion, debate, and conflict over Europe and 
overlapping policy preferences by political actors strongly hampered party competition over 
‘Europe’. For some authors (Katz and Mair, 1995), developments on the EU level (whose 
influence feeds back into the national arena) can also be seen as symptomatic of a greater change 
in national democratic politics. The democratic deficit can also be seen as an interaction between 
the trans-national level of Union building and distinctive processes of party evolution at the 
national levels. Political parties are intrinsic to modern representative democracy as we know it, 
and the nature of political parties has changed over time. The characteristics of parties have 
changed, their modus operandi evolved, as well as the behavior of their leaderships and target 
constituencies. According to Katz and Mair, some of these key characteristics of party behaviour 
that have varied over periods have cast a strong influence on the terms of inter-party competition.  
Originally, the mass parties evolved from forms closer to grass-roots manifestations, 
often built around well-defined social groups (for example the working class), being in a way a 
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part of civil society. Political parties evolved as agencies through which these groups (implicitly 
their members) participate in politics and make demands of the state, hoping even to put their 
own representatives in key offices. This however, started to change with the appearance of 
Kirchheimer’s63 so called „catch-all party‟, which challenged the idea of the party as a 
representative of a pre-defined social group, sector or strata of society. With time traditional, 
established political parties in Europe have – simultaneously – lost most of their initial grass-
roots manifestations and increasingly changed from being organizations meant to represent 
constituencies into organizations whose main role has become the formation of government and 
running of the state. Concomitantly, the main objective for most parties became the winning of 
as many votes as possible in elections, to effectively „catch all‟ votes, hence the tag. Parties, and 
the governments they formed, are being faced with increasingly many principals. Besides their 
standard constituencies of partisan voters, catch all parties are now vying for as large a segment 
as possible of the electorate that is growing increasingly de-aligned (see Andre, Depauw, and 
Beyens, 2015). The prospect of government necessitates that parties are at the same time 
responsive to a swath of private and public organizations, within national borders and outside 
them. There is plethora of international fora which states must comply with today (most 
importantly the EU), not to mention the commitments towards other countries, all the while the 
electorate is ever more fragmented. On the one hand, the proportion of partisans and non-partisan 
voters in society is changing. As society is becoming more atomized, and as traditional clusters 
of social groups are drifting apart, parties have to respond to an ever diverse electorate, wherein 
people are less committed to voting consistently for only one party ( due to personal family or 
class histories, as was common in the past) which encourages voter dealignement. 
In their vying for as great a share of the distribution of votes as possible parties have 
moved increasingly more towards the center of the political spectrum, in their attempt to cover as 
wide a political space and reach as many voters as possible. The upshot has been that by doing 
so, most of these parties helped accentuate the perception that party leaderships are sealed off 
from society, that they (their members, their leaders, i.e. the political elite) have started to 
resemble each other increasingly more and ever less with their constituents. As the parties have 
moved closer together and the supply of policy alternatives shrank in terms of range, especially 
so on the issue of Integration which was limited to begin with, so did the alternatives available to 
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voters to the point of limiting the apparent scope for a real choice on EU issues. Those “elites” 
held responsible for maintaining a consensual discourse on the EU level were the same ones 
charged with creating the seemingly depoliticized architecture of the European Union, the 
mainstream politicians and the leadership of catch-all parties. The fact that they seemed to 
function ever less as representative entities (but as governing and administrative ones instead) for 
the masses did not help matters, especially when viewed in combination with the reduced 
competition space for EU policy preferences. 
 
Opposition to ‘Europe’ 
 
From the Eurocautious, or Eurosceptic perspective, the development of the European level of 
decision making played a role in the hollowing out of policy competition between parties at the 
national level. Firstly, „Europe‟ limited the policy space available to competing parties when 
policies are harmonized and different policy areas face convergence within the Union. Europe 
was charged with also limiting the capacities of national parties in government by reducing their 
policy repertoire and their range of available policy instruments. While national governments 
may still vary from one another in how they interpret the demands for policy convergence 
(within a certain margin), the result is often policy that seems to differ too little across 
moderate/mainstream parties. When decision making is delegated from the national to supra-
national level, it is most often delegated to non-majoritarian institutions, from which parties and 
politics are excluded by design. When this happens, policy is usually decided according to 
various legal and expert principles, but not subject to opposition politics. This has thus helped 
reduce the stakes of competition between political parties, to mute the potential differences 
brought by successive governments, (and to limit the scope for classical opposition). When 
policy competition is dampened down in this way, elections become less decisive in policy 
terms. This also has the effect of making political parties converge, increasing the potential 
political space/niche for parties willing to criticize the system. 
Part of the appeal of populist anti-system Eurosceptic Parties can and should be viewed 
also from the perspective of avenues made available for opposition of different kinds with time. 
The development of opposition in Europe (in relation to the processes of European Integration 
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and Enlargement) can be made sense of from a perspective based on Kirchheimer’s now widely 
quoted and famous essay about the „waning‟ of Opposition in Western Europe (1957). In it, 
Kirchheimer described various types of political opposition. The first one, defined as „classical‟ 
opposition, reflects a system where those who are not in government opposed and offered 
alternatives to the policies pursued by the government. The opposition accepts the constitutional 
order of the polity, it accepts the right of those in power to govern, and acts as a shadow (or 
potential) government which could itself find itself in power in the near future. What it opposes 
are the individual policies themselves. „Opposition of principle‟ on the other hand is referred to 
by Kirchheimer as being opposition to the polity itself. This opposition rejects the constitutional 
order „out of principle‟ and rejects the right of government to govern, in other words, it denies 
the legitimacy of the system of government, and does not wish to be a part of it. Anti-system 
opposition, or opposition of principle, is undermined when more scope is afforded to classical 
opposition. People are less likely to oppose a political system when they are afforded the 
alternatives to choose from within it (and the possibility to say yes or no to various elements and 
policies within that political system). When voters are able to express opposition to policies 
within the polity, or are offered an electoral choice that represents opposition, they are less likely 
to swayed by opposition to the polity. When the possibilities to organize classical opposition are 
limited, the likelihood grows that critics will mobilize around an opposition to the polity itself, 
out of principle, hence the name.  
In its incipient phases, the lack of real consistent opposition to European Integration 
(whole, or parts of it) enhanced the feeling of „elimination of opposition‟. The growing salience 
of Europe and the initial convergence of political parties in the middle of the political space 
created a growing niche for „opposition of principle‟. As the weight of the EU grew, as its reach 
into the domestic sphere extended into and impacted national politics, that too helped foster the 
sentiment of democratic deficit and implicitly the perception of limited possibilities for 
traditional opposition in relation to the apparent collusion of mainstream politics and lack of 
critical alternatives at the ballot box. Because of the lacking possibility for real opposition 
‘within the system’ – i.e. the mainstream parties -, the political niche was opened to opposition 
„to the system‟, which new political entrepreneurs are more than happy to exploit it in the wake 
of growing concerns about state sovereignty, integration, immigration and economic woes. Such 
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Eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs have also speculated64 the seeming lack of accountability of 
decision-making at the EU level, accountability which – as Gustavsson, Karlsson and Persson 
(2009, 171) have argued – has been of questionable strength. Cathernie De Vries (2007, 364) 
states that „European Integration has motored full speed ahead‟ with the expansion of the 
Union’s jurisdictional authority over a range of policies (from market integration and 
employment policy to immigration and the adoption of the single currency, Eastern Enlargement 
and the negotiation of a proposed „Constitution‟ for the entire bloc). At the same time, Loveless 
and Rohrschneider argue that: „at the core, the democratic deficit is founded on the idea that it is 
difficult for Europeans to care about a Union whose identity was for so long nebulous or at least 
limited, but which over time appears to increasingly impinge upon every aspect of their 
existence‟ (Loveless and Rohrschneider, 2008, 15). The development of EU has been 
characterized by long periods of absence of political conflict on questions of European 
Integration. More often than not, political contestation on the issue of Europe was muted, and 
traditionally there was basically little to no Eurosceptic option available to the voter unless she 
was prepared to go completely outside of the mainstream, an option that was rarely utilized for a 
variety of reasons.  
In the past, it was harder for populist parties to legitimize themselves, given that less time 
had passed since the 2nd world war. It was harder to vote „nationalist‟ and to justify voting for 
populists. The extreme right was discredited by the memory of the 1930’s and 40’s, and the left 
(to some degree) by the ongoing reality of the cold war. Arguably, the presence of external 
geopolitical threat helped gel the then members of the EEC together. Due to the outside threat, 
the permissive consensus was better legitimized. This helped „enshrine‟ the consensus, as it not 
only made politicians more amenable to consensus on the EEC, but the „people‟ more amenable 
to compromise on the existence and the workings of EU. As one moves further through time 
though, the safety cushion of cartelized mainstream politics eroded, and certain types of political 
actions or concepts underwent a change in their acceptability and interpretation, aided by certain 
exogenous developments. Firstly, memories of past years faded, the cold war (and communism 
as a perceived threat) fizzled out, nationalists distanced themselves from the World War, and 
ever larger populations of immigrants helped give a new lease on life to those parties promoting 
populist or nationalist stands. Time and historical change offered a new platform for those 
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promoting the nationalist ideas not as an expansionist message, but a more communitarian one, 
wishing to „conserve‟ the nation, its ethnic unity and its values. The losers of globalization saw 
transnationalism sap into their livelihood, supranational decision-making was presented as 
encroaching upon communities (Kriesi et al, 2008), and the new far right made the master stroke 
of promoting welfare-chauvinism (De Lange, 2007; Kitschelt, 2004, 1): protecting the welfare 
state and its social-democratic policies against immigration, foreigners, globalization, and its 
strongest expression: the EU. The re-legitimized fringe parties of the far right and far left now 
had the potential to offer a credible challenge and alternative to the mainstream that designed 
Europe as we know it. Increasing visibility and contestation of the integration process brought to 
light the discrepancy between voters and the voted on the desired speed of integration, and this 
perception of discrepancy perfectly plays into fringe parties’ populist ideology, whose core 
tenets likewise use the claim that ‘ordinary politicians don’t represent the people’. 
Cas Mudde (2004, 543) has referred to populism has to as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ and 
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonte generale”. Central to populist discourse is an ‘us versus 
them’ categorization of political forces and political relations. When the ‘them/they’ group is 
constituted and constructed to mean the political leadership of a country (the members of 
moderate political parties) and equated with elites, the charge is made that the group is 
unrepresentative and unresponsive to ‘the people’ (or worse, opposed to furthering the interests 
of the latter) and that the situation – the political landscape of the polity - must be rectified. 
When the members of grass-roots, fringe or radical parties brand themselves as being part of the 
‘us’, a collection of potential politicians un-tainted and corrupted by the ‘elitism’ of those in the 
political center, they are attempting to present themselves as being on the side of the people, the 
‘us’ in the struggle against the out-group of elites. 
 
Successful challengers 
 
Norris suggests (2005, 15) that the spatial spread of mainstream parties all across the ideological 
spectrum constrains the opportunities for the radical right or left to expand. It is in those 
countries where the major parties of the left and right converge in the moderate center of the 
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political spectrum, and where major parties failed to address the issues of race relations, 
immigration, and free market economics (that concern the electorate), that the most space is 
allowed for the radical right or left to maximize their support in. Such a policy space with a large 
open niche for policy entrepreneurs opened with ever growing Europeanization. 
Following the work of Hooghe and Marks (2009), and Meguid (2005), issue promotion is 
more often than not the territory of small parties or parties on the fringes of the political 
spectrum (most often, these go hand in hand). Hobolt and De Vries (2015) argue that the most 
likely issue entrepreneurs tend to be fringe and radical parties (while the mainstream – especially 
governing parties – are less mobile and innovative). These new political parties typically lie on 
the periphery of political party systems, often displaying more grass-roots characteristics than 
mainstream parties and offer an alternative policy position to the central parties EU position that 
was previously missing. Thus, they exploit the demand for opposition to Integration, for an 
alternative position previously missing. Moreover, parties on the fringes of the political spectrum 
have a strong interest in restructuring contestation to broaden their voter base, because their 
extreme position on the left/right dimension is likely to provide a low ceiling to their support 
base. As a result, these parties have an incentive to „find some alternative issue that that beats the 
winner. Problematizing European Integration and an attitude more skeptical of the EU offers 
them a weapon with which to punish the political mainstream for its lack of flexibility over 
Europe.  The sort of issues that parties on the extreme left and right can be expected to pick up 
would be those maximizing consistency with their ideological platforms, while at the same time 
minimizing positional distance to some untapped concern of the public. The EU issue shapes up 
nicely to be such an issue because Euroscepticism is ideologically consistent with these parties’ 
general scepticism of the economic and political status quo, and public opinion is generally more 
Eurosceptic than mainstream elites (Costello, Thomassen and Rosema 2012)  – a situation which 
Hooghe (2003) refers to as „Europe Divided‟. Thus, opposition to European Integration should 
enhance extremist parties‟ credibility, since it fits well with their existing ideological profile 
(although euroscepticism is not exclusively limited of the far right or far left), and taps into 
voters positions on the issue. The erosion of the permissive consensus (and other conditions) set 
the scene for these parties to capitalize on the situation, and capitalize they have. Eurosceptic 
parties have in various ways managed to surprise the establishment with their results at the ballot 
box, and with every passing election, surprise is slowly turning into panic. 
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The growing success of populist parties has not remained undocumented in the field of 
electoral politics. Pippa Norris (2005) offers a detailed account of why conditions have become 
so ripe in Western European polities to make possible the threat of Mudde’s Populist Zeitgeist 
(Mudde, 2004). Formulated in Downsian Parlance, the position of the mean voter is not static, 
but changes with time (sometimes more rapidly, sometimes more slowly for a variety of reasons. 
Such changes can be gradual, cumulative long term shifts, or induced by external shocks and 
changes in the political economic environment. Norris argues that the impact of globalization 
acts like such a ‘shock’ to public opinion, driving the rising demand for cultural or economic 
protectionism (Norris, 2005, 23). The rising salience of cultural protectionism, with its affiliates, 
globalization, immigration, etc has altered public agendas in various countries, across countries. 
It is developments such as these that inform theories like those of Marks and Wilson (2000) 
according to which the new concerns about Europeanization are assimilated by fringe parties 
‘worked on top and into’ the pre-existing political ecology. 
For Norris, (2005, 24), radical right parties have best responded to this change in public 
opinion by articulating concerns and supplying policies about cultural protectionism, thereby 
meeting public demand. Rydgren (2004, 475) argues that the new populist right has managed – 
in the wake of new fears induced by globalization, immigration and the likes, to promote a new 
‘master frame’ of issues which distinguished it from the old European right, and managed to 
draw voters away from more established parties. According to the author, this success was 
contingent and dependent on certain political opportunity structures provided by the political 
system in the form of catch-all party convergence. Facilitating demand side explanations for such 
changes in the electorate, one cannot discount the phenomena of partisan de-alignment and 
increasing political dissatisfaction, which make it easier to defect from the traditional mass 
parties. Survey evidence indicates a loosening of the lifelong bonds tying loyalists to mainstream 
parties in many established democracies (Norris, 2005, 13). The dynamics of party support have 
changed insofar as the electorate consists ever less of party partisans. Parties themselves, in their 
conversion to catch-all parties (see Katz and Mair, 1995) have relinquished their dependence on 
a certain core of devoted voters. In the process, everyone has become a potential voter for every 
party and a swing voter. These weakened ties of voters to certain particular parties have made it 
easier for voters to become dissatisfied with politicians, as they felt are no longer represented by 
them. Thus, the convergence of catch all parties, voter de-alignement and the depoliticized 
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architecture of EU integration helped reinforce one another and, under the auspices of 
globalization and discontent with it, offered fringe parties the targets required for populist 
discourse and attacks. 
 
A Changing Landscape 
 
At the beginning of the new millennium, Mark Franklin and Cees van der Eijk (2004) used the 
metaphor of a sleeping Giant to warn about the perils of Euroscepticism and the potential it had 
to disturb traditional European Politics.  It was said to be asleep because it had not yet been 
activated, and tapped in as a political force, it was not yet properly relevant to political 
competition. It was a giant because of the great potential power it harbored, to uproot and change 
politics in Europe – if awakened. The authors claimed that the distribution of voter preferences 
according on an alternative issue and dimension of political conflict does not overlap with that 
on the traditional, economic dimension of politics, but is instead orthogonal to it. The implication 
was that if elections were actually run the basis of such political conflicts and issue agendas, it 
could unearth the structure of politics in Europe as we know it. While many may deem such 
changes and evolution of Europe’s political landscape as unfortunate, some have not missed the 
opportunity to specify that Euroscepticism is in a sense part of the democratization of the EU (De 
Wilde and Trenz, 2012). According to them: “Euroscepticism points towards the emergence of 
elements of popular democracy in a system that is not fully reached or accessed by conventional 
procedures of representation“ (De Wilde and Trenz , 2012, 550). 
Opposition to regional integration is becoming a relevant political topic and position, the 
electorate and public are voting in accordance, moderate parties are losing their voters and power 
base while populist Eurosceptic parties are turning into a determining force of political 
competition. Hooghe and Marks’ (2009) Post-Functionalist Theory of European Integration has 
at its heart the idea the European Integration, the EU and European politics have entered a new 
(post functionalist, post economic) phase of political engagement and dynamics. According to 
their thesis, future conflict about European Integration will be no longer be determined by 
economic considerations, but by questions of identity (see also Borzel and Risse, 2008, Schmitter 
2009). In a rejoinder to Hooghe and Marks, Kriesi (2009) compares the former’s depiction of 
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identity as the basis for new political conflict to his own assessment of culture (the cultural 
dimension) as the catalyst for new political dynamics.  
Whether one refers to culture, identity, or some other concept that can be applied to to the 
contest, it is clear that European Politics has has entered an era where political parties have far 
less room to maneuver and are under more pressure with regards to their political message and 
actions towards Europe. These changes vis-à-vis support and opposition to European Integration 
are mirroring those described by the likes of H. Kriesi, Romain Lachat or Edgar Grande, when 
discussing political and social changes in Western Europe from a wider perspective. In a way, 
the entire problem of Eurosceptic Contagion can also be seen as a part/parcel of this wider 
perspective. In the view of Edgar Grande (2012), globalization has led to a ‘fundamental’ change 
of cleavage structures, parties and party systems in Western Europe. These changes occurred at 
several levels – at that of societal conflicts (their structure and conflict-determined political 
space), that of political parties, and even that of entire party systems and their respective 
competitive dynamics. While globalization has long been seen as a result and outcome of 
agency, of decision making, the phenomenon has now begun to transform the very basis of 
politics in Western Europe. For Lachat and Kriesi (2008b, 275), the basis for this change has 
been a transformation of political party competition “from an essentially economic to an 
increasingly culturally determined confrontation”. Globalization has fueled and set the basis for a 
new line of conflict whose characteristic, specific issues are with time picked up, used and 
articulated by various political parties. Cultural issues have become ever more relevant for 
explaining the structure of party positions, and such issues that materialize around problems of 
globalization (such as questions of European integration) become increasingly salient. These 
changes and transformations are said to reflect changes taking place in the structure and political 
attitudes within the electorate. These changes, the new line of conflict, are turning Europe’s 
political landscape into one that is moving away from the old one-dimensional (economic) one 
towards one that is multi-dimensional. The new, second dimension is one that Kriesi et al term 
‘the integration-demarcation’ dimension, and this line of conflict will – the authors argue- 
determine not only voters attitudes but also their voting choices.  This is the basis of the now 
famous ‘New Cleavage Hypothesis’, which states that the new Cleavage will cast a strong 
influence on European Politics from now on. This new political cleavage, this new political fault 
of conflict, which pits the supporters of globalization against those of re-nationalization and 
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those of integration against those of demarcation, is predicted to influence politics in Western 
Europe in the years to come. Looking at the current presidential race in the United States of 
America, we might have reasons to assume that the New Cleavage Hypothesis could even hold 
across the ocean. 
 The findings in this dissertation show that the alternative political dimension is already 
influencing politics in Europe in line with the above mentioned work referring to the 
multidimensionality of European Politics. The political establishment in Western Europe is 
forced to acknowledge the electorate’s fatigue and irritation the project of ever closer Union, and 
forced into political choices it was able to avoid until the present day. For better or worse, 
European Integration is now politicized. While the work referenced above describes the wider 
changes to those social cleavages that inform and influence politics in the Western world, this 
project focused instead on a narrower and more minute aspect of these changes in European 
Politics: how Eurosceptic policy position spread in Europe’s party system simply due to the 
rational vote-seeking logic followed by political parties. It focuses on the behavior of political 
parties and the factors that influence the manner in which they adjust and adapt to the challenge 
of Eurosceptic policy entrepreneurs. While work such as those of Kriesi et al paint the entire 
socio-political landscape, this study attempts to draw the portrait of some of the actors in that 
landscape and – in the process – explore their interactions and their behavior in the electoral 
contest. 
Given mainstream and moderate parties traditional attachment to European Integration, 
this dissertation also argues that while Eurosceptic contagion might be happening, while 
mainstream parties are indeed sliding in a Eurosceptic direction, the fact that such changes are 
not tactically instrumental gives advocates of European Integration some measure of hope. If 
moderate centrist parties adjust in such a way that steals the populists’ thunder and maintain 
enough public support to keep the latter locked out of power (which is no longer a definite given, 
considering the continent’s volatile political environment) we could see not a rollback of 
European Integration, just a stalling and halting of it. Even in such a scenario the near future 
might be a bumpy ride. In the introduction to this dissertation I brought up the bicycle metaphor 
often used for the European Union, based on the assumption that it must constantly progress in 
order to not fall. Progress is becoming immensely more difficult as present developments around 
us are showing. 
211 
 
 
An Invitation to Contemplation 
 
As a closing remark, and as an invitation to future research and contemplation, I would like to 
bring up the idea of the changing structure of inter-party conflict. Recent elections and election 
forecasts have given us many a reason to pause and think about the evolution of the political 
landscape in Europe and beyond. In a number of countries, political parties and actors that lay on 
the fringes of the political scene are mounting an ever growing challenge for the center stage of 
the electoral race. The causes are multiple and intertwined, ranging from voter dissatisfaction 
with the cartelization of politics, to the erosion of party-constituency ties, to growing 
apprehension about globalization. One of the consequences of said developments is the growing 
success of populist or fringe parties, and growing polarization of policy preferences within the 
landscape of public opinion. 
Consider Austria, where the most recent presidential election produced a run-off result so 
close that the country’s constitutional court has decided that the second round of the election 
must be repeated. While this in itself might seem news-worthy and enough to attract attention to 
a national political scene that rarely makes the world headlines, it is not the most interesting or 
noteworthy aspect surrounding it. More important perhaps is the fact that neither of the two 
candidates come from one of the two main, established parties of Austrian politics (the 
candidates of the SPÖ and the ÖVP came 4th and 5th respectively). Not only was there a poor 
showing by the historical Volksparteien, but the two candidates that made it to the second round 
represent what is arguably the poles of the political landscape: Norbert Hofer of the right-wing 
Austrian Freedom Party and Alexander Van der Bellen, nominally an independent candidate but 
actually a member of the Green Party. 
The landscape of public opinion and political preferences has become such that voters are 
abandoning the political center for the fringes of the political spectrum. This phenomenon is not 
isolated. It is instead part and parcel of a larger wave of political discontent with mainstream 
politics combined with an apparent polarization of public opinion and political preferences 
(especially/more so along the lines of alternative political dimensions). This manifests itself as 
growing voter defections whereby individuals are taking their all precious vote either to a 
resurging populist far right that espouses communitarian, conservative, anti-immigrant, anti-
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globalization as a political message, or a left wing scene (often populist as well) that combines a 
traditional focus on social equity and redistribution with progressive positions on immigration, 
environment, bottom-up decision making.  
While Austria might be a particularly expressive example of this phenomenon (because 
the second round run-off forces candidates out of the race and both remaining candidates were 
interestingly ‘fringe’ candidates), such tendencies can be detected in many other western polities. 
A process of a somewhat similar flavor is animating German politics, where current forecasts 
predict that the coming legislative elections will see significant losses by both the CDU as well 
as the SPD, with the AfD and the Green Party gaining at their expense. Opinion polarization has 
been galvanized by issues such as the Euro crisis and the recent refugee crisis, with political 
actors and segments of society taking sides on a cleavage defined seemingly ever more by a 
cosmopolitan-nativist (pro/anti – immigration, refugees, EU) divide where the AfD stands at one 
pole and more progressive, left-leaning forces (The Greens, Die Linke) at the other. 
In the USA, among the last three persons vying for nomination as presidential candidates 
(D. Trump having already secured Republican nomination and B. Sanders and H. Clinton 
fighting over the Democratic one) one advocated policy views often decried as far-right populist, 
while another ran on a populist left-wing platform. Both presented the idea of ‘turning away’ 
from mainstream politics in a break with the past and the political establishment. In Great 
Britain, UKIP has not only mobilized the issue of European Integration and forced debate about 
it to the very center of the political agenda, it has managed to achieve and accomplish its raison 
d’etre: the United Kingdom has voted to leave the European Union. At the same time, the two 
main political parties (reflecting developments across the ocean) are forced to put up with 
internal tensions that reflect wider voter apprehension with mainstream politics. The main 
center-left party is rebelling against its leader whom some deem to be too far to the left (but 
appears to have the backing of the masses), while on the center-right the Torries are struggling to 
balance the competing demands of moderation and opposition to integration. 
In Southern Europe, the relative strength and influence of the far right and the more 
progressive far left is somewhat reversed compared to the rest of the continent, with right wing 
populism being the weaker pole. The Lega Nord in Italy was for a long time the country’s 
‘flagship’ Eurosceptic party and its leader, Umberto Bossi, was perhaps the face of Italian 
Euroscepticism until Giuseppe Grillo initiated the Five Star Movement. While being a populist, 
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anti-establishment, anti-EU party, the latter is also characterized by a focus on sustainability, 
environmentalism, and grass-roots orientation (the party is sometimes even referred to as an ‘e-
party’). While the Lega Nord has maintained its position and supporters on the far right of Italian 
politics, the Five Star Movement has been a juggernought in Italian politics drawing large 
numbers of voters from other parties – only a few years after its birth, it has become the largest 
opposition party in Italy, and the second largest behind the social-democratic PD (the PD itself 
resulted after a series of mergers by various smaller center-left parties). 
In Greece, the social fallout of the Euro crisis and the election of Alexis Tsipras has 
produced a situation that is simultaneously a tragedy and fairy tale of socialism and the far left in 
Europe. Syriza’s left wing leader became Prime Minister in the economically embattled country, 
but the political scene there has had to contend with populist forces from the other edge of the 
ideological landscape as well: right wing parties such as Golden Dawn and The Independent 
Greeks have contributed to the sap in support for traditional, more established parties. Spain 
seems to have been spared the fight with right-wing populism. While the left-wing anti-
establishment Unidos Podemos has managed to become the third best represented party behind 
the established PP and PSOE, the other party that is attracting voters at the expense of other, 
traditional, political actors is the moderate Ciudadanos. 
These are just some examples from Europe’s (and beyond) more important national 
political arenas, where the ideological center is losing to both the right and the left. Historically, 
the structure of political conflict and the shape of political parties has often also been a function 
of wider societal political change. From Weltanschaungsparteien to the Mass Party in the era of 
expanding enfranchisement, and from Kirchheimer’s Catch-all Party to the Cartelization of 
Parties in more recent times, the nature of the contest between parties has been a function of the 
changing landscape of constituencies and dynamics of public opinion. Western polities are 
increasingly characterized by the simultaneous weakening of party ties, discontent with 
traditional politics and the growing gap between supporters and opponents of globalization, 
integration, denationalization. The main conclusion, or take-away of this project is that as 
Eurosceptic parties grow successful enough, the other parties will move to copy, at least to some 
degree, elements of their discourse or policy positions. It is further implied that while this might 
slow down the process of Integration, it will not reverse it, provided that mainstream, Europhile 
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parties manage to remain at the healm of political decision making and keep Eurosceptic parties 
out of power. That however is no certainty in the present environment of European Politics. 
 A set of questions springs from this set of circumstances. If current trends of political 
defection from historical political parties to alternative, less established parties continue; and if 
the trends of defection continue to be multi-directional (in other words, if voters move towards 
political entrepreneurs on both the right and left wing, resulting in voter distributions that are 
ever less bell-shaped and ever more flat), what consequences might this hold for electoral 
politics and inter-party competition in the near and mid term future? Is this a mere temporary 
weakening of large center parties, or a more lasting effect? If current polarization and 
divisiveness over cultural and ‘vertical’/non-economic policy issues remain (or grow) what will 
that mean for the future of catch-all politics in ‘the West’? Moreover, if the foreseeable future 
will be characterized by ever stronger alternative fringe parties and ever weaker mainstream, 
centrist parties, is there any base on which to talk about a new era of party politics? One of 
ideological-families’ style contagion and adaptation where the center left and center right are 
ever more drawn apart by their respective fringe neighbors? Or one where moderate parties 
converge even more towards the center (increasing cartelization) and fringe parties populate an 
ever larger space? One where increased divisiveness between the proponents and opponents of 
globalization, integration and supranational governance reduce the possibility space for consent 
and compromise, or one where grass-roots, partisan politics and populism on both sides of the 
political spectrum generates a reversal of political cartelization and professionalization? All this 
is, of course, mere postulation at best and speculation at worst, but it is undoubted that Western 
politics are undergoing certain transformations with regards to the parameters (issue agenda, 
trends in party support) of political competition that could provide interesting avenues of future 
research. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that their party systems and the nature of 
political party competition in Europe might also undergo significant changes.  
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Appendix 1 – The temporal structure of the dataset 
 
Belgium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1981 - 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 - 1991 1988 – 1992 
1991 -1995 1992 – 1996 
1995 - 1999 1996 – 1999 
No Election between 99 and 
02 
1999 – 2002 – Cases 
Dropped 
1999 - 2003 2002 -2006 
2007 - 2010 2006 – 2010 
2010 - 2014 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1984 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1988 – 1990 1988 – 1992 
1990 – 1994 1992 – 1996 
1994 – 1998 1996 – 1999 
1998 – 2001 1999 – 2002 
2001 – 2005 2002 -2006 
 
2005 – 2007 2006 – 2010 
2007 - 2011 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1990 1988 – 1992 
1990 – 1994 1992 – 1996 
1994 – 1998 1996 – 1999 
1998 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
2002 – 2005 2002 -2006 
 
2005 – 2009 2006 – 2010 
2009 – 2013 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1981 – 1985 1984 - 1988 
1985 – 1990 1988 – 1992 
1990 – 1993 1992 – 1996 
1993 – 1996 1996 – 1999 
1996 – 2000 1999 – 2002 
227 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ireland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
2000 – 2004 2002 -2006 
2004 – 2009 2006 – 2010 
2009 - 2012 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1982 – 1996 1984 - 1988 
1986 - 1989 1988 – 1992 
1989 – 1993 1992 – 1996 
1993 -1996 1996 – 1999 
1996 - 2000 1999 – 2002 
 
2000 - 2004 2002 - 2006 
2004 – 2008 2006 – 2010 
2008 - 2011 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1981 – 1986 1984 - 1988 
1986 – 1988 1988 – 1992 
1988 – 1993 1992 – 1996 
1993 – 1997 1996 – 1999 
1997 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
No election between 02 and 
06 
2002 - 2006 – Cases 
Dropped 
2002 – 2007 2006 – 2010 
2007 – 2012 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1982 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1989 1988 – 1992 
1989 – 1992 1992 – 1996 
1992 – 1997 1996 – 1999 
1997 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
No election between 02 and 
06 
2002 – 2006 – Cases 
Dropped 
2002 – 2007 2006 – 2010 
2007 – 2011 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1992 1988 – 1992 
1992 – 1994 1992 – 1996 
1994 – 1996 1996 – 1999 
1996 – 2001 1999 – 2002 
228 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Austria 
2001 – 2006 2002 -2006 
2006 – 2008 2006 – 2010 
2008 - 2013 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1982 – 1986 1984 - 1988 
1986 – 1989 1988 – 1992 
1989 – 1994 1992 – 1996 
1994 – 1998 1996 – 1999 
1998 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
 
2002 – 2006 2002 -2006 
2006 – 2010 2006 – 2010 
2010 - 2012 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1992 1988 – 1992 
No election between 92 and 
96 
1992 – 1996 – Cases 
Dropped 
1992 – 1997 1996 – 1999 
1997 – 2001 1999 – 2002 
2001 – 2005 2002 -2006 
2005 – 2010 2006 – 2010 
No election between 2010 
and 2014 
2010 – 2014 – Cases 
Dropped 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1991 1988 – 1992 
1991 – 1995 1992 – 1996 
1995 – 1999 1996 – 1999 
1999 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
2002 – 2005 2002 -2006 
2005 – 2009 2006 – 2010 
2009 - 2011 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1986 1984 - 1988 
1986 – 1990 1988 – 1992 
1990 – 1995 1992 – 1996 
1995 – 1999 1996 – 1999 
229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
2002 – 2006 2002 -2006 
2006 -2008 2006 – 2010 
2008 – 2013 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1983 – 1987 1984 - 1988 
1987 – 1991 1988 – 1992 
1991 – 1995 1992 – 1996 
1995 – 1999 1996 – 1999 
No election between 99 and 
02 
1999 – 2002 – Cases 
Dropped 
1999 – 2003 2002 -2006 
2003 – 2007 2006 – 2010 
2007 – 2011 2010 - 2014 
Election results between _ 
and _ 
Affect party positions 
between CHES waves 
1982 – 1988 1984 - 1988 
1988 – 1991 1988 – 1992 
1991 – 1994 
 
1992 – 1996 
1994 -1998 1996 – 1999 
1998 – 2002 1999 – 2002 
2002 -2006 2002 -2006 
2006 – 2010 2006 – 2010 
2010 - 2014 2010 – 2014 
 
230 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
List of Parties 
The following list contains three categories/types of parties for every country:   1) The ‘normal’ parties, pro-EU or 
EU-neutral parties whose changes in position is measured as the dependent variable (ergo the left side of the 
equation). 2) Eurosceptic Parties – those parties whose (changes in) election results provide the values of the 
independent variable (ergo the right side of the equation). 3) Parties that are dropped from the analysis because they 
do not feature in the Expert Survey in consecutive years – these parties did not run in consecutive elections or were 
not deemed important enough by the survey administrators to be included in the original datasets. 
 
Belgium 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party 
SP; SPA Socialistische Partij; Socialist Party; Socialistische Partij Anders-Spirit Socialist Party Different-Spirit 
ECOLO Ecolo Ecolo 
AGALEV; Groen Agalev; Groen! Agalev; Green! 
PRL; MR Parti Réformateur Libéral; Liberal Reformist Party; Mouvement Réformateur Reformist Movement 
VLD Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten Flemish Liberals and Democrats 
PSC; CDH Parti Social Chrétien; Christian Social Party; Centre Démocrate Humaniste Humanist Democratic Centre 
CVP; CD&V Christelijke Volkspartij; Christian People’s Party; Christen-Democratisch & Vlaams Christian 
Democratic & Flemish 
VU; NVA Volksunie; Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie People’s Union; New Flemish Alliance 
FDF/RW Front Démocratique des Francophones Francophone Democratic Front 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
VB Vlaams Block; Vlaams Belang Flemish Bloc; Flemish Interest 
FN Front National National Front 
LDD Lijst DeDecker List Dedecker 
PVDA Partij van de Arbeid in Belgie Workers Party of Belgium 
NA Communist Party PCB/KP  
PP Parti Populaire People’s Party 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
MCC Mouvement des Citoyens pour le Changement Citizens’ Movement for Change 
ID21 ID21 
SLP Sociaal-Liberale Partij Social-Liberal Party 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
SD Socialdemokraterne Social Democrats 
RV Det Radikale Venstre Radical Left-Social Liberal Party 
KF Konservative Folksparti Conservative People’s Party 
CD Centrum-Demokraterne Centre Democrats 
KRF Kristeligt Folkeparti Christian People’s Party 
V Venstre, Danmarks Liberale Parti Venstre, Liberal Party of Denmark 
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LA Liberal Alliance Liberal Alliance (in 14) 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
SF Socialistisk Folkeparti Socialist People’s Party (until 02) 
FP Fremskridtspartiet Progress Party 
EL Enhedslisten Unity List-Red/Green Alliance 
DF Dansk Folkeparti Danish People’s Party 
JuniB Junibevaegnelsen June Movement 
FolkB Folkebevægelsen mod EU People’s Movement Against the EU 
Justice Party RF 
Greens GRONN  
Danish Communist Party DKP  
Common Course FK 
Left Socialist Party VS 
 
 
 
Germany 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
CDU Christlich Demokratische Union Christian Democratic Union 
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Social Democratic Party of Germany 
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei Free Democratic Party 
Grünen Bündnis ’90/Die Grünen Alliance 90/The Greens 
CSU Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern Christian Social Union in Bavaria 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
REP Republikaner Republikaner 
PDS; Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus; Party of Democratic Socialism; Linkspartei/PDS Die Linkspartei/ 
Left Party/ Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus Party of Democratic Socialism 
DVU Deutsche Volksunion German People’s Union 
German Communist Party KPD 
AfD Alternative für Deutschland Alternative for Germany  
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
Piraten Piratenpartei Deutschland Pirate Party of Germany  
DieTier Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz Human Environment Animal Protection 
 
 
 
Greece 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
PASOK Panellinio Sosialistikó Kínima Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
ND Néa Dimokratía New Democracy 
POLA Politiki Anixi Political Spring 
Democratic Renewal DIANA/DA  
Ecologist-Alternatives EA  
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
SYN; SYRIZA Synaspismós tïs Aristerás kai tïs Proódou; Coalition of the Left and Progress; Synaspismó’s 
Rizospastikís Aristerás Coalition of the Radical Left (Until 2010) 
DIKKI Dimokratiko Kinoniko Kinima Democratic Social Movement (after 1996) 
KKE Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas Communist Party of Greece 
LAOS Laïkós Orthódoxos Synagermós Popular Orthodox Rally 
NA New Left Current NAP 
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ANEL Anexartitoi Ellines Independent Greeks  
XA Laïkós Sýndesmos—Chrysí Avgí Popular Association—Golden Dawn 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
Potami To Potami The River  
DIMAR Dimokratiki Aristera Democratic Left  
OP Oikologoi Prasinoi Ecologist Greens 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero EspaÃśol Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party 
PP Partido Popular People’s Party 
CiU Convergència i Unió Convergence and Unity 
PNV Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/ Partido Nacionalista Vasco Basque Nationalist Party 
EA Eusko Alkartasuna Basque Solidarity 
PAR Partido Aragonés Aragonese Party 
ERC Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Republican Left of Catalonia 
UV Unión Valenciana Valencian Union 
BNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego Galician Nationalist Bloc 
VERDE Los Verdes The Greens 
VE Green party 
PA Partido Andalucista Andalusian Party 
CC Coalicion Canaria Coalicion Canaria 
CHA Chunta Aragonesista Aragonese Council  
UPD Union Progreso y Democracia Union, Progress, and Democracy 
Centre Democrats CDS, CDS/UC 
Basque Left EE, PSE-EE 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
IU Izquierda Unida United Left     
EH Euskal Herritarrok We Basque Citizens 
Podemos Podemos We Can  
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
IC Iniciativa per Catalunya Initiative for Catalonia 
PSC Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya Catalan Socialist Party 
CpE Coalicion por Europa Coalition for Europe 
EdP-V Europa de los Pueblos-Los Verdes Europe of the Peoples-Greens 
Amaiur Amaiur Amaiur  
Cs Ciudadanos—Partido de la Ciudadanía Citizens—Party of the Citizenry 
 
 
 
France 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
PS Parti Socialiste Socialist Party 
PRG Parti Radical de Gauche Left Radical Party 
VERTS Les Verts Green Party 
RPR; UMP Rassemblement pour la République; Rally for the Republic; Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 
Union for Popular Movement 
UDF Union pour la Démocracie FranÃğaise Union for French Democracy 
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NA Ecology Generation GECOLO 
DL Démocratie Libérale Liberal Democracy  
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
PCF Parti Communiste FranÃğais French Communist Party  
FN Front National National Front 
RPF/MPF; MPF Rassemblement pour la France/Mouvement Pour la France; Rally for France/Movement for France; 
Mouvement Pour la France Movement for France 
LO-LCR Lutte Ouvrière/Ligue communiste révolutionnaire Workers Fight/Revolutionary 
Communist League 
CPNT Chasse, Pêche, Nature, Traditions Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition Party 
MN Mouvement National Républicain National Republican Movement 
PG Parti de Gauche Left Party  
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
MEI Mouvement Ecologiste Indépendant Independent Ecological Movement 
D La Droite The Right 
Unified Socialist Party PSU 
NC Nouveau Centre New Center  
PRV Parti radical Radical Party  
AC Alliance centriste Centrist Alliance  
Ens Ensemble Together 
 
 
 
 
Ireland 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
FF Fianna Fail Soldiers of Destiny 
FG Fine Gael Family of the Irish 
Lab Labour Labour 
PD Progressive Democrats Progressive Democrats 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
GP Green Party Green Party (until 06) 
SP Socialist Party Socialist Party (until 92, in 96 moderate) 
SF Sinn Fein We Ourselves 
Workers’ Party WP 
PBPA People Before Profit Alliance People Before Profit Alliance 
Christian Solidarity 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
Democratic Left DLP  
101 Socialist Party SP 
 
 
 
 
Italy 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
PDS; DS Partito Democratico della Sinistra; Democratic Party of the Left; 
Democratici di Sinistra Democrats of the Left 
PSDI; SDI Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano; Italian Democratic Socialist Party; 
Socialisti Democratici Italiani Italian Democratic Socialists 
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Verdi Federazione dei Verdi Federation of Greens 
PRI Partito Repubblicano Italiano Italian Republican Party 
RAD Radicali Italiani Italian Radicals 
CCD; UDC Centro Cristiano Democratico; Unione dei Democratici Christian Democratic Center; 
Cristiani e die Democratici di Centro Union of Christian and Center Democrats 
FI Forza Italia Forward Italy 
CU/UD Unione Democratica Democratic Union 
CDU Cristiani Democratici Uniti United Christian Democrats 
DEM; DL I Democratici; Democrazia è Libertà-La Margherita The Democrats; Democracy is Freedom— 
The Daisy  
PPI Partito Popolare Italiano Italian Popular Party 
RI Rinnovamento Italiano Italian Renewal-Dini List 
SVP Südtiroler Volkspartei South Tyrolean People’s Party 
IdV Di Pietro-Italia dei Valori Italy of Values 
UDEUR Popolari-UDEUR Popular-UDEUR 
PD Partido Democratico Democratic Party  
Christian Democrats/ Popular Party DC/PP 
Italian Socialist Party PSI 
Italian Liberal Party PLI 
Network/Movement for Democracy RETE 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
LN Lega Nord Northern League (from 1999) moderate until 96 
RC Rifondazione Comunista Communist Refoundation Party 
AN Alleanza Nazionale National Alliance MSI-DN/AN (until 06) Moderate in 10 
MS Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore Tricolor Flame Social Movement 
PdCI Partito dei Comunisti Italiani Party of Italian Communists 
FDL Fratelli d’Italia Brothers of Italy  
M5S MoVimento Cinque Stelle Five Star Movement  
Proletarian Democracy DP (until 88) DP 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
LB Lista Bonino Bonino List 
PdUP Partito di UnitÃă Proletaria Party of Proletarian Unity for Communism 
PsDA Partito Sardo d’Azione Sardinian Action Party 
SEG Patto Segni Segni Pact 
PP Partito dei Pensionati Pensioners’ Party 
MRE Movimento Repubblicani Europei European Republican Movement 
NPSI Nuovo Partito Socialista Italiano New Italian Socialist Party 
SL Sinistra e Liberta Left and Freedom 
PSI Partito Socialista Italiano Italian Socialist Party 
MpA Movimento per le Autonomie Movement for Autonomies 
PCI Partito dei Comunisti Italian Italian Communist Party 
SD Sinistra Democratica Democratic Left 
CD Centro Democratico—Diritti e Libertá Democratic Centre  
SC Scelta Civica Civic Choice  
VdA Vallée d’Aoste Aosta Valley  
NCD Nuovo Centrodestra New Centre-Right 
 
 
 
Netherlands 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appel Christian Democratic Appeal 
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party 
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VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy 
D66 Democraten 66 Democrats 66 
GL Groen Links Green Left 
CU Christen Unie Christian Union 
PvdD Partij voor de Dieren Party for the Animals 
Radical Political Party PPR  
Evangelist People’s Party EVP 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Political Reformed Party (until 99 and again in 14) 
GPV Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond Reformed Political League 
RPF Reformatorische Politieke Federatie Reformational Political Federation 
CD Centrum Democraten Center Democrats 
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party 
LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Party for Freedom 
SGP Sttatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Reformed Political Party 
Pacifist Socialist Party PSP  
Dutch Communist Party CPN  
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
50PLUS 50PLUS  
 
 
 
 
 
UK 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
Cons Conservative Party Conservative Party 
Lab Labour Party Labour Party 
LibDems Liberal Democratic Party Liberal Democratic Party 
SNP Scottish National Party Scottish National Party 
Plaid Plaid Cymru Party of Wales 
Soc.-Democratic Labour Party (N.IRL) SDLP 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
Greens Green Party Green Party (Until 1996) 
UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party United Kingdom Independence Party 
BNP British National Party British National Party 
Referendum Party 
Socialist Labor Party 
Scottish Socialist Party 
Socialist Alliance 
Democratic Unionist Party 
 
 
 
Portugal 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
CDS/PP Centro Democrático e Social/ Partido Popular Democratic and Social Center/People’s Party 
PS Partido Socialista Socialist Party 
PPD/PSD Partido Popular Democrático/ Democratic People’s Party/ Partido Social Democrata Social Democratic 
Party 
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Popular Monarchist Party PPM  
Democratic Renewal Party PRD 
National Solidarity Party PSN 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
CDU Coligação Democrática Unitária Unitarian Democratic Coalition  
BE Bloco de Esquerda Left Bloc (Not in 06 and 10) 
Portuguese Communist Party PCP 
Popular Democratic Union UDP  
Democratic Movement of Portugal MDP  
Ecologists ‘os Verdes’ PEV (until 92) after that moderate 
National Renovator Party 
New Democracy Party 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
Party of Christian-Democracy PDC  
MPT Partido da Terra Earth Party 
 
 
 
Austria 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
SPÖ Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs Social Democratic Party of Austria 
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei Austrian People’s Party 
LIF Liberales Forum Liberal Forum 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Freedom Party of Austria (Starting 96) 
Grüne Die Grünen The Austrian Green Party (until 1996) 
BZÖ Bündnis Zukunft Österreich Alliance for the Future of Austria 
MARTIN Liste Dr. Hans-Peter Martin Hans-Peter Martin’s List 
Austrian Communist Party KPO 
TeamStronach Team Stronach für Österreich Team Stronach for Austria 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
NEOS NEOS—Das Neue Österreich NEOS—The New Austria  
 
 
 
 
Finland 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
 
SDP Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Social Democratic Party of Finland 
KOK Kansallinen Kokoomus National Coalition Party 
KESK Suomen Keskusta Finnish Center Party 
RKP/SFP Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue/ Svenska folkpartiet Swedish People’s Party 
VIHR Vihreät De GrÖna Green League 
Liberal People’s Party LKP  
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
SKL; KD Suomen Kristillinen Liitto; Kristillisdemokraatit Finish Christian League; Christian Democrats (until 99) 
after 1999 moderate 
VAS Vasemmistoliitto Left Alliance (until 1992)  
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PS Persussuomalaiset True Finns (SMP) 
EKA Eläkeläiset Kansan Asialla Pensioners for the People  
KIPU Kirjava “puolue” - Elonkehän puolesta Ecological Party 
Democratic Alternative DA 
Alliance for free Finland 
 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
REM Remonttiryhmä Reform Group 
 
 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Europhile and Euromoderate Parties (Left side of the equation) 
SAP Arbetarpartiet- Socialdemokraterna Worker’s Party-Social Democrats 
C Centerpartiet Center Party 
FP Folkpartiet liberalerna Liberal People’s Party 
M Moderaterna Moderate Party 
KD Kristdemokraterna Christian-Democrats 
NyD Ny Demokrati New Democracy 
PIRAT Piratpartiet Pirate Party 
 
Eurosceptic Parties (Right side of the equation) 
V Vänsterpartiet Left Party  
MP Miljoepartiet de Groena Environmental Party the Greens (until 2006) after 06 moderate 
JL Junilistan June List 
SD Sverigedemokraterna Sweden Democrats 
 
Parties in the dataset but not used by the analysis 
FI Feministiskt initiativ Feminist Initative 
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Appendix 3 – Extended Regression Tables 
 
 
Table 1 – the Radical Party Hypothesis, first Analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02**    
 (0.007)    
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.01   
  (0.009)   
Votechange_All_ES_Parties   -0.02**  
   (0.006)  
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties   0.03 0.05 
   (0.042) (0.045) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties   -0.04 -0.02 
   (0.088) (0.087) 
Totalvotes_All_ES_Parties    -0.00 
    (0.008) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.06   
 (0.043) (0.042)   
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.01   
 (0.086) (0.088)   
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.13* 0.15** 0.13* 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01** 0.01 0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
2.country 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.20 
 (0.166) (0.172) (0.163) (0.180) 
3.country -0.09 -0.10 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.117) (0.130) (0.115) (0.134) 
4.country -0.24 -0.19 -0.22 -0.19 
 (0.278) (0.300) (0.282) (0.300) 
5.country -0.17 -0.23 -0.14 -0.20 
 (0.207) (0.211) (0.193) (0.194) 
6.country 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.07 
 (0.177) (0.188) (0.182) (0.202) 
7.country 0.27 0.24 0.28 0.27 
 (0.173) (0.181) (0.185) (0.188) 
8.country 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.109) (0.117) 
10.country 0.32* 0.35* 0.32* 0.35* 
 (0.136) (0.153) (0.131) (0.170) 
11.country -0.15 -0.21 -0.14 -0.17 
 (0.222) (0.244) (0.213) (0.248) 
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12.country 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.04 
 (0.198) (0.203) (0.195) (0.205) 
13.country -0.07 0.17 -0.05 0.11 
 (0.235) (0.256) (0.222) (0.254) 
14.country 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.16 
 (0.214) (0.242) (0.224) (0.264) 
16.country 0.36 0.41* 0.36* 0.42* 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.180) (0.201) 
Constant 0.73 0.64 0.78 0.69 
 (0.672) (0.669) (0.611) (0.603) 
     
Observations 527 533 527 533 
R-squared 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.14 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.10 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table 2: Radical Party Hypothesis, 2nd analysis 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*  
 (0.009)  
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.00  
 (0.011)  
Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.02* 
  (0.008) 
Totalvotes_All_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.009) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.04 
  (0.046) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  -0.04 
  (0.085) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04  
 (0.043)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03  
 (0.088)  
Time -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.005) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.054) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
2.country 0.10 0.09 
 (0.169) (0.177) 
3.country -0.09 -0.02 
 (0.115) (0.112) 
4.country -0.25 -0.23 
 (0.287) (0.274) 
5.country -0.17 -0.15 
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 (0.204) (0.191) 
6.country 0.03 -0.04 
 (0.179) (0.187) 
7.country 0.27 0.27 
 (0.176) (0.183) 
8.country 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.112) (0.108) 
10.country 0.33* 0.28 
 (0.138) (0.152) 
11.country -0.18 -0.10 
 (0.228) (0.222) 
12.country 0.00 0.01 
 (0.198) (0.195) 
13.country -0.05 -0.09 
 (0.261) (0.242) 
14.country 0.15 0.14 
 (0.232) (0.235) 
16.country 0.36 0.36 
 (0.184) (0.183) 
Constant 0.76 0.69 
 (0.641) (0.564) 
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 3 – The Alternative Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Change_Position_on_EU 0.24 -0.27 0.07 -0.31 
 (0.407) (0.514) (0.773) (1.018) 
leadextremeness_biggestES -0.83**  -1.27  
 (0.276)  (1.232)  
leadsalience_biggestES -0.20  -0.62  
 (0.391)  (1.326)  
leadextremeness_allES  -1.20**  -1.36 
  (0.368)  (1.141) 
leadsalience_allES  0.06  0.26 
  (0.508)  (1.328) 
Time 0.25 0.30* 0.26 0.24 
 (0.127) (0.153) (0.307) (0.354) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU 0.03 0.07** 0.10 0.15 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.085) (0.107) 
unemployment 0.17** 0.18* 0.17 0.26 
 (0.063) (0.079) (0.222) (0.290) 
2.country   1.42 -0.64 
   (2.706) (2.927) 
3.country   3.08 3.45 
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   (2.472) (2.553) 
4.country   -1.26 0.44 
   (2.861) (3.603) 
5.country   2.57 1.12 
   (3.916) (3.443) 
6.country   1.39 1.59 
   (3.086) (3.635) 
7.country   -0.29 -0.91 
   (2.678) (3.037) 
8.country   1.22 1.27 
   (3.660) (4.120) 
10.country   0.07 1.44 
   (3.641) (3.795) 
11.country   3.23 3.72 
   (3.006) (3.881) 
12.country   0.32 -0.18 
   (2.197) (2.333) 
13.country   2.61 5.20 
   (4.888) (5.814) 
14.country   4.89 3.70 
   (4.958) (5.290) 
16.country   3.46 4.09 
   (3.136) (3.755) 
Constant -0.79 -3.17 -3.90 -9.88 
 (2.326) (2.818) (10.290) (11.085) 
     
Observations 421 421 421 421 
R-squared 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.11 
Adj. R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
Table 4 – Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral Threshold 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold 0.11 0.30 
 (0.575) (0.527) 
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.02* 
  (0.009) 
Totalvotes_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.12 -0.30 
 (0.578) (0.529) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.06 0.04 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.090) (0.090) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.028) (0.027) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* 
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 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.06*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.13* 0.15** 
 (0.056) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01** 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
2.country -0.19 -0.81 
 (1.739) (1.583) 
3.country -0.11 -0.10 
 (0.138) (0.121) 
4.country -0.41 -0.85 
 (1.237) (1.118) 
5.country -0.44 -0.77 
 (1.226) (1.118) 
6.country -0.45 -1.47 
 (2.878) (2.630) 
7.country -0.31 -1.24 
 (2.981) (2.721) 
8.country -0.11 -0.30 
 (0.648) (0.585) 
10.country -0.13 -1.00 
 (2.625) (2.399) 
11.country -0.76 -1.68 
 (2.867) (2.615) 
12.country -0.52 -1.50 
 (2.938) (2.691) 
13.country 0.06 -0.36 
 (0.593) (0.559) 
14.country -0.40 -1.35 
 (2.938) (2.676) 
16.country 0.30 0.05 
 (0.729) (0.668) 
Constant 1.19 2.29 
 (2.792) (2.574) 
   
Observations 533 527 
R-squared 0.15 0.16 
Adj. R-squared 0.11 0.12 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 5 – The Circumstances of Electoral Contagion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.01 -0.04 0.03 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.036) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) 
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Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.00   
 (0.003)   
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  0.01  
  (0.008)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP   -0.01 
   (0.010) 
2.country 0.12 0.10 0.10 
 (0.174) (0.166) (0.171) 
3.country -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.123) 
4.country -0.23 -0.20 -0.21 
 (0.279) (0.269) (0.283) 
5.country -0.18 -0.17 -0.15 
 (0.203) (0.208) (0.211) 
6.country 0.07 0.04 0.04 
 (0.196) (0.180) (0.189) 
7.country 0.29 0.27 0.28 
 (0.171) (0.171) (0.179) 
8.country 0.02 0.03 0.02 
 (0.116) (0.111) (0.117) 
10.country 0.33* 0.29* 0.32* 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.137) 
11.country -0.11 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.227) (0.219) (0.225) 
12.country 0.03 0.00 0.02 
 (0.196) (0.195) (0.201) 
13.country -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 
 (0.235) (0.234) (0.243) 
14.country 0.24 0.18 0.20 
 (0.247) (0.214) (0.226) 
16.country 0.41* 0.38* 0.37 
 (0.186) (0.192) (0.195) 
Constant 0.60 0.66 0.70 
 (0.683) (0.681) (0.669) 
    
Observations 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
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Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 6 – The Circumstances of Electoral Contagion (B) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.01 -0.03 0.03 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.039) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.04 0.03 0.03 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Time*Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.00   
 (0.003)   
2.country 0.14 0.12 0.11 
 (0.172) (0.162) (0.166) 
3.country -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.123) 
4.country -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 
 (0.283) (0.277) (0.280) 
5.country -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 
 (0.192) (0.195) (0.196) 
6.country 0.02 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.183) (0.184) (0.184) 
7.country 0.29 0.28 0.28 
 (0.183) (0.183) (0.185) 
8.country 0.01 0.03 -0.03 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.114) 
10.country 0.33* 0.30* 0.30* 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.134) 
11.country -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 
 (0.221) (0.212) (0.219) 
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12.country 0.02 0.01 0.00 
 (0.196) (0.194) (0.197) 
13.country -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.226) (0.220) (0.227) 
14.country 0.16 0.13 0.14 
 (0.244) (0.225) (0.231) 
16.country 0.37* 0.36* 0.33 
 (0.175) (0.178) (0.195) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.01  
  (0.008)  
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties*Votechange_All_ES_Parties   -0.01 
   (0.011) 
Constant 0.75 0.77 0.75 
 (0.632) (0.607) (0.617) 
    
Observations 527 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table7 –Nonlinear and Threshold Contagion 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02 -0.02** 
 (0.015) (0.007) 
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold -0.00  
 (0.013)  
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04 0.05 
 (0.048) (0.044) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.085) (0.085) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 
 (0.054) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Votes_Over_Electoral_Threshold*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.001)  
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Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.00 
  (0.001) 
2.country 0.11 0.08 
 (0.181) (0.166) 
3.country -0.09 -0.10 
 (0.118) (0.119) 
4.country -0.24 -0.25 
 (0.280) (0.278) 
5.country -0.16 -0.19 
 (0.199) (0.206) 
6.country 0.05 0.03 
 (0.195) (0.179) 
7.country 0.28 0.26 
 (0.174) (0.172) 
8.country 0.01 0.02 
 (0.117) (0.115) 
10.country 0.34* 0.33* 
 (0.151) (0.138) 
11.country -0.16 -0.17 
 (0.220) (0.224) 
12.country 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.211) (0.198) 
13.country -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.264) (0.224) 
14.country 0.16 0.18 
 (0.224) (0.220) 
16.country 0.36 0.36 
 (0.188) (0.193) 
Constant 0.76 0.67 
 (0.655) (0.654) 
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table  8 – The Motivations behind party responses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02* -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.046) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.090) (0.091) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
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 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) 
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.15* 0.15** 
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Gov_Opposition*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.01    
 (0.012)    
2.country 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 
 (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) (0.168) 
3.country -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.07 
 (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.119) 
4.country -0.24 -0.26 -0.12 -0.11 
 (0.279) (0.280) (0.296) (0.308) 
5.country -0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.207) (0.208) (0.212) (0.218) 
6.country 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 
 (0.177) (0.178) (0.198) (0.208) 
7.country 0.27 0.26 0.32 0.34 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.202) (0.197) 
8.country 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.115) (0.113) (0.129) (0.127) 
10.country 0.32* 0.32* 0.30* 0.33* 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.138) (0.139) 
11.country -0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.16 
 (0.222) (0.223) (0.229) (0.230) 
12.country 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.199) (0.198) (0.200) (0.203) 
13.country -0.08 -0.06 -0.10 -0.04 
 (0.235) (0.231) (0.242) (0.237) 
14.country 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.221) (0.225) 
16.country 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.39 
 (0.193) (0.191) (0.194) (0.196) 
Party_votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  0.00   
  (0.001)   
Relative_Votechange   0.00  
   (0.003)  
Relative_Votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP   0.00  
   (0.000)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange    0.00* 
    (0.000) 
Relative_Percent_Votechange*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP    -0.00 
    (0.000) 
Constant 0.74 0.70 0.76 0.72 
 (0.673) (0.670) (0.688) (0.704) 
     
Observations 527 527 508 497 
R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 
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Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table  9 – The Motivations behind party responses (B) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.092) (0.092) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Gov_Opposition 0.14* 0.15** 0.15* 0.15** 
 (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01   
 (0.004) (0.004)   
Gov_Opposition*Votechange_All_ES_Parties 0.01    
 (0.010)    
2.country 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 
 (0.163) (0.163) (0.164) (0.163) 
3.country -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.117) (0.116) 
4.country -0.23 -0.22 -0.07 -0.08 
 (0.282) (0.284) (0.301) (0.316) 
5.country -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
 (0.193) (0.194) (0.195) (0.204) 
6.country 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.180) (0.182) (0.203) (0.213) 
7.country 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.36 
 (0.187) (0.186) (0.215) (0.209) 
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8.country 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
 (0.110) (0.108) (0.120) (0.118) 
10.country 0.31* 0.32* 0.30* 0.33* 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) 
11.country -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.219) (0.219) 
12.country 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.200) 
13.country -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 
 (0.221) (0.220) (0.227) (0.219) 
14.country 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 
 (0.224) (0.224) (0.227) (0.231) 
16.country 0.37* 0.35 0.36 0.38* 
 (0.181) (0.178) (0.181) (0.183) 
Party_votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.00   
  (0.000)   
Relative_Votechange   0.00  
   (0.003)  
Relative_Votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties   0.00  
   (0.000)  
Relative_Percent_Votechange    0.00* 
    (0.000) 
Relative_Percent_Votechange*Votechange_All_ES_Parties    -0.00* 
    (0.000) 
Constant 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.78 
 (0.615) (0.611) (0.622) (0.632) 
     
Observations 527 527 508 497 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 – Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02* -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.011) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.05 0.10 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.075) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.03 -0.03 -0.12 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.110) 
Time -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
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 (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
unemployment 0.03 0.03 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05***  
 (0.014) (0.014)  
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.09 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.068) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Party_vote*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00   
 (0.000)   
2.country 0.09 0.09 0.21 
 (0.166) (0.165) (0.216) 
3.country -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.158) 
4.country -0.24 -0.24 -0.05 
 (0.278) (0.278) (0.291) 
5.country -0.17 -0.17 -0.31 
 (0.207) (0.207) (0.264) 
6.country 0.02 0.02 0.25 
 (0.177) (0.177) (0.265) 
7.country 0.27 0.27 0.22 
 (0.174) (0.174) (0.225) 
8.country 0.00 -0.00 -0.03 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.175) 
10.country 0.32* 0.32* 0.34 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.183) 
11.country -0.15 -0.15 0.17 
 (0.222) (0.221) (0.258) 
12.country 0.00 0.00 0.23 
 (0.199) (0.197) (0.192) 
13.country -0.07 -0.08 0.09 
 (0.235) (0.235) (0.227) 
14.country 0.16 0.16 0.19 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.201) 
16.country 0.36 0.36 0.22 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.146) 
Left_Right*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP  -0.00  
  (0.003)  
galtan   -0.03** 
   (0.010) 
galtan*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP   -0.00 
   (0.002) 
Constant 0.73 0.73 0.23 
 (0.672) (0.672) (0.562) 
    
Observations 527 527 340 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.11 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 11- Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.02* -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties 0.03 0.03 0.06 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.084) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.091) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 0.00 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05***  
 (0.014) (0.014)  
Gov_Opposition 0.15** 0.15** 0.11 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.070) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Party_vote*Votechange_All_ES_Parties 0.00   
 (0.000)   
2.country 0.13 0.12 0.18 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.198) 
3.country -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.115) (0.114) (0.159) 
4.country -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 
 (0.282) (0.282) (0.295) 
5.country -0.14 -0.14 -0.31 
 (0.193) (0.193) (0.247) 
6.country 0.01 0.01 0.04 
 (0.183) (0.182) (0.253) 
7.country 0.28 0.28 0.22 
 (0.185) (0.186) (0.239) 
8.country 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.150) 
10.country 0.32* 0.32* 0.23 
 (0.131) (0.131) (0.148) 
11.country -0.14 -0.14 0.04 
 (0.214) (0.213) (0.247) 
12.country 0.01 0.01 0.20 
 (0.196) (0.194) (0.190) 
13.country -0.05 -0.06 0.05 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.231) 
14.country 0.13 0.13 0.08 
 (0.225) (0.223) (0.189) 
16.country 0.36* 0.36* 0.15 
 (0.179) (0.180) (0.147) 
Left_Right*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.00  
  (0.003)  
galtan   -0.03** 
   (0.010) 
galtan*Votechange_All_ES_Parties   -0.00 
   (0.002) 
Constant 0.78 0.78 0.11 
 (0.612) (0.612) (0.515) 
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Observations 527 527 340 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.10 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 – who is stealing votes from whom? 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES -0.01 -0.03**   
 (0.021) (0.010)   
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.007) (0.019)   
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.05 0.05   
 (0.045) (0.045)   
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.01   
 (0.089) (0.090)   
Time -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.03* 0.03* 0.02 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.14* 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.054) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES*Left_Right -0.00    
 (0.004)    
2.country 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.166) (0.166) 
3.country -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.114) (0.114) 
4.country -0.32 -0.32 -0.21 -0.21 
 (0.287) (0.288) (0.286) (0.286) 
5.country -0.23 -0.23 -0.14 -0.14 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.201) (0.201) 
6.country -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.196) (0.196) (0.188) (0.189) 
7.country 0.14 0.13 0.25 0.25 
 (0.159) (0.158) (0.184) (0.183) 
8.country 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.112) (0.112) 
10.country 0.37* 0.37* 0.33* 0.34* 
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.138) (0.139) 
11.country -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 
 (0.224) (0.225) (0.220) (0.221) 
12.country -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.207) (0.207) (0.218) (0.217) 
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13.country -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.09 
 (0.223) (0.224) (0.217) (0.217) 
14.country 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
 (0.241) (0.242) (0.231) (0.232) 
16.country 0.37 0.37 0.32 0.33 
 (0.197) (0.199) (0.185) (0.186) 
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES*Left_Right  0.00   
  (0.004)   
Votechange_All_Left_ES   -0.02 -0.03** 
   (0.022) (0.010) 
Votechange_All_Right_ES   -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.006) (0.018) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties   0.04 0.04 
   (0.044) (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties   -0.04 -0.04 
   (0.086) (0.087) 
Votechange_All_Left_ES*Left_Right   -0.00  
   (0.004)  
Votechange_All_Right_ES*Left_Right    0.00 
    (0.003) 
Constant 0.57 0.57 0.82 0.82 
 (0.700) (0.698) (0.619) (0.617) 
     
Observations 517 517 525 525 
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 13 – the Geographical take on Eurosceptic Contagion 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES  -0.03 -0.02** 
  (0.015) (0.008) 
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) 
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.051) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
unemployment 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Left_Right -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) 
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Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_Biggest_Left_ES*South_EU  0.01  
  (0.017)  
South_EU -0.14 -0.12 -0.12 
 (0.092) (0.093) (0.091) 
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*   
 (0.007)   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP*South_EU 0.01   
 (0.012)   
Votechange_Biggest_Right_ES*South_EU   0.01 
   (0.008) 
Constant 0.62 0.60 0.60 
 (0.433) (0.455) (0.441) 
    
Observations 527 517 517 
R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table 14 – the Geographical take on Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
Votechange_All_Left_ES  -0.04** -0.03** 
  (0.013) (0.009) 
Votechange_All_Right_ES  -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) 
Time -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
unemployment 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Left_Right -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** 
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 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.17** 0.15** 0.16** 
 (0.058) (0.055) (0.057) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Votechange_All_Left_ES*South_EU  0.03  
  (0.015)  
South_EU -0.13 -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Votechange_All_ES_Parties -0.02*   
 (0.008)   
Votechange_All_ES_Parties*South_EU 0.00   
 (0.009)   
Votechange_All_Right_ES*South_EU   0.01 
   (0.010) 
Constant 0.62 0.61 0.63 
 (0.403) (0.387) (0.394) 
    
Observations 527 525 525 
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Table 16 – Proportionality and National Elections 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP -0.02*  
 (0.009)  
System_proportionality -0.03* -0.04** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.02  
 (0.045)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.087)  
Time -0.02 -0.02 
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 (0.025) (0.023) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
unemployment 0.02 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.05*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
Gov_Opposition 0.16** 0.17** 
 (0.051) (0.051) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.01 0.01 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
System_proportionality*Votechange_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.00  
 (0.002)  
2.country -0.06 -0.07 
 (0.192) (0.196) 
3.country -0.11 -0.09 
 (0.123) (0.122) 
4.country -0.20 -0.15 
 (0.279) (0.280) 
5.country -0.07 -0.03 
 (0.218) (0.204) 
6.country 0.35* 0.41** 
 (0.152) (0.155) 
7.country 0.32 0.33 
 (0.179) (0.188) 
8.country -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.115) (0.110) 
10.country 0.20 0.21 
 (0.141) (0.131) 
11.country 0.03 0.05 
 (0.188) (0.178) 
12.country 0.03 0.04 
 (0.200) (0.197) 
13.country -0.22 -0.22 
 (0.263) (0.254) 
14.country 0.04 -0.02 
 (0.223) (0.236) 
16.country 0.19 0.17 
 (0.192) (0.172) 
Votechange_All_ES_Parties  -0.02** 
  (0.008) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.01 
  (0.044) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.090) 
System_proportionality*Votechange_All_ES_Parties  0.00 
  (0.001) 
Constant 0.99 1.05 
 (0.706) (0.640) 
   
Observations 527 527 
R-squared 0.17 0.19 
Adj. R-squared 0.13 0.15 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 15 – Eurosceptic Contagion and EP elections 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.01  
 (0.005)  
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.11**  
 (0.042)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.02  
 (0.076)  
Time 0.03 0.02 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
unemployment 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Gov_Opposition 0.10* 0.08 
 (0.052) (0.053) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
2.country 0.24* 0.30* 
 (0.120) (0.128) 
3.country -0.01 0.06 
 (0.111) (0.118) 
4.country -0.13 -0.18 
 (0.229) (0.243) 
5.country -0.35 -0.29 
 (0.176) (0.156) 
6.country 0.23 0.17 
 (0.126) (0.129) 
7.country 0.22 0.22 
 (0.134) (0.142) 
8.country -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.095) (0.093) 
10.country 0.26* 0.24* 
 (0.115) (0.114) 
11.country 0.18 0.15 
 (0.142) (0.140) 
12.country 0.10 0.11 
 (0.162) (0.166) 
13.country 0.31 0.28 
 (0.171) (0.170) 
14.country 0.14 0.16 
 (0.119) (0.124) 
16.country 0.34* 0.30* 
 (0.132) (0.137) 
EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.004) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.09* 
  (0.037) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  -0.00 
  (0.076) 
Constant -0.67 -0.46 
 (0.525) (0.439) 
   
Observations 519 526 
R-squared 0.13 0.12 
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Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.08 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
Table 17 – Proportionality and European Elections 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.00  
 (0.007)  
System_proportionality -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Extremeness_of_Biggest_ES_Party 0.10*  
 (0.041)  
EU_Salience_Biggest_EuroscepticP 0.04  
 (0.080)  
Time 0.02 0.01 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
unemployment 0.04** 0.03** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Left_Right -0.05*** -0.04*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Gov_Opposition 0.11* 0.09 
 (0.051) (0.052) 
Party_vote -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Party_votechange 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
System_proportionality*EP_Votechange_Biggest_Euroscepti -0.00  
 (0.001)  
2.country 0.18 0.22 
 (0.149) (0.162) 
3.country -0.03 0.03 
 (0.115) (0.122) 
4.country -0.14 -0.18 
 (0.232) (0.241) 
5.country -0.33 -0.25 
 (0.177) (0.155) 
6.country 0.32* 0.30 
 (0.154) (0.156) 
7.country 0.23 0.23 
 (0.136) (0.144) 
8.country -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.098) (0.096) 
10.country 0.22 0.20 
 (0.124) (0.118) 
11.country 0.21 0.20 
 (0.144) (0.144) 
12.country 0.10 0.11 
 (0.164) (0.167) 
13.country 0.26 0.22 
 (0.196) (0.191) 
14.country 0.08 0.09 
 (0.147) (0.152) 
16.country 0.28 0.23 
 (0.147) (0.149) 
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EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.005) 
Avg_Extremeness_all_ES_Parties  0.07 
  (0.039) 
Avg_EU_Salience_all_ES_Parties  0.02 
  (0.082) 
System_proportionality*EP_Votechange_All_Eurosceptics  -0.00 
  (0.001) 
Constant -0.63 -0.39 
 (0.531) (0.448) 
   
Observations 519 526 
R-squared 0.14 0.12 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.08 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 18 – Eurosceptic Contagion and Dissonance 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
Dissonance -0.10 -0.25 
 (0.369) (0.502) 
Public_Opinion_of_EU -0.13** -0.13* 
 (0.039) (0.054) 
unemployment 0.11 0.34*** 
 (0.069) (0.094) 
eu_salience -1.05** 0.02 
 (0.323) (0.441) 
2.country -0.06 0.82 
 (0.705) (0.966) 
3.country -0.48 -0.21 
 (0.787) (1.077) 
4.country -0.26 -0.74 
 (1.266) (1.731) 
5.country 0.02 -1.60 
 (0.756) (1.035) 
6.country -1.01 -0.69 
 (0.709) (0.971) 
7.country 3.28*** 2.54* 
 (0.824) (1.127) 
8.country 1.60* 1.85 
 (0.710) (0.970) 
10.country 3.09*** 5.41*** 
 (0.791) (1.082) 
11.country 0.53 2.31 
 (1.042) (1.425) 
12.country -0.22 0.06 
 (0.810) (1.109) 
13.country -4.02*** -2.56 
 (1.143) (1.564) 
14.country -0.66 -1.58 
 (0.809) (1.108) 
16.country -2.74** -3.82** 
 (0.873) (1.195) 
Constant 10.35*** 5.31 
 (3.019) (4.119) 
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Observations 568 568 
R-squared 0.18 0.17 
Adj. R-squared 0.15 0.15 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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